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INTRODUCTION
Consumer rebates have evolved into a major marketing method. Although exact figures
are difficult to ascertain, estimates of total rebate offer volume now range from $4 to $10 billion
per year.1 According to one consulting firm, over 80% of consumers participated in rebate offers
in 2004, redeeming over 5 billion rebates worth more than $3 billion.2 The prevalence of rebates
within the market for consumer electronics and high-tech products is particularly pronounced —
one recent industry study indicated that 25% of all computer hardware product purchases almost
50% of personal computer sales included rebate offers.3 Yet despite their popularity, few
1

See Brian Grow, with Rishi Chatwal, The Great Rebate Runaround, Business Week, December 5, 2005, at 34
(citing “Hal Stinchfield, a 30-year veteran of the rebate business” who stated that businesses offer 400 million
rebates each year with a total face value of $6 billion); Howard Millman, Customers Tired of Excuses for Rebates
That Never Arrive, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 2003, at G9 (citing “industry analysts” for the proposition that $10 billion
worth of rebates were offered in 2002);
Over the last five years, rebate volume has been skyrocketing. The actual volume is hard to pin
down because it is only tracked by guesstimaters in the industry. One of those guesstimaters,
Michael Leonard, vice-president of marketing at Continental Promotions Group, says the volume
of rebates is about $4 billion U.S. today. Back in 1999, it was reported at just $1 billion.
Carol Vinzant, The Great Rebate Scam, Slate, Tuesday, June 10, 2003, available online at
http://slate.msn.com/id/2084210; see also Renee DeGross, The Spate of Rebates; More Sellers of Products Use
Them to Entice Customers—Some of Whom End Up Unhappy, Atlanta Journal-Const., Dec. 18, 2003 at 1C ($6
billion in rebate offers up from $3.3 billion in 1999) (quoting Peter Kastner, who is discussed infra note __). One
problem is that “industry associations and the vast majority of manufacturers do not maintain data on rebate
promotions, limiting the availability of market data.” Timothy Guy Silk, Examining Purchase and Non-Redemption
of Mail-In Rebates: The Impact of Offer Variables on Consumers’ Subjective and Objective Probability of
Redeeming 3 (2004) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Florida) (available through UMI Dissertation
Services).

2

See NPD Insights, Issue 2 (May 2005), available at
http://www.npdinsights.com/corp/enewsletter/html/archives/May2005/index.html; Peter K. Tat & C.H.Schwepker,
Jr., An Empirical Investigation of the Relationships Between Rebate Redemption Motives: Understanding How
Price Consciousness, Time and Effort, and Satisfaction Affect Consumer Behavior, 6 Journal of Marketing Theory
and Practice 61, 61 (1998) (“According to Donnelly Marketing Services, 85 percent of the responding firms in its
annual survey of sales promotion practices offered rebates to consumers.”); Peter K. Tat et al., Consumer
Perceptions of Rebates, 28 Advertising Res. 45, 45 (1988) (citing sources that claimed that 45% of households
participated in rebate offers in 1981, up from 27% in 1977). Peter K. Tat et al., Consumer Perceptions of Rebates, 28
Advertising Res. 45, 45 (1988) (estimating that consumers collected over $702 million in rebates in 1980) (citing
Jennifer Jones, Coupon Power (1981)).

3

See Stephen Baker, The Changing Role of Rebates in Technology and Consumer Electronics, available at
http://www.npdtechworld.com/techServlet?nextpage=viewpoint_body.html&content_id=2149 (summarizing survey
evidence); see also Adams, supra note __ (“Among consumer electronics retailers, rebate offers have become the
norm.”); Patrick Burns, “We Want Our Money Back” — Rebate Offers Are on the Rise, But So Are Complaints
About the Popular Incentives, Lancaster New Era/Intelligencer Journal, December 8, 2003 (“Nearly 75% of the ads
placed last year by retailers and manufacturers” of “[h]ighly competitive industries like electronics, phones,
2

marketing practices have received as much negative press as rebates. The difficulties of meeting
rebate redemption requirements have become a staple of consumer affairs and business columns4
and frustrated consumers frequently write into newspapers to complain about rebates gone
astray.5
Negative consumer sentiment regarding rebates goes beyond gripes in the press — each
year thousands of consumers complain about rebates to the Federal Trade Commission, state and
local consumer protection and law enforcement agencies, and organizations such as the Better

computers and software” included rebate offers, (citing Beyen Corp, a Niagara Falls, N.Y.-based market research
company).
4

See, e.g., See Steve Adams, The Check is in the Mail. Or Is It? As Rebate Offers Proliferate, Consumers Wonder
Whether They’re Worth All the Trouble, The Patriot Ledger, May 29, 2004, at 31; Catherine Greenman, The
Trouble with Rebates, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1999, at G1; Brian Grow, with Rishi Chatwal, The Great Rebate
Runaround, Business Week, December 5, 2005, at 3; Caroline E. Mayer, CompUSA Bound By Advertised Rebates,
The Wash. Post, March 17, 2005, at E1 Howard Millman, Customers Tired of Excuses for Rebates That Never
Arrive, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 2003, at G9; Bruce Mohl, If Rebates Annoy You, They’re Working as Intended,
Boston Globe, Nov. 2, 2003, at C1, Mike Musgrove, Rebates Fuel Sales, Frazzle Buyers, Wash. Post, Sept. 19,
2004, at F6, Don Oldenburg, The Rebate Check May Not Be in the Mail, Wash. Post, Feb. 1, 2005, at C10; Jane
Spencer, Rejected! Rebates Get Harder to Collect — As Cash-Back Offers Multiply, So Do Obstacles to
Consumers, Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2002, at D1; Joseph B. Treaster, Rebates May Save Money, Just Maybe
Not for You, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 2000, at H10; Companies Are Boosting Rebates to Drive Sales — and Driving
Many Customers Crazy, Newsweek, June 23, 2003, at 48; Alina Tugend, A Growing Anger Over Unpaid Rebates,
N.Y. Times, March 4, 2006, at C5.
5

See, e.g., Asa Aarons, Woman’s Being Seeing Red After Snail Mail-In Rebate, N.Y. Daily News, February 8,
2001, at 60; Catherine Greenman, Two Companies Agree to Send Speedy Rebates to Customers, N.Y. Times, Jan.
13, 2000, at G3; Sheryl Harris, Persistence Pries Loose Promised Rebate, Cleveland Plain Dealer Oct. 23, 2002, at
E1; Sheryl Harris, Avoiding the Pitfalls of Rebates, Cleveland Plain Dealer (Ohio), December 10, 2003, at E1;
Jolayne Houtz, Where’s My Rebate Check?, Seattle Times, Dec. 19, 2004, at M6; Anne Kandra, Rebate, Rebate,
Who’s Got the Rebate, PC World Online, July 1, 2000; Erik Lacitis, Reader Says, ‘Dude, What Happened to My
Rebate?’, Seattle Times, Jan. 23, 2003, at E1; Kevin McGurk, Consumer’s Copies Help Solve Rebate Runaround,
The Republic (Columbus, Ind.), Feb. 27, 2005, at D4; Nancy Paradis, Making Rebate Requests Less of a Hassle, St.
Petersburg Times, Jan. 13, 2005, at 2; Nancy Paradis, Another Obstacle Pops up on Rebate Course, St. Petersburg
Times, Feb. 19, 2004, at 2E; Nancy Paradis, Tardy Rebate Comes with Company Apology, St. Petersburg Times,
Mar. 1, 2004, at 2E; Nancy Paradis, Reading Fine Print for Rebate Didn’t Help, St. Petersburg Times, Feb. 13, 2004,
at 2E; Nancy Paradis, Rebate Offers Sound Great, but Can Be Tough to Track, St. Petersburg Times, Aug. 22, 2004,
at 2E; Nancy Paradis, Rebate Check is Accompanied by an Apology, St. Petersburg Times, Mar. 24, 2003, at 2D;
Nancy Paradis, Redeeming a Rebate? First Make Copies of All Paperwork, St. Petersburg Times, October 26, 2003,
at 2F; Nancy Paradis, Rebate Offer was for a Specific Product, St. Petersburg Times, Dec. 4, 2003, at 2E; Nancy
Paradis, Read Rebate Offers Carefully for Instructions, St. Petersburg Times, Nov. 20, 2003, at 2E; Nancy Paradis,
Another Cautionary Rebate Tale, St. Petersburg Times, July 21, 2002, at 2F; Nancy Paradis, Rebate Data Takes
Wrong Route, St. Petersburg Times, June 30, 2002, at 2F; Nancy Paradis, Customer Wants Rebate, Not Reward
Choice, St. Petersburg Times, May 27, 2004, at 2E; Nancy Paradis, Another Twist in Tough-to-get Rebate Story, St.
Petersburg Times, Feb. 4, 2005, at 2E.
3

Business Bureau. And these numbers are growing:6 the New York Times recently reported that
annual rebate complaints to the Better Business Bureau had increased nearly three-fold from
2001 to 2005 — from 964 to 2,715.7 Given the small stakes involved in many rebate programs
and the effort required to file a formal complaint, it is reasonable to conclude that the actual
number of consumers with rebate complaints is much higher than these numbers suggest.8
Despite rising consumer complaints about rebates, legal scholars thus far have not paid
much attention to consumer rebates,9 perhaps because rebates have escaped significant direct
legal regulation. But the dramatic expansion of rebate promotion usage and resulting consumer
dissatisfaction has begun to exert pressure on regulators and lawmakers to take action on rebates.
This trend is evidenced by FTC enforcement actions against rebate providers who have failed to
hold up their end of the rebate bargain,10 as well as proposed rebate legislation in several states,

6

See Adams, supra note __, at 31 (noting rebate complaints to the Federal Trade Commission as follows: 1,073 in
2001; 1,162 in 2002; and 1,982 in 2003); Sandra Block, Rattled About Rebate Hassles? Regulators Starting to Step
In, USA Today, March 22, 2005, at B3 (21% increase in rebate complaints to Better Business Bureau over previous
year); Patrick Burns, “We Want Our Money Back” — Rebate Offers Are on the Rise, But So Are Complaints About
the Popular Incentives, Lancaster New Era/Intelligencer Journal, December 8, 2003 (rebate complaints to
Pennsylvania Attorney General doubled from 2002 to 2003); Mayer, supra note __, at E1 (“A total of 1,710
complaints about rebates were filed with the Better Business Bureau in 2003 . . .compared with 964 complaints filed
in 2001. At the FTC, complaints about rebates for computer equipment climbed from 1,004 in 2000 to 1,857 in
2004.”); Carole Fleck, The Long Rebate Wait: Clip the Bar Code, Circle the Receipt, Cross Your Fingers, AARP
Bulletin, April 2004, available at http://www.aarp.org/bulletin/yourmoney/Articles/a2004-04-22-long_rebate.html
(“Matthew Gold, a lawyer with the Federal Trade Commission, says complaints about rebate offers nearly doubled
last year.”); Dan Zehr, Rebates Can Be Alluring, But They Play Hard to Get; Most Consumers Don’t Send in the
Forms, and Companies Count on It, Austin American Statesman, August 30, 2004, at A1 (587 rebate complaints to
Texas Attorney General from August 2002).
7

Alina Tugend, A Growing Anger Over Unpaid Rebates, N.Y. Times, March 4, 2006, at C5.

8

In 2004, the editor of one website devoted to consumer complaints claimed that he had received 35,000 complaints
regarding consumer rebates in less than two years. See Tamara Chuang, Improve Your Odds of Getting A Rebate,
Orange County Register, January 18, 2004, at E7 (claims made by Ed Magedson, editor of The Rip-Off Report,
www.ripoffreport.com).
9

One significant, recent exception is Jeff Sovern, Towards a New Model of Consumer Protection: The Problem of
Inflated Transaction Costs, 47 William & Mary L. Rev. 1635 (2006) [hereinafter, Sovern, Transaction Costs]
(discussing rebates as a method of exploiting buyers by increasing arguably unnecessary transaction costs).
Consumer rebates have been the subject of marketing and economics literature. See infra notes ___.
10

4

See infra notes __ and accompanying text.

including California and Texas,11 and a rebate law that was recently enacted in New York.12 As
more legislators and regulators begin to focus on rebates, they will undoubtedly ask how the
“problem” of rebates should be solved. In response, policy-makers likely will get ample input
from consumer rights advocates, who will be inclined to suggest additional rebate regulation, and
from business advocates who will recommend a laissez faire approach to rebates. This article
will focus on a threshold question in this emerging “rebate debate” that should not be neglected:
what exactly is the problem with consumer rebates? As this Article aims to demonstrate, there
are several distinct categories of rebate complaints, and how the problem of rebates is understood
should inform potential legislative or regulatory responses. In short, clear problem identification
should precede any rebate regulation.
The article proceeds as follows. Part I covers the fundamentals of consumer rebates. It
surveys the consumer rebate process and introduces the reader to the relevant marketing
terminology for the various forms of rebate redemption and non-redemption. Part I then
explores the reasons why manufacturers and retailers offer rebates, with particular emphasis on
the concept of economic price discrimination. In particular, Part I explains how rebates allow
firms to sell goods at different prices to different consumers, thus extracting a greater part of the
consumer surplus than would otherwise be possible under a uniform pricing regime.

11

California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and Texas Governor Rick Perry vetoed the proposed legislation in
their respective states. See infra notes ___ and accompanying text.

12

See NY GBL § 391-p (McKinney 2005), as amended by 2005 N.Y. S.B. 6355 (June 7, 2006). A research note is
necessary: At the time this Article went to press, there were two separate sections of the GBL, both passed in 2005,
with the same numerical designation: § 391-p. One section pertains to rebates, the other to the rental of previously
worn clothing. Presumably, this clerical error will be corrected by the New York State Legislature. If so, the GBL
section number referenced throughout this Article may change. In addition, NY GBL § 391-p (pertaining to
rebates), was amended by N.Y. SB 6355, but the amendments have not yet been codified. For the purposes of this
Article, however, citations will be made to NY GBL § 391-p, as if the amendments have been integrated fully into
the code.
5

Part II covers three of the major categories of consumer complaints regarding rebates,
that: (1) many rebate offerors and rebate fulfillment centers intentionally or negligently fail to
honor qualified rebate requests; (2) manufacturers and retailers complicate the rebate redemption
process as part of an insidious effort to reduce the number of successful rebate submissions, thus
increasing what is known as slippage or breakage in the marketing literature; and (3) it is unfair
or unethical to charge different prices to different consumers for the same product, as facilitated
by rebates.
Part III confronts the possibility that even without intentional inducement of rebate nonredemption, rebate offerors may be taking advantage of predictable patterns of sub-optimal
consumer behavior because some consumers will “irrationally” fail to redeem their rebates. Part
III, therefore, addresses two important issues: (1) why some consumers fail to redeem rebates,
despite their original intention to redeem, and (2) why some consumers fail to anticipate and
account for their own sub-optimal behavior in the purchase process. To answer these questions,
Part III confronts the complexities of intertemporal decision-making, by drawing on economic
and psychological literature literature on procrastination, prospective memory, prospect theory,
overconfidence, and temporal construal theory.
Part IV addresses the ways in which rebates have been and might be regulated to address
the various categories of consumer complaints treated earlier in the article. Part IV reviews
several potential regulatory approaches, including: (1) bans on rebates; (2) federal and state
unfair or deceptive trade practice litigation against rebate offerors; (3) legislation or regulation
aimed at minimizing irrational or sub-optimal consumer rebate redemption behavior; (4)
legislation or regulation aimed at rebate offerors to prevent the most egregious rebate abuses; and
(5) permitting the market to self-correct. By surveying the advantages and disadvantages and

6

disadvantages of various regulator approaches, Part IV endeavors to show how the precise nature
of one’s complaints regarding rebates should be linked to the design of particular rebate
remedies. The purpose of this part, therefore, is to provide regulators and legislators with the
information necessary to make enlightened choices as to the regulatory “fit” between purported
rebate problems and rebate solutions.
I. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF CONSUMER REBATES
A. The Rebate Offer and Redemption Process
1. Consumer Rebates Defined
A consumer rebate13 is a delayed incentive14 offered by either a product manufacturer or
retailer that requires consumers to: (1) make a purchase at a pre-rebate shelf price; (2) submit a
request for a refund amount by mail or the Internet to the rebate offeror or a fulfillment center
that processes rebates for the rebate offeror;15 and (3) wait some period of time after the purchase
and the rebate submission for the rebate offeror or its agent to send a rebate check or something
of value, known as the “rebate reward,”16 to the consumer. 17 Because of the delay in receipt of

13

This Article will only deal with mail-in or on-line consumer rebates; it will not address other rebates, such as
those granted by manufacturers to distributors or retailers or automobile rebate offers, which are significant but
distinct marketing practices.
14

See Dilip Soman, The Illusion of Delayed Incentives: Evaluating Future Effort-Money Transactions, 35 J. of
Marketing Research 427, 427 (1998) (defining delayed incentives). A recently passed New York rebate stature
explicitly draws the distinction between delayed and instantaneous incentives. See NY GBL § 391-p (West 2005)
(defining rebate as “an offer to provide cash, credit, or credit towards future purchases, that is offered to consumers
who acquire or purchase a specified product or service and that is conditioned upon the customer submitting a
request for redemption after satisfying the terms and conditions of the offer” and excluding “any discount from the
purchase price that is taken at the time of purchase”).

15

See Russell D. Bowman, Profit on the Dotted Line: Coupons and Rebates 206-07 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing the
role of third-party fulfillment centers in the rebate process).

16

See John T. Gourville & Dilip Soman, The Consumer Psychology of Mail-In Rebates: A Model of Anchoring and
Adjustment at p. 4, Working Paper, December 10, 2005, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=875658.
17

7

This process is outlined as a diagram in Appendix 1.

the reward and the risk that redemption will not follow purchase, rebates are often contrasted
with coupons, which have the characteristic of immediate redemption.18
2. Types of Rebate Redeemers and Non-Redeemers
The rebate redemption process begins with a product or good that is being offered to
consumers with a rebate. This article will assume that all of the parties to the exchange have
determined their reservation prices.19 For buyers, this is the maximum amount that they would
pay for the good, while for the seller it is the minimum price that he will accept for his product.20
At the outset, neither party knows the other’s reservation price (though they may attempt to
discern this information21). If a product is offered with a rebate, the consumers will fall into one
of two groups: rebate-dependent purchasers — those whose purchase decisions are influenced by

18

See Yuxin Chen, Sridhar Moorthy & Z. John Zhang, Price Discrimination After the Purchase: Rebates as StateDependent Discounts, 51 Management Science 1131 (2005); Gourville & Soman, supra note __, at 6; Sridhar
Moorthy & Qiang Lu, Coupons versus Rebates, forthcoming Marketing Science (unpublished manuscript, on file);
Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action
Litigation, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 991, 1023 (2002) (“Rebates are generally more administratively difficult than coupons
because they require the consumer to mail additional paperwork to the manufacturer and to cash a rebate check.”);
See Tim Silk & Chris Janiszewski, Managing Rebate Promotions: An Empirical Analysis of Purchase and
Redemption 3, Working Paper, Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia. (under review at Journal
of Marketing) (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file with the author of this paper) (“Rebates are distinct from
coupons because the effort required to obtain the cost savings and the receipt of the cost savings both occur after
rather than at or before purchase.’’); Silk, supra note __, at 5 (contrasting rebates with coupons); Soman, supra note
__, at 427.

19

This Article will not address how consumers arrive at their reservation prices. See Hyeong-Min Kim, Small Print
Versus Large Print: Consumer Evaluations of Different Rebate Ad Formats, 29 Advances in Consumer Res. 149,
149-50 (2002) (discussing internal reference prices and perceived transaction value); Tridib Mazumdar & Sung
Youl Jun, Consumer Evaluations of Multiple versus Single Price Change, 20 Journal of Consumer Research 441,
441 (1993) (“[C]onsumers evaluate a purchase price against an internal price standard (or reference price) and their
purchase decisions depend on whether the purchase price compares favorably with the reference price.”); Joel E.
Urbany et al., The Effect of Plausible and Exaggerated Reference Prices on Consumer Perceptions and Price Search,
14 J. Consumer Res. 95 (1988).

20

See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice § 1.1, at 4 (3d ed.
2005) (“A reservation price is the highest amount that a consumer is willing to pay for a product.”); Russell
Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 5 (2002) (“In any bargaining situation, negotiators have
a reservation price, defined as the maximum amount the negotiator is willing to give up or the minimum amount the
negotiator is willing to accept, as the case may be, to consummate a transaction.”).
21

See Steven S. Posavac, Overbidding in Value Elicitation: When Consumers Report Inflated Reservation Prices,
and What to Do About It, 11 J. of Consumer Psychology 87, 87 (2001) (“Estimating consumers’ reservation prices,
or maximum willingness to pay, for goods and services is an important endeavor for both marketers and economists
involved in public policy decision making.”).
8

the existence of the rebate, 22 and rebate-independent purchasers — those who purchase a product
without being influenced by the existence of the rebate.23 Rebate-dependent purchasers can
further be broken down into intended redeemers —those who estimate their probability of
redeeming at 100%, and probabilistic redeemers — those who estimate their probability of
redeeming is less than 100% but still sufficient to merit purchase.24
To illustrate, let us assume that a product is being sold for $100, with a $20 mail-in
rebate. The seller’s reservation price, the lowest price that he will accept, is $80, the shelf price
less the possible rebate amount. Further assume that there are four consumers in the
marketplace, each with different reservation prices as indicated in the following chart. 25 Finally,
for present purposes, assume that all of the parties are wealth-maximizing decision-makers and
that the price of the product is the only factor being considered in the purchase decision.
Table 1
Party

Reservation Price

Seller (S)

$80

Consumer #1 (C1)

$110

Consumer #2 (C2)

$90

Consumer #3 (C3)

$90

Consumer #4 (C4)

$50

22

See Silk, supra note __, at 5.

23

See id.

24

See id.; Silk & Janiszewski, supra note __, at 6; see also Gourville & Soman, supra note __, at 4.

25

Perhaps the least realistic assumption embedded in this hypothetical is that the transaction itself or the seller’s
pricing strategy does not affect the buyer’s reservation price.

9

C4’s reservation price, the most that C4 will pay ($50), is below S’s reservation price
($80), the lowest price that S will accept. As there is no price that is acceptable to both S and C4,
with or without the rebate, no sale will occur between these two parties. In contrast, we can
assume that C1 would make a rebate-independent purchase because the price without the rebate
($100) is less than C1’s reservation price of $110. This is not to say that C1 will not be pleased to
see that the rebate is being offered and that he may not attempt to redeem the rebate after
purchase; if he does so, we would refer to him as an “opportunistic redeemer,”26 because his
initial purchase decision was not influenced by the existence of the rebate. On the other hand, if
he does not intend to redeem the rebate, then he would be an intended non-redeemer, a rebateindependent consumer who purchases a product that is offered with a rebate without the intention
to redeem the rebate.27
Finally, S may make the sale to C2 and C3. Recall that both have reservation prices of
$90, so neither would make the purchase at the original, pre-rebate shelf price of $100. But the
$80 “strike price”28 (price after rebate) is less than their reservation prices. If C2 believes with
100% certainty that she will redeem the rebate and decides to make the purchase on this basis,
she is a rebate-dependent purchaser and intended redeemer.29 In contrast, let us assume that C3 is
not certain, at the time of purchase, that she will redeem the rebate; she thinks that there is a 60%
chance that she will do so. She is, thus, a probabilistic redeemer, and if she purchases the
product because of the rebate, she too would become a rebate-dependent purchaser.

26

See Silk, supra note __, at 5-6; Silk & Janiszewski, supra note __, at 6.

27

Id.

28

See Silk & Janiszewski, supra note __, at 7.

29

Whether such a decision is necessarily economically rational will be bracketed here. For present purposes, it is
sufficient to state that some consumers will decide to purchase a good because of the existence of a rebate.
10

3. Rebate Non-Redemption
a) Rebate Redemption Terminology
A brief survey of rebate redemption terminology is necessary before discussing
redemption rates, since the terminology is used inconsistently in the literature. When a good is
sold with a rebate, the rebate redemption rate is the number of successful redemptions divided by
the number of units sold.30 If 1,000,000 sales are made and 300,000 consumers successfully
redeem their rebates, then the rebate redemption rate is 30%. Incremental sales are the number
of sales that would not have been made but for the existence of the rebate offer.31 For example, if
a seller predicts that he would sell 750,000 units without a rebate, but the seller offers a rebate
and sells 1,000,000 units, the incremental sales in this case are 250,000 units. “Breakage” is the
failure of rebate-dependent purchasers to complete and send their rebate reward requests.32 This
definition excludes rebate-independent purchasers who do not attempt to redeem. Breakage also
does not include rebate-dependent and rebate-independent purchasers who try unsuccessfully to
redeem a rebate. At least three groups of consumers fall into this category. First, we have
purchasers who attempt to redeem their rebates, but fail to satisfy the technical requirements of
the rebate offer, resulting in a disqualification from the promotion and a forfeiture of their
rewards.33 This group is captured by the rejection rate — the percentage of rebate requests that
are denied due to purported consumer failure in the redemption process.34 Second, some

30

See Silk, supra note __, at 5.

31

See Silk & Janiszewski, supra note __, at 5-8.

32

See Silk & Janiszewski, supra note __, at 9 n. 7 (“Breakage is the industry term for rebate-triggered (i.e., rebatedependent) purchasers that fail to redeem the rebate.”); Silk, supra note __, at 2 (“[B]reakage … occurs when
consumers are enticed to purchase as a result of a rebate offer but subsequently fail to apply for the reward.”).

33

For example, the consumer may fail to include an original receipt or a bar code (“UPC”) from the product
packaging with the rebate request, thus leading to a rejection of the rebate request.

34

See Silk, supra note __, at 19 n. 1 (observing that “rejection rates typically range between 1% and 10% of
submitted applications and can reach as high as 25%”); see also Spencer, supra note __ (noting rejection rate of 15%
for one Nokia phone rebate promotion); TCA, http://www.tcarebates.com/new-program.htm (fulfillment center
11

consumers satisfy all of the rebate requirements and receive their rebate check, but simply fail to
cash it within the time period allotted.35 Third, some consumers appear to satisfy all of the rebate
requirements but the manufacturer, seller or the rebate fulfillment center fails to honor the offer.
Reasons for this failure might include the seller’s financial insolvency, negligence in rebate
processing or outright fraud in the rebate promotion.
It should be observed that news and marketing articles sometimes use the term “slippage”
instead of breakage, but this term lacks definitional consistency and precision. It is not clear
whether slippage is meant to be a synonym for breakage (covering only rebate-dependent
purchasers who fail to redeem) or whether slippage is the overall non-redemption rate (covering
rebate-dependent and independent purchasers).36 To confuse matters even further, some

website observing that rejection rates should average 12-22%);
35

See infra note __ and accompanying text.

36

A passage from an online dictionary illustrates this problem. It defines slippage as “[a] promotion marketing term
that describes when a consumer purchases a product because of an associated incentive, such as a rebate, but does
not send in the rebate form. Slippage is difference between the amount of incentives actually redeemed and the total
possible redemptions if at 100%.” http://www.marketingpower.com/mg-dictionary-view4135.php. But note that the
two sentences from the definition differ in key respects. The first sentence limits its scope to rebate-dependent
purchasers (those who are affected by the presence of the rebate offer), while the second sentence covers all
purchasers, including those who are rebate-independent. Thus, it is not clear from these formulations whether the
concept of slippage embodies more than the overall non-redemption rate. Other published definitions vary in the
extent to which they make clear whether slippage is limited to rebate independent consumers. Compare Bowman,
supra note __, at 196 (“[E]xperienced marketers know that more consumers buy a product to get the refund but for
some reason never follow through. . . . This is called slippage — the amount of product purchased by consumers
who bought the product in response to the offer but never took advantage of it.”); Marvin A. Jolson, et al, Correlates
of Rebate Proneness, 27 J. Advertising Research 33, 34 (1987) (defining slippage as “the proportion of consumers
who are enticed to purchase as a result of the rebate offer but fail to request refunds to which they are entitled”) with
Peter K. Tat & C.H.Schwepker, Jr., An Empirical Investigation of the Relationships Between Rebate Redemption
Motives: Understanding How Price Consciousness, Time and Effort, and Satisfaction Affect Consumer Behavior, 6
Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice 61, 62 (1998) (defining the slippage rate as the “percentage of consumers
who fail to send in the refund request from among would-be rebate seeking customers”). It is not clear, however,
who exactly falls into the category of “would-be rebate seeking customers,” and whether this term includes both
rebate-dependent and rebate-independent consumers. In another article, Peter Tat refers to the slippage rate as “the
percentage of consumers who fail to send in the refund request.” Peter K. Tat, Rebate Usage: A Motivational
Perspective, 11 Psychol. & Marketing 15, 17 (1994). This would seem to include both rebate-dependent and rebateindependent consumers.
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observers have referred to a distinct phenomenon — consumers’ failure to cash their rebate
checks — as slippage.37
b) Rebate Redemption Rates
Reliable rebate redemption rate data are difficult to obtain;38 few industry insiders have
systematically studied such matters and those with access to such information are not eager to
make it public.39 Based on a survey of rebate fulfillment centers, marketing scholars Tim Silk
and Chris Janiszewski state that rebate redemption rates on total sales ranged from 1.1% to

37

See Oldenburg, supra note ___, at C10 (“Then there's what the industry calls ‘slippage’ — the percentage of
people who get a check and forget to cash it.”); Grow, supra note __, at 34 (“Rebate checks that are never cashed are
called ‘slippage.”); TCA, http://www.tcarebates.com/new-program.htm (rebate fulfillment center website using term
in this way); Jonathan Sheldon & Carolyn L. Carter, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices § 4.6.3.2, at 221 (6th
ed. 2004) (referring to slippage as “rebate checks that are never cashed”). Some observers contend that rebate
checks appear to be junk mail, which can lead to their disposal. See James Gallagher, Consumers Often Find
Rebates Not Worth the Trouble, Augusta Chronicle, December 16, 2003 (quoting Paul Richard, the executive
director of the Institute for Financial Education); Richard J. Dalton, Jr., Many Consumers Never Cash in on Rebates,
Newsday, January 23, 2005 (“Some consumers receive the rebate but then forget to cash the check, an oversight
usually limited to rebates for $10 or less.”) (quoting Tamara Pattison, vice president of products for Cairo.com, “a
website providing deals at retailers”).

38

Several newspapers, including the New York Times, USA Today, and the Wall Street Journal have relied on an
industry analyst named Peter Kastner for a rebate redemption rate of 40%. See Kelli B. Grant, Mail In That Rebate
Fast, Wall Street Journal, May 7, 2006; Lorrie Grant, Rebates Motivate Consumer Choices; but Many Buyers Don’t
Bother with the Paperwork, USA Today, Mar. 1, 2004, at B6; Millman, supra note __, at G9; Tugend, supra note __,
at C5. Kastner also appeared on the NBC nightly news on May 25, 2003. Consumer advocates picked up on
Kastner’s 40% number as well. See Letter from Consumers Union to Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger Requesting
Signature on SB 1154 (Figueroa), Request for Signature, available at
http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/core_financial_services/001353.html (“[W]idely quoted estimates show that
60% of rebates go unfulfilled; 40 percent are never claimed and the other 20% are denied.’”) (citing NY Times,
April 17, 2003, quoting Peter Kastner of Aberdeen Group).
But the Aberdeen Group, with whom Kastner used to be associated, has denied ever researching rebates, leading one
author to call the 40% number an “urban myth.” Sheryl Harris, Avoiding the Pitfalls of Rebates, The Plain Dealer
(Cleveland, Ohio), Sept. 2, 2004, at C5 (citing Paula Rosenblum director of retail research at Aberdeen). In an email
correspondence, Mr. Kastner (who is no longer with the Aberdeen Group) stated that he had not done any research
on rebates. See e-mail (on file with the author). Yet, just recently Mr. Kastner, now a director at Vericours Inc.,
was quoted again in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal on the issue of rebates. See Tugend, supra;
Grant, supra.

39

Tim Silk and Chris Janiszewski’s survey of rebate fulfillment centers contains a telling bit of support for this
point: 80% of those surveyed indicated that they would benefit from additional research of rebates, but nearly 83%
of respondents stated that they themselves would not supply data on past rebate promotions and almost 69%
responded that they would not participate in a test market or field study. See Silk & Janiszewski, supra note __, at
25 (tbl 1). While writing this paper, I became aware of a rebate study conducted by a private marketing consulting
firm, NPD Group, but the costs of obtaining the study prevented me from reviewing its findings. See Baker, supra
note __ (discussing study).
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40.7%,40 which is consistent with the wide range of rebate redemption estimates that one finds in
scholarly works and press accounts.41 Perhaps not surprisingly, “promotion managers informed
[Silk and Janiszewski] that redemption rates tend to be ‘very low’ when the reward is below $10,
that rebates of $10 to $20 on a $100 software product range between 10% and 30%, and that
redemption rates on consumer electronics average approximately 40%.’’42 Redemption rates rise
as the value of the rebate rises ----- one industry insider asserts that rebates of over $50 garner a
66% redemption rate.43 Unfortunately, rebate redemption rates can be misleading because they
are distorted by the inclusion of two categories of consumers whose initial purchase decision are

40

Silk & Janiszewski, supra note __, at 8.

41

See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market
Manipulation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1420, 1450 (1999) (stating that manufacturers offer rebates because “only five to
ten percent of product purchasers actually redeem them” but “at the time of purchase … consumers anticipate the
rebate and perceive the sticker price as lower”) (citing William M. Bulkeley, Rebates' Secret Appeal to
Manufacturers: Few Consumers Actually Redeem Them, Wall St. J., Feb. 10, 1998, at B1); Jolson, et al, supra note
__, at 39 table 5(e) & 40 (self reported non-redemption rates of approximately 30%); Marlon Manuel, Rebate and
Switch: Money-Back Pitches Spur Sales Big Time, But the Promises Don’t Always Pan Out, Atlanta Journal
Constitution, January 21, 2005, at G1 (“Only 5 percent of eligible consumers file for rebates, estimates Marlene
Ferber, who's in charge of rebate delivery for ClientLogic, a Nashville processor.”); Mayer, supra note __, at E1
(citing marketing firm chairperson’s estimate that “about 30 percent of consumers actually redeem rebates”); Bob
Norberg, Rebate Debate; Manufacturers Betting Consumers Won’t Apply for Refunds, The Press Democrat,
October 28, 2002 at D1 (asserting that redemption rates are “just a few percentage points for rebates of less than
$10” and “100% for rebates of $100 or more”) (quoting Tom Edwards of NPD Techworld, a market research firm);
Silk, supra note __, at 7 n. 2 (“Redemption rates typically range from 2% to 40% depending on the product
category.”); Spencer, supra note __ (“Only 5% of offers are claimed by consumers, which allows companies to
advertise low prices without having to absorb the cost of a flat-out price cut. Claim rates rise with the value of the
rebate, but even on electronics, redemption rates are still only 40% on average, according to BDS Marketing.”); Tat
& Schwepker, supra note __, at 62 (citing 47 percent slippage rate); Vinzant, supra note __ (“Even with the most
attractive rebates, 10 per cent of consumers fail to get their act together to turn in the form. Often the failure rate
tops 90 per cent.”).
42

See Silk & Janiszewski supra note __, at 5; see also Mayer, supra note __; TCA, http://www.tcarebates.com/newprogram.htm (fulfillment center website noting that “[w]hen the dollar amount is below $10, redemption rates
decrease sharply); Vinzant, supra note __ (“noting that the rebate redemption “success rate goes up as the rebate gets
more valuable”).
See Mayer, supra note __, at E1 (“Britt Beemer, chairman of the consumer behavior marketing firm America's
Research Group, estimates that about 30 percent of consumers actually redeem rebates. The lower the dollar value of
the rebate, the lower the redemption rate, with rebates above $50 sometimes garnering a 66 percent redemption rate,
he said.”); see also Block, supra note __ (quoting Beemer). Due to high redemption rates one prominent Internet
retailer, Cyberrebates, went into bankruptcy after offering many products that were free after rebate. Peter
Edmondson, Free-With-Rebate Costs Web Buyers Some Big Bucks, Wall Street Journal, May 18, 2001, at B1.
43
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not motivated by the presence of the rebate offer: intended non-redeemers and opportunistic
redeemers.44 This presents problems for those designing rebate promotions:
In an ideal world, a manager would be able to monitor redemptions by
opportunistic redeemers and rebate-dependent purchasers so as to learn how to
discourage the former and encourage the later. Unfortunately, most firms do not
have access to this level of specificity in their redemption data. Still, most firms
are able to estimate the incremental sales owing to a rebate promotion. As such, a
metric of redemptions/incremental sales can be computed. Although this metric
includes opportunistic redemptions in the numerator, it is still a more diagnostic
metric than the redemption rate on total sales. 45
Questions regarding overall rebate redemption rates naturally leads to one of the most
important empirical questions regarding rebates: How much breakage occurs? Unfortunately,
this is not an easy question to answer.46 A firm can easily judge how many sales were made and
how many rebates were successfully redeemed. But breakage involves non-redemption by
rebate-dependent purchasers, and consumers do not identify their redemption intentions at the
time of purchase. Moreover, questioning consumers after they have failed to redeem their
rebates presents self-reporting problems because they may rationalize their failure to redeem by
suggesting that they did not intend to redeem at the time of purchase or they may not remember
their intentions at the time of purchase.47 With this in mind, industry insiders have estimated that
63.5% of non-redeemed rebates are due to breakage,48 and 36.5% of rebate non-redemption is
due to intended non-redemption.49 A series of experimental studies conducted by Tim Silk using
undergraduate students arrived at significantly different estimates of breakage. Three of Silk’s

44

Silk & Janiszewski, supra note __, at 7-8; Silk, supra note __, at 6-7.

45

Id.

46

See Silk, supra note __, at 7 (“[R]esearch has yet to obtain accurate measures of breakage.”).

47

See id. at 8 (discussing self-reporting of breakage found in Jolson, supra note __).

48

This was the mean estimate from a survey of rebate fulfillment centers. See Silk & Janiszewski, supra note __, at
4-5, 9 & 25 tbl. 1.
49

Id.
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experiments, which varied required redemption efforts and rebate amounts,50 generated breakage
rates of 33%,51 26%,52 and16%,53 respectively. These percentages are considerably lower than
the estimates by industry insiders noted above. The upshot is that more empirical work needs to
be done to establish the proportion that breakage (non-redemption by rebate-dependent
purchasers) constitutes of all rebate non-redemption. There is no doubt that breakage is a
significant phenomenon, but the exact extent of breakage remains unknown, a fact that regulators
and legislators may wish to consider before they attempt to intervene in the rebate process.
B. The Purposes of Rebate Promotions
1. Common Justifications for Rebate Promotions
Fully understanding the legal issues involving rebates requires an understanding of why
firms use rebate promotions. Common explanations for offering rebates include increasing instore traffic, introducing consumers to a new brand, generating or reinforcing brand loyalty, and
meeting sales goals for a particular period.54 In a sense, though, these generic reasons could

50

Silk attempted to isolate breakage from non-redemption by offering a purchase that was only attractive with the
rebate offer. See Silk, supra note __, at 22.

51

Silk, supra note __, at 30, 32, fig. 9 at 36.

52

Id. at 39.

53

Id. at 48. This study involved repeat purchasers. Id.

54

See Abdul Ali, Marvin A. Jolson & Rene Y. Darmon, A Model for Optimizing the Refund Value in Rebate
Promotions, 29 J. of Bus. Research 239, 239 (1994) (noting that there are “four basic mechanisms by which
promotions contribute incremental sales: brand switching, repeat purchasing (rebuys), purchase acceleration and
category expansion) (citing Robert C. Blattberg & Schott A. Neslin, Sales Promotion: Concepts, Methods and
Strategies (1990)); Ramon A. Avila, Joseph D. Chapman & Teresa K. Avila, An Exploratory Study on Consumers’
Attitudes Toward Rebates, 12 Developments in Marketing Science 273, 273 (1989) (rebates build product loyalty)
Peter K. Tat et al., Consumer Perceptions of Rebates, 28 Advertising Res. 45 (1988) (“Rebates are effective in
creating new users, brand switching, and repeat purchases among current users of a product…”); Peter K. Tat &
C.H.Schwepker, Jr., An Empirical Investigation of the Relationships Between Rebate Redemption Motives:
Understanding How Price Consciousness, Time and Effort, and Satisfaction Affect Consumer Behavior, 6 Journal of
Marketing Theory and Practice 61, 69 (1998) (“Rebates are typically offered to entice the consumer to try a new
product, or to increase sales in the face of competition.”); Peter K. Tat & C.H.Schwepker, Jr., An Empirical
Investigation of the Relationships Between Rebate Redemption Motives: Understanding How Price Consciousness,
Time and Effort, and Satisfaction Affect Consumer Behavior, 6 Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice 61, 69
(1998) (“Manufacturers are also interested in having consumers redeem rebates because it affords the manufacturer
the opportunity to make a positive statement about the product, service, or company.”);Wee, supra note __
(“Rebates have the power to instantly generate high customer traffic in retail stores. If the rebates are advertised
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justify many marketing methods. Given the administrative costs of rebate promotions,55 one
might ask whether a straight sale or a coupon with immediate redemption might be less costly
methods for accomplishing these objectives.56 However, rebates offer firms advantages over a
price cut or an incentive with immediate redemption. First, firms may prefer to use marketing
strategies that do not have a long-term affect on consumers’ perceptions of the “regular” sale
price of a product.57 Two scholars explain:
Rebates permit firms to lower prices temporarily without unduly affecting
consumers’ perception of the normal sale price. The advantage of a rebate over a
price cut for stimulating demand is that a rebate is a temporary inducement which
can be taken away without altering the basic structure. Pricing experts have
discovered that people are more sensitive to price increases than to price
decreases. Thus, the manufacturer who decides to reduce prices to increase
demand for a short period of time and later raises prices to former levels, will
meet more resistance than if a rebate method of price discounting is used. The
manufacturer has the best of both worlds when using rebates; price can be
temporarily reduced without reducing the upper price threshold. Because price
marked on the product never changes, the consumer is less resistant to paying the
usually marked price once the rebate is discontinued.58

outside the store premises, the customer traffic is made up of purposeful shoppers who are drawn to the store to buy
the special offers.”); see also Bowman, supra note __, at 22-25 (discussing promotion objectives for “refunds”).
55

See Ali, et al., at 240 (“The incremental costs incurred in rebate promotion include advertising, distribution, and
redemption processing costs, in addition to the promised refund.”); Vinzant supra note __ (“A store offering a rebate
must pay a fulfillment centre anywhere from 40 cents to $1.75 U.S. to process each claimed rebate.”). It should be
noted that coupon promotions also carry administrative costs. See Bowman, supra note __, at 201-06.
56

See Ramon A. Avila & Teresa K. Avila, Rebates: An Ethical Issue?, 1 Mid. American J. of Bus. 41, 43 (1986)
(“Instant rebates would eliminate many of the difficulties currently experienced as consumers would receive
immediate recognition of their purchase and an immediate refund.”); Vinzant, supra note __ (“The store doesn't have
any good reason to offer a rebate, since it could just as easily have a sale— if in fact it wanted you to have the
product at a lower price.”). These reasons are stronger when it comes to manufacturers. See Vinzant, supra note __
(“When a manufacturer offers a rebate, you needn't be too suspicious. The manufacturer wants to lower the price
temporarily (to move an old product or combat a competitor's new low price), but doesn't have faith that the retailer
will pass on the savings.”).

57

Keeping a list price high may lead consumers to believe that the product sold with a rebate at a higher list price is
superior in quality to a good offered without a rebate, even if the net price to consumers is the same. See Lynda
Wee, Can Asian Retailers Deploy Rebates As a Successful Sales Tactic?, Retail Asia, October 31, 2003. But this
does not explain why retailers or manufacturers would prefer a mail-in rebate over an immediate incentive.

58

Avila & Avila, supra note __, at 41 (citations omitted); see also Ramon A. Avila, Joseph D. Chapman & Teresa K.
Avila, An Exploratory Study on Consumers’ Attitudes Toward Rebates, 12 Developments in Marketing Science 27,
273-74 (1989) (making same point); TCA, http://www.tcarebates.com/new-program.htm.

17

Second, the rebate redemption process can be a method of gathering potentially valuable
information about customers, which can be used along with other available data for direct
marketing and advertising purposes.59 Peter K. Tat and & C.H.Schwepker note: “[W]hen the
consumer redeems the rebate the manufacturer has the opportunity to provide important
promotional information to the consumer. Indeed, some companies are finding that the
consumer can be reminded about complimentary products or on-going sales or product
information by providing appropriate information along with the rebate check.” 60 For example, a
computer manufacturer might use contact information on recent buyers to market additional
software and computer peripherals to targeted consumers. In addition, firms can learn how much
consumers spend during trips to different types of retailers, what types of products are purchased
together, and whether shopping patterns vary in different store locations.61 This information may
be useful for designing future sales and promotions. A seller who learns that consumers who
buy a computer printer often buy a ream of paper along with the printer, might offer a special

59

See Peter K. Tat & C.H.Schwepker, Jr., An Empirical Investigation of the Relationships Between Rebate
Redemption Motives: Understanding How Price Consciousness, Time and Effort, and Satisfaction Affect Consumer
Behavior, 6 Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice 61, 69-70 (1998) (“[N]ames and addresses obtained from
consumers who redeem rebates provide valuable information for a company’s customer data base.”); David Becker,
CNET News.com available at http://news.com.com/2100-1040-965514.html?tag=nl (“Rebates work as well as
actual price cuts in driving store traffic, but they have the added benefit for the publisher of providing useful
customer information from completed rebate coupons.”); Sovern, Transaction Costs, supra note __, at 1702
(“[M]erchants might attempt to rationalize the use of rebates by arguing that they generate mailing lists of
consumers who have purchased a particular product, and that such mailing lists are valuable.’’) (footnotes omitted)
(citing P.J. Huffstutter, O.C. Tech Beat; Freeafterrebte.com Offers What Name Says for the Record, Los Angeles
Times, July 12, 1999 at C1; Ellen James Martin, 100 Years of Cutting Along the Dotted Line; Cents-able: Since the
First 5-Cents-Off a Glass of Coke Offer, Coupons Have Saved Americans $4.8 Billion a Year, Balt. Sun, Dec. 27,
1995, at 1E; Stuart Silverstein, As Rebates Spread, Some Consumers Fume; Marketing: PC and Electronics Makers
and Sellers Have Joined in the Promotional Trend, But Sometimes the Money Doesn’t Arrive for Months ----- Or at
All, Los Angles Times, Dec. 13, 1998 at C1)); Wee, supra note ___ (“Rebate forms provide information about the
consumers and their consumption patterns. For customers who complete their rebates application, these completed
forms are a good source for building customer database [sic]).”).

60

Tat & Schwepker, supra note __, at 69; see also Joseph B. Treaster, Rebates May Save Money, Just Maybe Not
for You, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 2000, at H10 (rebate information can help firms “sell something else,” “determine
whether they are reaching their target audience,” and enable the seller to “persuade customers to try a product that
they might otherwise have passed up”).
61

See TCA, http://www.tcarebates.com/new-program.htm.

18

combination printer/paper deal or might simply display paper closer to the printers to induce
purchase. The direct marketing facilitated by rebates need not only benefit sellers; it also could
benefit consumers who are eager to learn about special deals and promotions offered by
companies from whom they are purchased goods or services in the past.62 The third and most
important reason for using rebates, rather than instant incentives, is to engage in price
discrimination. The next subsection addresses this point.
2. Rebates as Price Discrimination
It has become conventional wisdom within the marketing literature that rebates facilitate
economic price discrimination63 — the sale of the same good or service at different prices to
different consumers based upon their willingness to pay.64 The basic idea is that the consumers’
willingness to spend the time and effort to redeem a rebate can serve as a proxy for price
sensitivity or willingness to pay. Consumers who are less price-sensitive presumably are less
likely to redeem rebates, while those who are more price-sensitive are more likely to redeem

62

Though there are costs to consumers as well, such as sorting through a deluge of unwanted special offers.

63

See Yuxin Chen, Sridhar Moorthy & Z. John Zhang, Price Discrimination After the Purchase: Rebates as StateDependent Discounts, 51 Management Science 1131, 1131 (2005); Chakravarthi Narasimhan, A Price
Discrimination Theory of Coupons, 3 Marketing Sci. 128 (1984).

64

Economists provide a more precise definition of price discrimination. See Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination, in
1 Handbook of Industrial Organization 597, 598) (Richard Schmalansee & Robert Willig eds., 1989) (explaining
that economic price discrimination occurs “when two or more similar goods are sold at prices that are in different
ratios to marginal costs”) (citing George Stigler, Theory of Price (1987)). For examples of the economics literature
on price discrimination, see Lars A. Stole, Price Discrimination in Competitive Environments (unpublished
University of Chicago GSB Working Paper, Nov. 7, 2003, forthcoming in the Handbook of Industrial Organization,
available at http://gsblas.uchicago.edu/papers/hio-disrib.pdf; Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization
133-152 (1988); Louis Phlips, The Economics of Price Discrimination (1983); Dennis W. Carlton & Jeffrey M.
Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization 290-308 (4th ed. 2005). Helpful law review treatments can be found in
Mark Klock, Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 Tenn. L. Rev. 317 (2002); Michael J. Meurer,
Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 55 (2001); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price
Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 1205 (2001). In addition, an overview of
economic price discrimination can be found in Matthew A. Edwards, Price and Prejudice: The Case Against
Consumer Equality in the Information Age, 10 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2006). The term price
discrimination also has a legal meaning, which is quite different. See id. at ___.
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rebates. Therefore, by offering a product with a rebate, the manufacturer effectively sells the
same product at two different prices.65 As one article explains:
According to the conventional theory, rebates are a marketing tactic that sellers
use to price discriminate between high and low reservation price consumers. The
seller sells at the shelf price to those willing to pay more for the product, and at a
lower, rebated price to those willing to pay less, achieving the necessary
separation between the two groups by relying on the higher costs of redeeming
rebates faced by high reservation price consumers.66
This point can be illustrated with another simple example. Assume that the seller’s
reservation price, the lowest price that he will accept for a particular good, is $80, and we have
three consumers in the marketplace, Grover, William and Betty, with reservation prices of $100,
$90 and $80 respectively.67 The total consumer’s surplus available is the difference between the
least that the seller would accept from these three buyers ($240) and the most that they would
pay ($270).68 If the seller could engage in first-degree or perfect price discrimination,69 he would
sell the items for a total of $270 (the sum of the buyers’ reservation prices) and obtain the entire

65

See Avila, et al., supra note __, at 274 (“In many instances it appears that manufacturers increase demand for their
product virtually without cost, while consumers are led to believe that they are getting a price deal.”); Avila &
Avila, supra note __, at 42; Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alternative Explanation
for Recent Events in Products Liability, 8 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 34 (1990) (“[M]odern marketing techniques, including
coupons and consumer rebates, are easily and often directed at particular subgroups of consumers and have the
effect of offering the same products to different consumers at different prices.”); Sovern, Transaction Costs, supra
note __, at 1639 (“It appears that manufacturers employ rebates chiefly because they increase sales by creating an
illusion of a lower price while the transaction costs they generate permit manufacturers effectively to charge the
unrebated price to most consumers.”). But see Eitan Gerstner & James D. Hess, Who Benefits From Large Rebates:
Manufacturer, Retailer or Consumer, 36 Economics Letters 5, 5 (1991) (observing that price discrimination is not a
reasonable explanation for dollars-off rebates since most consumers are likely to redeem them).
66

See Chen, Moorthy & Zhang, supra note __, at 1131.

67

This basic example comes from Edwards, supra note __, at __.

68

See Dennis W. Carlton & Jeffrey M. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization 70 (4th ed. 2005) (“Typically,
consumers value the goods they purchase above the amount they actually pay for them. Consumer surplus is the
amount the price paid that a consumer would willingly spend, if necessary, to consume the units purchased.”);
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 279 (6th ed. 2003) (“Consumer surplus is a measure of the aggregate
value that consumers attach to a product over and above the price they pay for it.”).

69

See Edwards, supra note __, at ___ (under first-degree or perfect price discrimination “the seller extracts the entire
consumer surplus by ‘charging a different price for each unit of the good so that the price charged for each unit is
equal to the maximum willingness to pay for that unit’”) (quoting Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination, in 1
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 597, 600 (Richard Schmalansee & Robert Willig eds., 1989)).
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$30 consumer’s surplus. Assume, in contrast, the seller cannot determine the buyers’ demand
function, so he uniformly prices the item at $80 and makes all three sales for a total of $240.
Since the consumers, in the aggregate, would have paid $270 (the sum of their reservation
prices), all $30 of the consumers’ surplus has been allocated to the buyers.
Rebates offer a potential solution. The seller can offer the product at $100 with a $20
rebate. Grover buys the product because both the shelf price ($100) and the post-rebate price
($80) satisfy his reservation price ($100). William will buy the product if he believes that he has
at least a 50% chance of redeeming the rebate,70 since the post-rebate price of $80 meets his
reservation price of $90. Betty, with a reservation price of $80, will buy the product if she is
certain that she will redeem the rebate, since the post-rebate price of $80 meets her reservation
price of $80. So, three sales are made for a total of $300. If all three buyers redeem their
rebates, the average sale price will be $80, which meets the seller’s reservation price. The effect
is basically the same as an $80 uniform price: the buyers obtain $30 of the consumers’ surplus.
In the terminology discussed earlier, Grover would be an opportunistic redeemer, William is a
probabilistic redeemer, and Betty is an intended redeemer.71
Let us assume, however, that Grover does not redeem his rebate because he was a rebateindependent purchaser (his reserve price was met by the shelf price), while the rebate-dependent
purchasers, William and Betty, both redeem their rebates. In this case, the total sales prices will
be $260 ($300 shelf price less two $20 rebates). As opposed to the scenario with an $80 uniform
price (or 100% rebate redemption), the buyers only obtain $10 of the consumers’ surplus, the
difference between what they were willing to pay ($270) and what they actually paid ($260).

70

Assuming that we treat a 50% certainty of receiving a $20 rebate as equivalent to a $10 discount in the shelf price.
See Gourville & Soman, supra note __, at 4.

71

See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
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From the perspective of the seller, he has gained $20 of the surplus, since he was willing to
accept $240, but has received $260. The worst-case scenario for the seller (all three buyers
redeeming) was at least as good as a fixed pricing scheme at $80, while the best-case scenario
had the seller obtaining a significant portion of the consumers’ surplus. We can thus see why a
seller might decide to offer a rebate as a method of price discrimination, assuming, of course,
that the costs of administering a rebate program do not outweigh these benefits.72
3. Rebates as Exploitation of Suboptimal Consumer Behavior
Even beyond the normal price discriminating function of rebates, it could be argued that
another purpose of rebates is to enable firms to exploit the “irrational” failure of some consumers
to redeem their rebates resulting in breakage.73 Part III of this paper will address this argument in
great detail. To use the example from above, the seller’s reservation price, is $80, and the
consumers, Grover, William and Betty, have reservation prices of $100, $90 and $80
respectively. The seller prices the item at $100 with a $20 rebate. What if all three consumers
purchase the product but none of them redeem their rebates? (Put to the side why such arguably
irrational behavior might occur.74) The total sales price will be the $300 (three times the $100
shelf price), which actually exceeds their reservation prices ($270). The seller has obtained the
entire consumers’ surplus ($30), plus an additional $30 — the difference between the price
actually paid and the sum of the sellers’ purported reservation prices — a “bonus” due to what
might be considered a distortion in the demand curve.75
72

See supra note __ (discussing costs of administering rebate programs).

73

See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 207, 22729 (2006) (discussing distinction between socially beneficial price discrimination and marketing efforts to exploit
cognitive vulnerability).

74

See infra notes __ and accompanying text.

75

See Sovern, Transaction Costs, supra note __, at 1684 (“Consumers who intend to seek the rebate but never
bother, or fail in the attempt because they do not comply with arcane requirements, experience a distortion of their
demand function.”); see also infra notes ___ and accompanying text.
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II. CONSUMER COMPLAINTS ABOUT REBATES
Firms use rebates to stimulate sales, obtain marketing information and, most important, to
engage in price discrimination. This raises the question: what is the problem? Why do
consumers find rebates more objectionable than other marketing tools? This section begins to
answer this question, by focusing on the most conventional complaints regarding rebates, while
Section III will address more complex behavioral critiques of rebates.
A. Rebate Offeror Fraud, Negligence and Delay
The first complaint regarding rebates is the most straightforward: Consumers complain
that rebate offerors and rebate fulfillment centers fail to honor valid rebate requests in a timely
manner,76 if at all. Frustrated with rebate payment delays, observers have even suggested that
rebate offerors are hanging on to their money as long as possible, perhaps to earn additional
interest.77 Although there is undoubtedly some intentional malfeasance within the rebate
industry,78 it seems more likely that delays in payment to consumers are due to administrative
incompetence not duplicity.79 In particular, late payments from rebate offerors to fulfillment

76

See Block, supra note __, at B3 (“Many consumers complain that rebates take months to arrive, or never show
up.”).
77

See Rae-Dupree & Spring, supra note __(“'With money in the bank, there is no hurry to pay the rebates,’ says
Todd Fernandez, a financial analyst at Glass Lewis & Company. ‘Businesses can sit on consumer money [while it
earns interest] for a quarter, or sometimes two--a great way to facilitate working capital.’”); Treaster, supra note __
(“Finally, the seller has an opportunity to earn interest on the money until the rebate is paid several weeks later,
although some analysts say many manufacturers are not organized enough to put the check into an interest-earning
account while the rebate is processed.”).
78

See Sovern, Transaction Costs, supra note __, at 1642 (“One way to address rebates is to see them as a particular
species of fraud and deal with them through existing common law deceit claims and deceptive trade practices
legislation. Certainly some seller rebate practices violate these rules, and perhaps all do.”) (emphasis added and
footnotes omitted); see also Jonathan Sheldon & Carolyn L. Carter, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices §
4.6.3.2, at 221 (6th ed. 2004) (“Fulfillment houses that process rebates may even be paid a percentage of the
‘slippage,’ i.e., rebate checks that are never cashed, so they have an incentive to impede payment of rebates.”). But
see Janet Rae-Dupree & Tom Spring, Rebate Roulette: Still Waiting For That Check in the Mail? Here’s the Ugly
Truth About Rebates — And How to Steer Clear of the Gotchas, PC World, March 1, 2004, at 135 (comments by
Frank Giordano, founder and CEO of TCA Fulfillment, disputing claims that the firm intentionally loses rebates and
discussing his firm’s unsatisfactory rating with the metropolitan New York Better Business Bureau).
79

See Fleck, supra note __ (“Other companies don't set aside enough money for rebates, underestimating how many
consumers will submit claim forms. But some deliberately make it difficult to redeem rebates by imposing complex
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centers can result in delayed payment to consumers.80 FTC attorneys have been quoted in the
press on more than one occasion advancing the view, shared by industry consultants,81 that “most
companies that fall short on rebate promises are poorly managed — not underhanded.” 82
Fraud is not involved in most rebate problems, Mr. Gold said. “The biggest
problem is companies’ providing rebates late or not at all,” he said. “It's not
something we're seeing that they're doing intentionally — companies are not
entering the rebate program with the intent to rip off — rather, it may be a small
company that gets in over its head and may have offered a very generous rebate
that it didn't really prepare for.''83
Finally, it is possible that legitimate disagreements between consumers and the rebate
offerors as to whether a consumer has satisfied the rebate offer requirements can be perceived by
consumers as untoward efforts to thwart rebate redemption. For example, a consumer might send
qualifying terms and conditions.”).
80

See Tamara Chuang, Consumers Like the Discounts. Retailers and Manufacturers Like the Sales Boost. But
Nobody Likes the Rebate Paperwork, Orange County Register, December 4, 2003, at Business 1 (“Most fulfillment
centers won’t send out rebate checks until they’re paid by the manufacturer, which is where delays can set in. Some
manufacturers pre-pay, but others won’t may until the fulfillment center sends an invoice.”); Jonathan B. Cox, The
Lure of the Rebate Entices Many to Pay Full Price and Regret that They Didn’t Heed the Fine Print, News and
Observer, May 21, 2003, at F1 (“Checks can be delayed because fulfillment centers won't send them until they have
the necessary money from manufacturers.”); Fleck, supra note __ (“But increasingly, says Mike Leonard of the
Continental Promotion Group in Scottsdale, Ariz., which handles rebates for more than 400 companies, some
manufacturers are slow to pay the centers. ‘No fulfillment house sends out checks to the consumer until they've
been paid,’ he says, adding that it's an industry-wide problem.”); Millman, supra note __ (“‘Fulfillment houses have
to wait to receive the rebate money from the manufacturers, and that can cause added delays.” (quoting Frank
Giordano, president of TCA Fulfillment Service); Rae-Dupree & Spring, supra note __ (“[F]ulfillment houses can't
cut any checks until the sponsoring manufacturer or retail store hands over the rebate money, which can take
anywhere from 15 to 90 days after the fulfillment company's invoice date. If the sponsor pays the invoice with a
paper check, the fulfillment house must wait several days for that check to clear before it can write any checks to
consumers. Sometimes the manufacturer doesn't pay the invoice at all.”)
81

See Oldenburg, supra note __, at C10:
Paula Rosenblum, director of retail research at Aberdeen Group, a Boston-based market research
firm, doesn't think companies are intentionally ripping off rebate customers. ‘‘They are expecting
some percentage of consumers will space out and forget, some percentage won't bother. And in
some cases their requirements are so complicated -- like get the serial number off the hard drive
you've already installed -- that the rebate won't happen," she says.’’ They are relying on that. But I
don't see a lot of malice. I don't think they are intentionally not paying

82

See Fleck, supra note ___ (“’With larger companies, it's more of a bureaucratic problem caused by a lack of
planning,’ Gold says. ‘There's some negligence involved, but I wouldn't characterize it as anything stronger than
that.’”); Rae-Dupree & Spring, supra note __ (quoting Matthew Gold).

83

Tugend, supra note __; see also Spencer, supra note __ (“Part of the problem is that many companies aren't
equipped to follow through, says Michael Dershowitz, a senior attorney at the FTC. ‘They don't realize the demand
they're creating,’ he says.”).
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in a rebate request with a copy of a UPC code rather than an original as required by the terms of
the rebate offer. If the rebate offeror or fulfillment center denies the rebate, the consumer may
claim “fraud,” even if the rebate offeror believes that non-payment was warranted.84
B. Intentional Complication of the Rebate Redemption Process
Commentators and consumers contend that firms intentionally complicate the rebate
redemption process to: (1) increase the number of rebate requests that will be rejected on
arguably valid grounds; and (2) reduce the number of consumers who will complete the
redemption process.85 This is one of the most enduring complaints about rebate programs, fueled
by allegations of rebate instructions in tiny print,86 unavailable rebate forms,87 short redemption

84

See Millman, supra note __ (“Manufacturers and companies that process rebates say they are being blamed for
problems they do not cause. ‘Consumers complain because they don't receive their rebates,’ said Frank Giordano,
president of TCA Fulfillment Services in New Rochelle, N.Y. ‘’Maybe that's because they didn't buy the right
product, or bought it at the wrong time, or did not follow the submission rules.’).

85

See Avila, et al., supra note __, at 273 (discussing redemption requirements); Avila & Avila, supra note ___, at 42
(same); Mary Hunt, Be Vigilant About Filing For Product Rebates, The Cincinnati Post, September 2, 2003, at B8
(“[T]he conditions can be so rigid that it becomes nearly impossible for the average consumer to comply. And that's
exactly the way they want it. Manufacturers have a vested interest in making the rebate process difficult. They're
hoping we won't bother — that we'll lose our proofs of purchase and miss our deadlines.”); Mike Langberg,
Consumer Relectronics Rebates Rife With Abuse, San Jose Mercury News, December 17, 2004 (“This system gives
the industry an ugly incentive to manage down the number of rebate requests it approves, by making the process of
applying unnecessarily complicated and by using trivial technicalities to reject legitimate requests. No one keeps
statistics on this, but I've heard too many horror stories not to believe there aren't abuses in this largely unregulated
system.”); Oldenburg, supra note __ (“[I]n some cases their requirements are so complicated -- like get the serial
number off the hard drive you've already installed -- that the rebate won't happen. They are relying on that.”)
(quoting Paula Rosenblum director of retail research at Aberdeen Group, a Boston-based market research firm)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Silk & Janizewski, supra note __, at 14 (“The academic literature and business
press support the majority view that the effort and the complexity of the redemption task discourages consumers
from redeeming rebate offers.”); Sovern, Transaction Costs, supra note __, at 1640 (“Commentators claim that some
manufacturers, in an effort to make rebates even more profitable, impose time-consuming requirements on rebate
applications largely to discourage consumers from submitting them.”) (collecting sources); Tat, supra note ___, at
(discussing complexity and time consuming nature of rebate redemption process); Tat et al., supra note __, at 45
(same).
86

See Cox, supra note __ (discussing complaints over size of print in rebate instructions); Rae-Dupree & Spring,
supra note __ (lack of contact information and size of type on rebate coupons presents problems for consumers).

87

See Avila, Chapman & Avila, supra note __, at 273; Avila & Avila, supra note ___, at 42. There are laws that
address this. See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
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deadlines,88 and onerous or bizarre rebate offer requirements. A well-known Consumers Reports
article from twenty years ago provides some of the most outlandish examples:
Valvoline offered a . . . rebate with the purchase of 12 quarts of motor oil. To
collect, you had to send in a dated sales receipt for the 12 cans, plus the emblems
from 7 cans — and you had to do it within 30 days of purchase. Stripping the
emblem from the cardboard can require care: Cut too deep and the oil would leak
out…
Elmer’s used a similar theme with its silicone sealer: To get a $1.50 rebate, you
had to cut the price code from the tube and send it in before the expiration date.
Nice — as long as you’re using the whole tube right away.
Cepacol mouthwash has a subtle variation: To receive a $1 refund, you had to fill
out your name and address on a “certificate.” But the space for the name was ¾inch long, the space for the address even shorter.
The terms of the Kidde fire-extinguisher rebate were less subtle: you had to cut
the price code from the carton. But there was no price code on the carton.89
Outrageous examples of difficult to redeem rebates reinforce the notion that firms
routinely try to induce breakage, but regulators and legislators must consider whether these are
typical rebate offerings.90 While it certainly can be annoying to save receipts91 and cut out UPC
bar codes,92 on a “complexity spectrum,” rebate submission hardly seems to be one of the more

88

Rebate deadlines have also been shortened in an effort to increase breakage, see Silk, supra note __, at 8; Silk &
Janiszewski, supra note __, at 22 (Managers also tell us that they fear increasing the length of redemption deadlines
because they generally believe that giving consumers more time to redeem will increase redemption rates.”). But it
is not clear whether shorter deadlines have that effect. See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
89

The Rebate That Isn’t, Consumer Reports 67 (January 1986).

90

For example, Jeff Sovern notes that one “manufacturer instructed consumers to hold a bottle under boiling water
for five minutes to remove the neck label so it could be submitted to the manufacturer.” See Sovern, supra note __,
at 1641 (citing Edward J. Finn, The Great Rebate Caper, 131 Sales & Marketing Mgmt., Oct. 10, 1983, at 43).
Sovern is correct to note this admittedly ridiculous rebate requirement. But the article Sovern cites is from almost
23 years ago, and I think it is fair to ask whether marketing and rebate practices have evolved since then.

91

Sending in an original receipt can be problematic if the consumer has made multiple purchases that are reflected
on the same receipt and he wishes to retain the receipt for the non-rebated goods. See Avila, Chapman & Avila,
supra note __, at 274 Avila & Avila, supra note ___, at 42.
92
Consumers may not want to remove the UPC code from a gift item. See Avila, Chapman & Avila, supra note __,
at 274; Avila & Avila, supra note __, at 42. This does not deter some consumers. See DeGross, supra note __
(discussing consumers who cut out UPC symbol on gift to obtain $50 rebate).
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onerous consumer tasks, despite what comments in the press suggest.93 In addition, focusing on
outrageous rebate requirements ignores that sellers do have a legitimate interest in minimizing
rebate fraud, which is the main reason why original receipts and UPC box codes are required in
many rebate promotions.94 Nevertheless, the counterargument to this point is simple: it does not
matter whether or not rebate redemption requirements seem difficult in some objective sense; the
point is that these requirements do in fact stimulate breakage and that they may go beyond what
is necessary to prevent consumer rebate fraud. Before moving on, I want to make this point clear
— I have little doubt that there are rebates that are difficult to redeem and such obnoxious
practices should not be countenanced by the law. But arguments against rebates should not be
based on a parade of horribles from over 20 years ago, but rather on an honest appraisal of
current rebate practices.

93

See Harris, supra note __ (“We can't just blame ourselves, though, because some companies put on so many
conditions that rebates are nearly impossible to collect. Some won't accept copies of receipts, only originals, which
if you buy other stuff, you may be loathe to part with. Some rules require you to perform a surgical procedure to cut
UPC stickers off boxes - which may mean the manufacturer won't take the item back if a problem develops. Others
have long, involved forms to fill out.”). Given my lack of medical training, I suppose I should be proud of the
surgery that I have performed on product boxes to get UPC codes.

94

See Burns, supra note __ (rebate steps “greatly lower the chance of fraud”) (quoting Claire Rosenzweig, President
of the Promotion Marketing Association); Chuang, supra note __ (discussing rebate fraud); Mohl, supra note __
(“[M]any manufacturers believed that collecting the UPC barcode was the best way to prevent consumers from
collecting a rebate more than once or attempting to collect a rebate while returning the product for a refund.”)
(quoting Jim Sherlock, director of sales and merchandise at Staples); Oldenburg, supra note __ (“[W]hat appear to
be overly complicated procedures often are how manufacturers combat rebate fraud, in which criminals massproduce rebate forms and redeem them.”) (quoting Tim Silk); Wee, supra note __ (rebate requirements minimize
fraud); Cox, supra note __ (“Manufacturers require original receipts, box cutouts with product codes and other
information to thwart fraud. Without such requirements, consumers could return a product after they request the
rebate, bilking companies for millions or billions of dollars.”); Dan Zehr, Rebates Can Be Alluring, But They Play
Hard to Get; Most Consumers Don’t Send in the Forms, and Companies Count on It, Austin American Statesman,
August 30, 2004, at A1 (rebate requirements reduce fraud according to Brian Hatch general counsel at Continental
Promotion Group, which handles rebates for Dell Computers); Bill Husted, Cut It Our, Send It In: Use of Rebates
Climbs As Spending Dwindles, Houston Chronicle, January 27, 2003, at 4 (rebate requirements are fraud protection)
(quoting Ken Bernhardt, professor of Marketing at Georgia State University).
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C. Price Discrimination, Inequality and Market Power
Rebates facilitate price discrimination, which raises both consumer fairness and market
power concerns.95 First, one might argue that there is something inherently improper about
differential or dynamic pricing simply because it is wrong to sell the same good to different
consumers at different prices. Consumers certainly resent being charged more than other
consumers for the same good or service but price discrimination against end-use consumers is
not typically illegal,96 and economists would oppose a blanket prohibition given that price
discrimination can be either welfare enhancing or diminishing, depending on the context.97 Price
discrimination can enhance welfare by enabling a firm to sell its goods at multiple price points,
thus opening the market to those consumers who would otherwise be unable to purchase the
good under a uniform-pricing regime.98
One could attempt to justify rebate regulation by arguing that rebate offerors, as
practitioners of a form of price discrimination, possess market power, and that it is this market
power that is objectionable and which requires remediation.99 Building upon this theory, a critic

95

This argument is included here to provide a comprehensive overview of possible consumer complaints against
rebates. Although consumers do complain about differential or dynamic pricing generally, consumer rights
advocates have not advanced the view that rebates, in particular, are objectionable because they facilitate differential
pricing.

96

See Edwards, supra note __, at __ (“Although it is often lawful, price discrimination is extraordinarily unpopular
with consumers.”) (citing Jessica Davis, American Consumers Will Force E-Tailers to Just Say No to Dynamic
Pricing, 22 Info World (Oct. 9, 2000); Ellen Garbarino & Olivia F. Lee, Dynamic Pricing in Internet Retail: Effects
on Consumer Trust, 20 Psychology & Marketing 495, 501(2003); Michael E. Levine, Price Discrimination Without
Market Power, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 4 (2002)); see also James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis,
Price Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 2007, 2038 (2000).
97

See Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1449, 1506 (2004) (“As a matter of
general economic theory, systematic price discrimination can be efficient or inefficient depending on whether it
increases total output or merely reallocates output between buyers with different price elasticities.”). For a brief
overview of this issue, see Edwards, supra note __, at ___.

98

See Edwards, supra note __, at ___ (collecting sources).

99

See Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Are Not Predatory — And the Implications
for Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 YALE L.J. 681, 726 (2003) (“[P]ricing above cost seems to meet a
standard definition of market power, given the normal premise that firms in a competitive market price at marginal
cost. Relatedly, standard analysis assumes that an ability to price discriminate implies the firm must have market
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of rebates could conceivably take the position that rebates should be regulated or even prohibited
because they demonstrate, per se, the existence of excessive market power. Although the “price
discrimination equals market power” argument has appeal, in recent years, scholars have argued
that price discrimination can indeed exist in competitive markets.100 In any case, it seems rather
audacious to argue that all rebate offerors have market power,101 given the multiplicity of markets
in which rebates are offered.
III. A BEHAVIORAL CRITIQUE OF REBATES
A. Introduction
We have seen that consumers complain that firms affirmatively act to discourage rebate
redemption through the imposition of onerous fulfillment requirements and claim that firms fail
to honor legitimate rebate submissions in a timely manner. These are complaints about the
manner in which rebate offerors administer rebate promotions. But one can make an argument
that there is something inherently unfair about rebate promotions because some consumers will
fail to redeem their rebates due to a variety of psychological phenomena that lead to “irrational”
or sub-optimal rebate redemption behavior.102 As Jeff Sovern argues:
power.”) (footnotes omitted); Michael E. Levine, Price Discrimination Without Market Power, 19 YALE J. ON REG.
1, 3-4 (2002) (“In thinking about price discrimination, economists have historically constructed the following
argument: In a competitive market, price equals marginal cost. Wherever there is price discrimination, price
deviates from marginal cost. Therefore, if there is price discrimination, the market must not be competitive and
there must be market power.”) (footnote omitted).
100

See Jonathan Klick, The Microfoundations of Standard Form Contracts: Price Discrimination v. Behavioral Bias,
32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 555, 564 (2005) (“Although many discussions of price discrimination assume a significant
degree of monopoly power on the part of the discriminator, price discrimination can exist in a zero-profit
equilibrium in which total consumer welfare is improved relative to the nondiscriminatory case.”) (citing Jean
Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization 139 (1988)); see also Edwards, supra note __, at ___ (collecting
sources on the welfare effects of price discrimination).

101

The precise relationship between “market power” and monopoly has been the subject of discussion in the antitrust
literature. See Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 253, 257-60, 330-37
(2003); Andrew I. Gavil, Copperweld 2000: The Vanishing Gap Between Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 68
Antitrust L.J. 87, 102-03 (2000); Andrew I. Gavil, Integrating New Economic Learning With Antitrust Doctrine:
Exclusionary Distribution Strategies By Dominant Firms: Striking A Better Balance, 72 Antitrust L.J. 3, 11-14
(2004).
102
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The existence of sub-optimal rebate redemption behavior does not necessarily mean that legal intervention is

[C]onsumers who purchase an item in the mistaken belief that they will obtain the
rebate have suffered a distortion of their demand function; they have purchased an
item they would not otherwise have bought. Consumers who submit the required
form lose the time needed to complete the form; as discussed above, some of that
loss is a dead weight loss to society. The result is that the benefit to the company
is less than the loss to consumers.103
The next subsections discuss situations in which rebate redemption is rational from a wealth
maximizing perspective,104 and then explorewhy suboptimal redeeming behavior occurs.
B. Rational Non-Redemption
Some decisions not to redeem rebates plainly can be considered rational if we assume
that consumers are wealth maximizing.105 First, we have consumers for whom the costs of
redemption including redemption effort and opportunity costs106 — outweigh the benefits of the

warranted. This paper largely brackets important, broader philosophical questions about when regulatory
intervention is warranted based upon the teachings of behavioral economics. For discussions see Edward L.
Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 133 (2006); Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is
an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U.L. REV. 1245 (2005); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for
Paternalism, 97 Nw. U L Rev 1165 (2003).
103

Id. at 1704. Sovern argues that the harm goes beyond those who fail to redeem. See Sovern, supra note __, at
1685 (“Even consumers who obtain the rebate incur transaction costs that do not benefit society because they must
comply with the requirements for the rebate. If the seller simply offered the product at a reduced price, consumers
would not have had to fulfill any requirements to obtain the reduced price. Accordingly, the rebate comes at a dearer
price than necessary.”); Id. at 1685 n. 173 (“Only consumers who purchase the item never intending to seek the
rebate-that is, consumers who are willing to pay the higher price-suffer no losses because of the rebate offer.”).
104

For an excellent overview of various forms of rational choice theory, see Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen,
Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption From Law and Economics, 88 Cal. L. Rev.
1051 (2000); see also Thomas Ulen, Rational Choice in Law and Economics, in Encyclopedia of Law and
Economics 790 (Boudewijn Boukert & Geerit de Geest eds., 2000).
105

For this discussion, I am assuming that consumers prefer to pay the least amount possible for a product, taking
into consideration the costs of searching for and acquiring the product and redeeming any immediate and delayed
incentives. This is not to imply that it would be irrational for a consumer to consider certain non-economic factors
in the redemption process., such as the satisfaction that one receives from redeeming rebates. See Tat & Schwepker,
supra note __, at 69 (“[S]atisfaction with redeeming rebates plays a pivotal role in determining whether the
consumer will redeem rebates. . . . It appears that consumers who enjoy redeeming rebates are more likely to do
so.”).
106

The costs include finding the rebate and fulfilling the rebate requirements, such as filling out the rebate form,
cutting out the UPC code from the package, and assembling and mailing the required materials to the rebate offeror
or the rebate processing center. See Moorthy & Lu, Coupons Versus Rebates, supra note __, at 4.
Conceivably, a wealth-maximizing consumer could be irrationally rebate-independent. If the rebate amount
outweighs the costs of rebate redemption, one might argue that the consumer is irrational for not redeeming her
rebate, even if the existence of the rebate did not affect her initial purchase decision.
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rebate reward.107 A law firm partner who bills her time at $800 per hour might decide that her
time is better spent working on a major corporate transaction, rather than spending 15 minutes
cutting out bar codes, copying receipts and filling in a form for a $10 rebate.108 In addition,
recent work by Yuxin Chen, Sridhar Moorthy and Z. John Zhang suggests another class of
rational non-redeemers109 — consumers of experience goods110 who use rebates as “state
dependent discounts”:111
When consumers purchase an experience good on rebate, and consider
subsequently whether to redeem the rebate, their redemption decision will depend
on a number of things that were uncertain at the time of purchase. In particular, it
will depend on the consumer’s marginal utility of income after purchase, which
could vary depending on postpurchase consumption states. To the seller, this
presents an additional opportunity for price discrimination — not price
discrimination between consumers, but price discrimination within a consumer. It
can leverage the variation in the consumer’s marginal utility of income to “utility
arbitrage,” giving discounts when they are most valuable, and withholding
discounts when they matter the least. The net result is an increase in the
consumer’s up-front willingness to pay, which the seller can extract with a higher
regular price.112
In this case, the consumer’s preference for wealth maximization remains constant, but the
behavior necessary to meet this goal can change as the decision-maker obtains updated utility
information in the post-purchase period.

107

See Jolson, et al., supra note __, at 36 (noting that benefits of rebates include money saving, astute shopping
accomplishment, and utility provided by the product, while the “negatives” include refund processing efforts,
opportunity costs of time, risk of untried brand and pre-need investment and storage).
108

If the consumer gets an enormous amount of personal satisfaction from the rebate redemption process, one could
say that she was acting as a rational maximizer if she chooses to redeem. But then the consumer is not wealth
maximizing in the traditional sense as we are assuming here.

109

See Chen, Moorthy & Zhang, supra note __, at 1132 (“In our model, consumers are fully rational: they anticipate
their future redemption behavior and take that into account when deciding whether to buy the product.”).

110

Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy 5 (1999)
(“Economists say that a good is an experience good if consumers must experience it to value it.”).
111

See Chen, Moorthy & Zhang, supra note __, at 1132.

112

Id..
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C. Irrational or Sub-Optimal Non-Redemption
If we assume a consumer goal of wealth-maximization, a puzzle is created by rebatedependent purchasers who fail to redeem their rebates.113 Since the redemption value of a rebate
reward is fixed (it does not increase or decrease depending on when it is redeemed), wealthmaximizing consumers that have decided to redeem presumably would redeem their rebates as
soon as possible after purchase. The longer that a consumer waits to redeem, the less that the
rebate reward is worth.114 But we know that the facts do not bear this out; many consumers
delay, and a significant percentage never redeem their rebates.115 This raises two related
questions. First, why do some consumers fail to act on their previously formed intentions to
redeem their rebates? Second, why do some consumers fail to incorporate their knowledge the
possibility that they may not act their previously formed intentions into their decision-making
process?
1. Irrational Failures to Redeem: A Behavioral Account
Various strands of economic and psychological literature suggest that that the
fundamental structure of rebate promotions — a purchase with a delayed incentive — leads to
sub-optimal consumer redemption behavior and breakage.116 This section will discuss

113

Assuming that the rebate reward exceeds the costs of redemption and there is no post-purchase change in their
utility calculation. See supra __.

114

See Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., A Lawyer's Guide to Modern Valuation Techniques in Mergers and Acquisitions,
21 J. Corp. L. 457, 469 (1996) (“One of the basic principles of finance is that a dollar received today is worth more
than a dollar received tomorrow. This is because a dollar received today can be invested today and begin earning an
immediate return, whereas a dollar received tomorrow cannot be invested until tomorrow.”) (footnote omitted); Lisa
Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale L.J. 1981, 2043 (1998) (stating same basic
principle); Bernhard Grossfeld, Global Financial Statements/Local Enterprise Valuation, 29 J. Corp. L. 337, 350
(2004) (same).
115
116

See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.

Breakage can be optimal from a wealth-maximizing perspective if the initial decision to purchase a product due
to the presence of an associated incentive was irrational.
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scholarship on procrastination, overconfidence, prospective memory and temporal construal that
supports this viewpoint.
a) Intertemporal Decision-Making and Procrastination
Decision-makers are regularly confronted with choices that will have an effect on their
future well-being. We decide whether to eat chocolate cake today, knowing that it will affect
whether we can fit into our favorite suit or dress for a special event next month.117 We choose
whether to spend money today knowing that this will affect how much money we will have when
(or if) retirement arrives.118 We decide whether to have an unpleasant dental procedure today
knowing that it may prevent a more painful and costly emergency next year.119 Economists refer
to “decisions involving trade-offs at among costs and benefits occurring at different times”120 as
intertemporal choices.121 Whenever we make an intertemporal choice, we are serving multiple
masters — our present selves and all of our future selves.122 This leads to a fact with which we
are all familiar:

117

See John G. Lynch & Gal Zauberman, When Do You Want It? Time, Decisions, and Public Policy, 25 J. of Pub.
Pol’y and Marketing 67 (2006) (“A dieter may weigh the immediate pleasure of a luscious chocolate cake against
short-term weight gain or long-term problems of obesity.”).

118

See id. (“A factory worker may weigh whether to replace a two-year old car with a shiny new model against
driving an old car and saving for retirement.”).

119

See Manuel A. Utset, A Theory of Self-Control Problems and Incomplete Contracting: The Case of Shareholder
Contracts, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 1329, 1357 (2003).

120

Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting: A Critical Review, 40 J. Econ. Lit. 351 (2002). This article was
reprinted as Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting: A Critical Review, in Advances in Behavioral Economics 162
(Colin Camerer, et al. eds. 2004).

121
122

Frederick et al., supra note __, at 351.

See Utset, supra note __, at 1349-50 (“The intertemporal decision-maker attempts to satisfy her ‘current self’ and
her ‘future selves;’ she makes choices by taking into account both current and (expected) future preferences.”); see
also Katherine J. Strandburg, Privacy, Rationality and Temptation: A Theory of Willpower Norms, 57 Rutgers L.
Rev. 1235, 1242-43 (2005) The future is unknown, but economists assume “in situations that involve uncertainty,
people have well-formed beliefs about how uncertainty will resolve itself, and when new information becomes
available, they update their beliefs using Bayes’s law — the presumed ability to update probabilistic assessments in
light of new information.” Camerer, et al, supra note __, at 1215; see also Camerer, supra note __, at 596 (Bayes’
rule represented as a formula).
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People are impatient, they like to experience rewards soon and to delay costs until
later. Economists almost always capture impatience by assuming that people
discount streams of utility over time exponentially. Such preferences are timeconsistent: A person’s relative preference for well-being at an earlier date over a
later date is the same no matter when she is asked.123
But this economic model is incorrect. In reality, decision-makers do not exhibit time-consistent
intertemporal preferences, as Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin observe:
[T]here is a mass of evidence that intertemporal preferences take on a specific
form of time inconsistency: a person’s relative preference for well-being at an
earlier date over a later date gets stronger as the earlier date gets closer. In other
words, people have self control problems caused by a tendency to pursue
immediate gratification in a way that their “long-run selves” do not appreciate.124
The classic self-control problem is procrastination, which can be defined in both
economic and non-economic terms. According to the Nobel Prize winning economist George
Akerlof: “Procrastination occurs when present costs are unduly salient in comparison with future
costs, leading individuals to postpone tasks until tomorrow without foreseeing that when
tomorrow comes, the required action will be delayed again.”125 Psychologists, in contrast,
123

Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, in Advances in Behavioral Economics 223 Colin
Camerer, et al. eds. 2004) [hereinafter O’Donoghue & Rabin, Doing It Now or Later]; see also Ted O’Donoghue &
Matthew Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116 Quarterly Journal of Economics 121, 125 (2001) (“The standard
economic model assumes that intertemporal preferences are time-consistent: a person’s relative preference for wellbeing at an earlier date over a later date is the same no matter when she is asked.”) [hereinafter O’Donoghue &
Rabin, Choice and Procrastination]; Herbert Gintis, Beyond Homo Economicus: Evidence from Experimental
Economics, 35 Ecological Economics 311, 312 (2000) (“H. economicus has a rate of time preference that allows his
to allocate consumption over time in a consistent manner, reflecting his welfare and his concern for the welfare of
future generations.”). Manuel Utset explains how economists model this:
Economists have traditionally modeled this impatience or time preference using exponential
discounting, whereby future rewards decline in utility at a constant rate over time. In making an
intertemporal choice, a decision-maker undertakes a cost-benefit analysis in which she discounts
future costs and rewards to reflect the degree of her time-preference. A constant discount rate
implies that after the individual has made her intertemporal choice, her preferences (from a timepreference point of view) will remain consistent over the relevant period ----- i.e., an individual's
later preferences must coincide with her earlier preferences.
Utset, supra note __, at 1350-51 (footnotes omitted).
124

O’Donoghue & Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, supra note __, at 124-25 (footnote omitted) (citing sources);
see also Lynch & Zauberman, supra note __, at 73 (“Time-inconsistent preferences lead to problems of self control.
The problem is that the same decision between smaller, sooner and larger, later rewards appears different when the
smaller, sooner reward is close from when it is viewed as far off in time in either the future or the past.”).
125
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George A. Akerlof, Procrastination and Obedience, 81 American Economic Review 1 (1991); see also

explain the phenomena of procrastination as “the lack or absence of self-regulated performance
and the behavioral tendency to postpone what is necessary to reach a goal.”126 Implicit in both
the economic and psychological accounts of procrastination is that not all delay is
procrastination. Sometimes it is logical for a decision-maker to take the time to obtain and
assimilate information before acting.127 A CEO who delays a week before deciding whether to
oppose or support a major corporate transaction may be acting reasonably if she is waiting for
relevant materials prepared by her subordinates. This delay conceivably could improve the
quality of her decision making.128 Similarly, a consumer might anticipate difficulty in returning a
product without an original receipt or with the UPC code from the box cut out. Thus, he might
decide to wait until he starts using the product before redeeming the rebate to make sure that he
is satisfied with the product. Such delay would not constitute procrastination in the sense that
concerns us here.
But some people delay even when it does not seem to generate a strategic advantage.
One clever explanation is that procrastinators may receive some short-term emotional benefits

O’Donoghue & Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, supra note __, at 233 n. 16 (“‘procrastination’ means that an agent
chooses to wait when her long-run self . . . would choose to do it”).
126

Angela Hsin Chun Chu & Jin Nam Choi, Rethinking Procrastination: Positive Effects of “Active” Procrastination
Behavior on Attitudes and Performance, 145 Journal of Social Psychology, 245, 245 (2005); see also Joseph R.
Ferrari & Dianne M. Tice, Procrastination as a Self-Handicap for Men and Women: A Task-Avoidance Strategy in a
Laboratory Setting, 34 Journal of Research in Personality 73, 73 (2000) (referring to procrastination as simply
“delay in the start and/or completion of a task”).
127

See William J. Knaus, Procrastination, Blame and Change, 15 Journal of Social Behavior and Personality 153,
155 (2000) (“Not all delays represent procrastination. Strategic delays prove advantageous when part of the strategy
involves gathering, sorting and absorbing vital preparation information.”).

128

One must be careful about accepting the common procrastinator’s excuse that delay serves to improve the quality
of the procrastinator’s work, as some studies show that this might not be so. See Diane M. Tice & Roy F.
Baumeister, Longitudinal Study of Procrastination, Performance, Stress and Health: The Costs and Benefits of
Dawdling, 8 Psychological Science 454, 457 (1997) (noting that procrastinators end up producing inferior work).
Though there may be a class of “active” procrastinators who do thrive under pressure and accomplish their goals in
an impressive fashion. See Chu & Choi, supra note ___, at 247 (“Active procrastinators . . . like to work under
pressure. When faced with last-minute tasks, they feel challenged and motivated, and that feeling immunizes them
against the kind of suffering common in passive procrastinators.”)
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from procrastination.129 Watching television, reading blogs on the Internet, or playing with a
neighbor’s puppy, may be more fun than filling out rebate forms. Although this explanation
suggests that procrastination can be utility maximizing, the short-term benefits of procrastination
often prove ephemeral, and many procrastinators eventually suffer negative emotional reactions,
such as low self-esteem, depression and anxiety,130 especially as deadlines draw nearer.131 In
sum, unlike Homo Economicus, people procrastinate and feel regret for their procrastination.
We see this in the rebate context, where rebate dependent consumers may procrastinate until it is
even too late to redeem and then regret their failure to obtain the rebate reward — though they
may try to minimize these ego-threatening feelings by asserting after the fact that they never
intended to redeem in the first instance.132
b) Prospective Memory & Forgetting to Redeem
While procrastinators may put off redeeming (even until it is too late to redeem), other
consumers just forget to redeem their rebates despite their original intentions to redeem.133
Psychologists refer to remembering previously performed actions or events as retrospective
memory, while remembering to perform actions is prospective memory.134 If I ask you whether

129

See Chu & Choi, supra note __, at 246 (“[C]ompared with nonprocrastinators, procrastinators experience less
stress and have better physical health when deadlines are far off. In this sense, procrastination can be seen as a
strategy that they use to regulate negative emotions.”) (citing Tice & Baumeister, supra note __, at 454-58).
130

See Ferrari & Tice, supra note __, at 74 citing studies and noting that procrastination leads to “low self-esteem,
self-confidence, and self-control and high states of perfectionism, noncompetitiveness, self-deception, dysfunctional
impulsivity, depression, and anxiety.”); Chu & Choi, supra note __, at 246 (surveying advantages of
nonprocrastination).
131

See Tice & Baumeister, supra note __, at 456 (“Procrastinators may enjoy a healthy, stress-free life when
deadlines are far off, but they suffer more when deadlines are imminent.”); id. at 457 (explaining that the cumulative
effect of procrastination on stress and health is negative).

132

See infra note ___.

133

A person may be both a procrastinator and forgetful; a consumer could remember prior to the rebate deadline that
she wanted to redeem the rebate, but then procrastinate until she actually forgets about redeeming.

134

Gilles O. Einstein & Mark A. McDaniel, Retrieval Processes in Prospective Memory: Theoretical Approaches
and Some New Empirical Findings, in Prospective Memory: Theory and Applications 115 (Maria Brandimonte, et
al. eds 1996) (“Prospective memory is memory for actions to be performed in the future, such as remembering to
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visited the Eiffel Tower during your recent visit to Paris, you will draw on retrospective memory
to respond to this inquiry. If I ask you to pick up wine for tonight’s party, this will be a
prospective memory task. The terminology can be a bit misleading, though, since prospective
memory (memory for intentions) includes prospective and retrospective components.135
Remembering to remember is known as the prospective component, and remembering what to
remember, is known as the retrospective component.136 To use a common example from the
psychological literature, in remembering to give a friend certain message — the prospective
component is remembering that you have to pass along a message, while the retrospective
component involves remembering the message itself.137 A failure of either the prospective or
retrospective component can lead to a failure to act on previously formed intentions.138 Imagine
that Mary intends to give a message to Jim that he is to bring a bottle of red wine to the party
tonight. Mary might run into Jim and forget to tell him the message at all (“Oh, no! I just saw
Jim and I forgot to tell him to bring the bring wine to dinner tonight”) or Mary might see Jim and
remember that she was supposed to pass along a message but be unable to recall the content of
the message (“Hey, Jim – I know that I was supposed to tell you to do something, but I can’t
remember what it was.”).

return a library book, give someone a message, perform your back exercises, and pick up the children at work.”);
Melissa J. Guynn, et al, Remembering to Perform Actions: A Different Type of Memory, in Memory for Action: A
Distinct Form of Episodic Memory 25 (2001).
135

See Gilles O. Einstein & Mark A. McDaniel, Retrieval Processes in Prospective Memory: Theoretical
Approaches and Some New Empirical Findings, in Prospective Memory: Theory and Applications 115 (Maria
Brandimonte, et al. eds 1996).

136

See H. Shanker Krishnan & Stewart Shapiro, Prospective and Retrospective Memory for Intentions: A TwoComponent Approach, 8 J. Consumer Psychology 141, 143-44 (1999); Rebekah E. Smith & Ute J. Bayen, A
Multinomial Model of Event-Based Prospective Memory, 30 J. Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory &
Cognition 756, 756 (2004).

137

See Krishnan & Shapiro, supra note __, at 143-44.

138

See id. at 144.
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As the example shows, there is a special challenge in the case of prospective memory —
the lack of an external agent prompting remembering.139 If Jim asks Mary whether he needs to
bring anything to the party tonight, this will place Mary into “retrieval mode”140 and activate
certain mental processes that trigger remembering the message that she was supposed to deliver.
On the other hand, if Mary and Jim are talking about a motion picture that they both watched, it
is less likely that the reminder about the wine will come to mind (unless, perhaps, they are
talking about the film, “Sideways”).141 Consumers face similar problems when redeeming
rebates; the rebate offeror does not call you up and remind you to redeem your rebate. Thus,
unless the consumer designs and implements some system on his own, the consumer’s memory
must be triggered in the post-purchase period by an “event-based prospective memory cue”142 —
a reminder of the consumer’ previously formed intentions.143 For example, a consumer could
keep her unredeemed rebate materials on a bulletin board in her office, so every day when she
arrives at the office she will be reminded that she had planned on filling out the paperwork and
sending them in. Hopefully, the act of remembering the rebate will increase the likelihood of
remembering this same task in the future.144 Of course, just remembering is not sufficient —
139

Guynn, supra note __, at 25 (“[T]here is not an external agent prompting remembering. A friend does not ask
you, ‘What message were to supposed to give me?’ but instead you must remember on your own to give the friend
the message.”).
140

Id. at 26.

141

It is not surprising, then, that psychologists believe that the prospective and retrospective components of
prospective memory rely on different mental retrieval processes. See id. at 43-45 & fig 2.1 (comparing retrieval
processes for cued retrospective memory and prospective memory); Krishnan & Shapiro, supra note __, at 144
(“The two components are assumed to rely on different retrieval processes. Whereas the prospective memory
component is presumed to be relatively spontaneous, the retrospective memory component supposedly relied on
directed processes that probe for the content of the previously formed intent.”).

142

Richard L. Marsh, et al., The Dynamics of Intention Retrieval and Coordination of Action in Event-Based
Prospective Memory, 28 Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition 652, 652 (2002).

143
144

Id.

See Sendhil Mullainathan, A Memory-Based Model of Bounded Rationality, 117 Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 735, 741 (2002) (according to the principle of rehearsal “recalling a memory increases future recall
probabilities”).
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whether or not a consumer will respond to this cue will depend, in part, on what else she is
doing,145 and she still may procrastinate and fail to complete the task.146
c) Prospect Theory
The path-breaking work by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky on prospect theory147
and its scholarly progeny provide another theoretical basis for understanding rebate nonredemption.148 Prospect theory takes “a position that is diametrically opposed to the tradition of
145

Id.

146

Cf. Dan Ariely and Klaus Wertenbroch, Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance: Self-Control by
Precommitment, 13 Psychological Science, 219, 224 (2002) (“What is clear from our empirical evidence is that
procrastination is a real behavioral problem, that people strategically attempt to curb it by using costly self-imposed
deadlines and that self-imposed deadlines are not always as effective as some external deadlines in boosting task
performance.”).
147

See Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1115, 1117 (2003)
(discussing Kahneman and Tversky’s work). Along with Herbert Simon, Kahneman and Tversky were two of the
founding figures of the behavioral economics movement. Simon (1978) and Kahneman (2002) were honored with
Nobel Memorial Prizes for their scholarship; Tversky passed away in 1997, prior to the recognition of his
groundbreaking work with Kahneman. See Gregory Mitchell, Mapping Evidence Law, 2003 Mich. St. L. Rev.
1065, 1068 n.3 (“Daniel Kahneman received the Nobel prize in economics for 2002 for his research into judgment
and decision-making, an award which he would have shared with Amos Tversky but for Tversky's untimely death in
1996.”) (citing Jon E. Hilsenrath, Nobel Winners for Economics Are New Breed, Wall St. J., Oct. 10, 2002, at B1);
Guthrie, supra note __, at n. 10 (“Had he been alive in 2002, Tversky would no doubt have shared the Nobel Prize
with Kahneman.”).

148

Another possibility is that the manner in which rebates are accounted for mentally leads to breakage. For
background on mental accounting, see Richard H. Thaler, The Winner’s Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of
Economic Life 107-21 (1992) (discussing mental accounting); Richard H. Thaler, Saving, Fungibility, and Mental
Accounts, Journal of Economic Perspectives 193 (1990); Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, in
Camerer, et al., supra note __. A key assumption of traditional economic theory is that money is fungible. See
Sunstein, Progress Report, supra note __, at 129; Cass Sunstein, Introduction to Behavioral Law & Economics 1, 6
(Cass R. Sunstein, ed. 2000); Richard H. Thaler, Saving, Fungibility, and Mental Accounts, Journal of Economic
Perspectives 193, 194 (1990). But Thaler’s work on mental accounting suggests, to the contrary, that people
compartmentalize their wealth into different categories, thus violating principles of fungibility. See Marianne
Bertrand, et al, Behavioral Economics and Marketing in Aid of Decision Making Among the Poor, 25 Journal of
Public Policy & Marketing 8, 10 (2006) (“Contrary to standard assumptions of fungibility, people compartmentalize
wealth and spending into distinct budget categories, such as savings, rent, and entertainment, and into separate
mental accounts, such as current income, assets, and future income.”). Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole explain:
Ethnographic accounts document the prevalence, especially in poor households, of ‘mental
budgeting,’ the hallmark of which is a violation of the fungibility of money. Individuals or
families thus earmark certain sources of incomes to specific uses (primary wage earner’s salary for
necessities, secondary earnings for savings, windfalls and capital income for luxuries, etc.) or keep
in separate envelopes or ‘‘tin cans’’ the monies reserved for food, rent, school supplies, ‘‘fun,’’ and
the like.
Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Willpower and Personal Rule, 112 J. Political Economy 848, 853 (2004) (citing
Viviana A. Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money (1997)); Sunstein, Progress Report, supra note __, at 130 (“A
glance at ordinary practice shows that people often organize decisions in terms of separate budgets and accounts,
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explaining decisions by attitudes to wealth . . . . [i]n prospect theory, the carriers of decision
utility are gains and losses relative to a reference level, which is often the status quo.”149
Prospect theory involves a set of related biases that are often grouped together150 — the status
quo bias,151 endowment effects,152 and loss aversion,153 — which support the view that the
allocation of initial entitlements and how decisions are framed may affect decision-makers, even
though such matters should not be relevant according to wealth-maximizing versions of expected
utility theory.154 Jeff Sovern connects these biases to the rebate redemption process:

and they often segment these accounts. Some money is for retirement; some is for vacations some is for college
tuition; some is for mortgage or rental payments.”).
Perhaps, then, at the time of purchase, the consumer has a certain amount in his product acquisition mental account
and he is willing to credit this account with the rebate amount prior to purchase, redemption and reward receipt.
After purchase, for some reason, the consumer no longer views the rebate amount as part of his product acquisition
budget, but he fails to allocate the rebate amount in any other account.
149

Daniel Kahneman, Objective Happiness, in Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology 3, 17 (Daniel
Kahneman, et al., eds. 1999).
150

See Camerer, supra note __, at 669-70.

151

Korobkin, supra note __, at 1228-29 (“[I]individuals tend to prefer the present state of the world to alternative
states, all other things being equal.”); see also Colin Camerer, Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field,
in Camerer, et al., supra note __, at 154 (“Samuelson and Zeckhauser coined the term status quo bias to refer to an
exaggerated preference for the status quo …”) (citing William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in
Decision Making, 1 J. Risk & Uncertainty 7 (1988)).
152

Korobkin, The Endowment Effect, supra note __, at 1228 (“[P]eople tend to value goods more when they own
them than when they do not.”) (footnotes omitted ) (crediting Richard Thaler for coining the term in Richard Thaler,
Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 39, 44 (1980)); see also Daniel
Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase
Theorem, in Camerer, et al., supra note __, at 55.
153

Guthrie, supra note – at 1119 (“[I]individuals tend to value losses more heavily than gains of the same
magnitude.”) (citing Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
Econometrica 263, 279 (1979)); Jolls, et al., supra note __, at 1535 (“[O]ne of the central features of Kahneman and
Tversky's prospect theory is that people evaluate outcomes based on the change they represent from an initial
reference point, rather than based on the nature of the outcome itself; also, losses from the initial reference point are
weighted much more heavily than gains.”) (citing Kahneman & Tversky, supra at, 277-79)). Russell Korobkin
breaks loss aversion down further based upon various second-order explanations for loss aversion. See Korobkin,
The Endowment Effect, supra note __, at 1250-55.
154

Korobkin & Ulen, supra note __, at 1104-07; (discussing framing); Rostain, supra note __, at 978 (“Contrary to
the requirement of description and process invariance, experimental evidence establishes that preferences depend
importantly on how choices are described.”). But see Mitchell, supra note __, at 1961-63, 2005-11 (skeptical
discussion of framing effects literature); James N. Druckman, Political Preference Formation: Competition,
Deliberation, and the (Ir)relevance of Framing Effects, 98 Am. Political Science Rev. 671, 683 (2004) (“[F]raming
effects depend in critical ways upon context. As a result, framing effects appear to be neither robust not particularly
pervasive.”).
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At the time the consumer makes the purchase, the price looks like a loss, and so
the consumer experiences the rebate as a reduction in pain —making the rebate
attractive. By the time the consumer contemplates the work required to obtain the
rebate, the rebate seems less like a reduction in a loss than a gain—and that makes
it appear less important.155
Conceivably, the endowment effect is at work here — once the consumer owns a product
that was purchased with a rebate, the consumer values the product more as an owner than he did
as a consumer considering purchase.156 It is challenging, however, to determine whether the
endowment effect is at play rather than a valid post-purchase re-appraisal of a product post-based
upon the consumer’s experience with the good.157 For example, imagine a consumer with a $70
reservation price who buys a $100 computer printer with a $30 rebate. After using the product,
the consumer realizes that he would have spent $100 on the computer printer and thus he no
longer needs to redeem the rebate to meet his new reservation price. In contrast, imagine that the
consumer’s experience with the good does not change his impression of the value of the printer
or the price that he paid. But post-purchase, the consumer realizes that he has failed to redeem
the rebate perhaps due to procrastination or prospective memory failure, and thus that his
reservation price was not actually met. The consumer wishes to maker to minimize negative
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Sovern, Transaction Costs, supra note __, at 1656; see also Silk & Janiszewski, supra note __, at 10 (“In effect,
initiating the redemption process encourages people to reframe the rebate amount as a payment for the redemption
effort and assess whether the pay is sufficient for the effort.”); Soman, supra note __, at 429, 435; Jolson, et al.,
supra note __, at 35 (“A large refund offer may be capable of moving a price-sensitive consumer with nonexistent
for the product from unawareness to conviction within a few seconds.”).

156

Russell Korobkin surmises:
Perhaps loss aversion, and hence the endowment effect, exists because individuals form
attachments to what they own rather than as a consequence of negative emotions associated with
the abstract concept of loss. If so, an item owned will have a predictably higher value than the
very same item that is unowned. From this perspective, an unowned widget is merely a
commodity with a value based on its potential for use or exchange. An owned widget, however,
loses at least a portion of its commodity status and takes on additional value.

Korobkin, The Endowment Effect, supra note __, at 1251 (footnotes omitted).
157
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See supra notes ___ and accompanying text (discussing state dependent discounts).

feelings about the deal initially struck and experiences regret avoidance.158 Rather than feeling
self-loathing for making a decision contrary to his wealth-maximizing interests, the consumer
decides that the printer is worth $100 to him and that his reservation price was actually met — a
familiar type of rationalization.159
2. Failing to Plan for Failure
If we accept that some consumers will either procrastinate until it is too late to redeem
their rebates or will forget to redeem their rebates, this raises the following crucial question: why
do many consumers fail to incorporate their knowledge about possible procrastination or
forgetfulness into their decision-making process?160 If a consumer knows that she often forgets
to redeem rebates or that she puts off redeeming until the deadline passes — why would she fail
to account for these personal tendencies and ignore or discount the availability of the rebate
when purchasing a product?161
a) Overconfidence, Anchoring and Temporal Construal
Some consumers may be overconfident or over-optimistic in their predictions of their
own rebate redemption behavior, and thus fail to account sufficiently for the possibility that they
158

See Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules
and Form Terms, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1583 (1998); Korobkin, The Endowment Effect, supra note __, at 1254-55.

159

Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation, 117 Quarterly Journal of Economics
871, 885 (2002) (“Psychologists, and before them writers and philosophers, have long documented people’s
universal tendency to deny, explain away, and selectively forget ego-threatening information. . . . [A] lot of research
has confirmed that people tend to recall their successes more than their failures, have self-servingly biased
recollections of their past performances.”) (citations omitted).
160

Decision makers vary in the degree to which they are aware of their future self-control problems. See
O’Donoghue & Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, supra note __, at 126 (contrasting sophisticated, naïve and
partially naïve people); see also Dan Ariely and Klaus Wertenbroch, Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance:
Self-Control by Precommitment, 13 Psychological Science, 219, 223 (2002) (observing that a decision maker who is
aware of the likelihood of procrastination may impose deadlines on himself).

161

See Gourville & Soman, supra note __, at 4:
[W]hile low rebate redemption rates have been extensively documented and commented upon in
the managerial literature, little academic research has attempted to understand how consumers
evaluate rebate offers. In particular, why do consumers tend to overestimate the likelihood of
redemption? When might we expect this bias to hold? Can it be reversed? And what can be done
to reduce this bias?
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will procrastinate or forget to redeem.162 Jeffrey Rachlinski sums up various self-serving biases
as follows:
Psychologists have noted a strong tendency for individuals to make inferences
that are self-serving. This tendency can be divided into three different
phenomena: overoptimism, which consists of overestimating one's capabilities;
overconfidence, which consists of overestimating one's ability to predict
outcomes; and egocentricism, which consists of overstating the role that one has
played in events in which one has participated.163
The overconfidence bias has been documented in a wide range of contexts,164 but most
relevant for our purposes, “people are overconfident when making personal forecasts about
behaviors involving desirable outcomes.”165 Several factors can affect confidence including: (1)
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See Gourville & Soman, supra note __, at 6; Soman, supra note __, at 429; Silk & Janiszewski, supra note __, at
15-16; Silk, supra note __, at 14-16.

163

Rachlinksi, supra note __, at 1172 (footnotes omitted); see also Jolls et al., supra note ___, at 1524 ("A common
feature of human behavior is overoptimism: People tend to think that bad events are far less likely to happen to them
than to others."); Korobkin and Ulen, supra note 107, at 1091 (describing the overconfidence bias as “the belief that
good things are more likely than average to happen to us and bad things are less likely than average to happen to
us”); Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market
Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 101, 139 (1997) (discussing “the systematic tendency
of many people to overrate their own abilities, contributions, and talents . . . [that] readily takes the form of
excessive optimism and overconfidence, coupled with an inflated sense of ability to control events and risks.”); But
see Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and Market Corrections, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 111, 119
(2006) (“Just as there is an optimism bias in some people, it seems easy to identify an ‘Eeyore’ effect in others, who
are excessively risk averse with respect to the outcome of future events.”).
164

Jon Hanson and Douglas Kysar cite some of amusing evidence of overconfidence:
[T]here is growing evidence that we are naively and stubbornly optimistic at heart, regardless of
how well informed we are. For instance, respondents in one study, although correctly estimating
that fifty percent of American couples end up in divorce, estimated their own chance of divorce at
zero. Similarly, college students are six times more likely to think they will have above average
job satisfaction than below average. They are also about six times more likely to think they will
own their own homes, two times more likely to think they will have a mentally gifted child, seven
times less likely to think they will have drinking problems, and nine and one-half times less likely
to think they will divorce soon after marriage.

Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 630, 655 (1999) (footnotes omitted) (citing Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every
Relationship is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 Law & Hum.
Behav. 439, 443 (1993); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism about Future Life Events, 39 J. Personality & Soc.
Psychol. 806, 810 (1980)).
165

Silk & Janiszewski, supra note __, at 11 (citing Stephen J. Hoch, Counterfactual Reasoning and Accuracy in
Predicting Personal Events, 11 Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 719 (1985);
Briony D. Pulford & Andrew M. Colman Overconfidence, Base Rates, and Outcome Positivity/Negativity of
Predicted Outcomes, 87 British Journal of Psychology 431 (1996); Robert. P. Vallone, et al. The Overconfident
Prediction of Future Action Outcomes by Self and Others, 58 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 582
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the relative frequency of an event; (2) the time gap between a prediction and the predicted event;
(3) the desirability of the predicted event.166
Less frequent life events are more difficult to predict than common occurrences in part
because decision-makers lack “base rate information” — the relative frequency with which an
event occurs.167 A person who drives to work every day might be optimistic about whether there
will be a parking spot available directly in front of her office, but this optimism will be tempered
by her daily parking experience. In contrast, someone who rarely drives to work will have a
more difficult time predicting the likelihood of finding a prime parking space in front of her
office. But this merely suggests that the person making the prediction will be inaccurate, which
could be either optimistic or pessimistic. Scholars claim, however, that in the absence of
relevant base rate information and “faced with an attractive rebate offer, a consumer anchors on
successful rebate redemption and adjusts inadequately (or not at all) for the many things that
could prevent redemption.”168 In other words, the infrequency of rebate redemption arguably
makes it difficult for consumers to accurately predict their own redemption behavior169 and in
such situations consumers tell themselves a successful rebate redemption story and fail to
consider everything that could go wrong with in their optimistic narrative.170

(1990)). The planning fallacy is an example of this phenomenon. See Lawrence J. Sanna & Norbert Schwarz,
Integrating Temporal Biases: The Interplay of Focal Thoughts and Accessibility Experiences, 15 Psychol. Sci. 474,
478 (2004) (“Research on the planning fallacy indicates that people adopt an optimistic ‘narrow focus on successful
future plans’ and this leads them to be overly optimistic in estimating completion times.”) (citing Griffin R. Buehler
& H. McDonald, The Role of Motivated Reasoning in Optimistic Time Predictions, 23 Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin 238 (1997)).
166

See Silk, supra note __, at 15 (“Studies in overconfidence have demonstrated that people become more confident
in their personal forecasts as outcomes become more desirable.”) (citing Pulford & Colman, cited supra note __).
167

See Plous, supra note __, at 115.

168

See Gourville & Soman, supra note __, at 7.

169

See id. __, at 6.

170

Gourville and Soman have an even more intriguing and provocative claim — they contend that the consumer’s
own underlying motivation to purchase a product affects how the consumer will view the likelihood of redemption.
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Several external factors also may influence confidence levels. First, confidence in rebate
redemption can be affected by rebate amounts.171 For example, imagine that a seller who is
offering a $20 rebate on a $100 (a 20% discount) increases the rebate to $30 rebate while
keeping the list price the same (thus increasing the discount to 30%). This can result in increased
sales to intended and probabilistic redeemers (due in part to increased redemption confidence on
the part of the latter group) but at the same time, the increased reward will inspire all segments of
consumers (including rebate independent consumers) to redeem more rebates.172 Whether this
change will be profitable for the rebate offeror will depend on the exact “tradeoff between the
benefit of increased sales from a larger discount percentage and the cost of higher redemption
rates.’’ 173
Second, confidence that a person will take a certain action increases as the temporal
distance increases between a prediction and the predicted event.174 We have all experienced this
phenomenon — if someone gives us a longer deadline to complete a task, we become more
confident that we will get our work done, even though this may not be the case. Amos Tversky

If consumers are motivated to purchase a rebated product, they overestimate their probability of
redeeming the rebate in order to make the purchase more attractive. However, if they are
motivated to avoid purchasing the product, they underestimate their possibility of redeeming the
rebate in order to make the purchase seem unattractive.
Id.
171

See id. 11-13.

172

Id. at 12, 26 (tbl. 2)

173

Id. at 12. Silk and Janiszewski argue that increasing the rebate reward and the pre-rebate shelf price while
maintaining the strike (after-rebate) price, by increasing the pre-rebate price, may lead to less sales but increased
redemptions. See id.

174

See Silk & Janiszewski, supra note __, at 15 (citing Thomas Gilovich, et al., Effect of Temporal Perspective on
Subjective Confidence, 64 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 552 (1993)); Michael Milburn, Sources of
Bias in the Prediction of Future Events, 21 Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 17-26 (1978); George
Wright & Peter Ayton, Judgmental Probability Forecasting in the Immediate and Medium Term, 51 Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 344 (1992); Silk, supra note ___, at 17-18 (“Research shows that
deadlines help to mitigate procrastination by facilitating the completion of tasks. . . . Research also has demonstrated
that the longer people are given to complete a task, the greater the likelihood of procrastination and failing to
complete the task.”)
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and Eldar Shafir conducted a study conducted in which they offered students $5 to answer a long
questionnaire by a certain date.175 The group that was given five days to complete the task had a
60% rate of return, the group that was given a three-week deadline had a 42% rate of return, and
the group that was given no deadline had a 25% rate of return.176 Tversky & Shafir concluded:
[T]he more time people had to complete the task, the less likely they were to do it.
Just as the addition of options enhances the tendency to defer decision, so can the
addition of time enhance the tendency to delay action. This observation, which
represents a temporal violation of the regularity condition, is as common in daily
experience as it is puzzling for decision theorists.177
But why does added time increase confidence, despite the possibility of procrastination
and prospective memory failure? Temporal construal theory (“TCT”) or construal level theory178
helps to explain why delay between purchase and rebate redemption may lead to overconfident
predictions of rebate redemption behavior.179 TCT draws a distinction between high and low
level construals.180 High-level construals represent a more simplified, abstract, decontextualized
way of representing an event,181 while low-level construals involve more complex, concrete,

175

Amos Tversky and Eldar Shafir, Choice Under Conflict: The Dynamics of Deferred Decisions, 3 Psychological
Science 358 (1992); see also Silk, supra note- at 17-18 (citing Tversky and Shafir, supra).

176

Tversky & Shafir, supra note __, at 358.

177

Id. Under the “regularity condition” to which Tversky and Shafir refer, the market share of any option should not
be increased by increasing the number of options present. Id. at 360. For example, imagine that my donut shop sells
two types of donuts: Boston creme and chocolate glazed, and they have market shares of 60% and 40%,
respectively. I then add a third donut to the mix: a jelly donut. The new jelly donut could reduce the market share
of either of the two original donuts being sold, but we should not see an increase in the percentage of Boston creme
or chocolate glazed donuts sold.
178

See Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman, Temporal Construal and Time-Dependent Changes in Preference, 79
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 876 (2000); Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman, Temporal Construal, 110
Psychological Review 403 (2003) [hereinafter Trope & Liberman, Temporal Construal]; Shiri Nussbaum, Nira
Liberman & Yaacov Trope, Creeping Dispositionism: The Temporal Dynamics of Behavior Prediction, 84 Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology 485 (2003); Michael S. Sagristano, Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman, TimeDependent Gambling: Odds Now, Money Later, 131 Journal of Experimental Psychology 354 (2002).
179

See Silk, supra note __, at 16.

180

Trope & Liberman, Temporal Construal, supra note __, at 405.

181

Id. at 405 table 1 (listing the following traits for high-level construal: abstract, simple, structured/coherent,
decontextualized, primary/core, subordinate, goal relevant).
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unstructured way of representing an event.182 The basic idea of TCT is “that temporal distance
changes people’s responses to future events by changing the way people mentally represent those
events”183 — a distinction that leads to underweighting the effort required to satisfy longer term
goals.184 As Lynch and Zauberman explain:
According to construal-level theory, people represent events at a “high level” in
the distant future and at a “low level” in the more immediate future. In the near
future, people think concretely about the feasibility of action, that is, what
constraints on action exist. In the more distant future, thoughts are dominated by
more abstraction about the desirability of the same events.185
For example, professor might state that she wishes to write a book on behavioral
economics and the law next year. The goal or action will be represented in the professor’s mind
as a high level construal, in rather abstract terms. In contrast, if the professor is asked on
Monday to give a BLE presentation to her colleagues on Tuesday, the task will be represented in
her mind as a low-level construal, as she concentrates on the concrete, goal-oriented efforts that
will be required to complete a presentation in one day. In the case of rebates, the prediction is
the assessment of one’s likelihood of sending in a rebate form at the time of purchase and the
predicted event is the actual rebate redemption. 186 According to TCT, a longer rebate
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Id. (listing the following traits for low-level construal: concrete, complex, unstructured/incoherent;
contextualized, secondary/surface, subordinate, goal irrelevant).
183

Trope & Liberman, Temporal Construal, supra note __, at 418; 110 Psychological Review 403, 418 (2003);
Trope & Liberman, Time-Dependent Changes in Preference, supra note __, at 887-88.

184

Gal Zauberman and John Lynch have advanced a complementary theory based on “resource slack.” See Gal
Zauberman & John G. Lynch, Resource Slack and Propensity to Discount Delayed Investments of Time Versus
Money, 134 J. of Experimental Psychology: General, 23 (2005). Their research shows that people expect to have
greater slack for time, or excess time available to complete tasks, in the future, even when no empirical basis exists
for these expectations. Id.
185

Lynch & Zauberman, supra note __, at 69; see also Trope & Liberman, Temporal Construal, supra note __, at __
; Trope & Liberman, Time-Dependent Changes in Preference, supra note __, at 877.

186

Silk & Janiszewski, Why Are Rebate Redemption Rates So Low? Understanding Breakage of Mail-In Rebates 9
(unpublished manuscript January 14, 2004) (on file with the author of this paper) (“[T]he reward is most likely a
high-level construal since it represents the superordinate purpose of the action and is the essential feature of the
rebate offer. The specific tasks that comprise the effort component are most likely low-level construals since they
represent the subordinate details that comprise the “how” aspects of the action.”).
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redemption period will lead to breakage because consumers will mentally represent rebate
redemption as a high-level construal, which leads to underweighting the effort that redemption
will require.
IV. REBATE REGULATION: PRESENT AND FUTURE
A. Rebate Regulation and Paternalism
As discussed in this paper, there are four major categories of consumer complaints
regarding rebates. It can be argued that firms (1) improperly deprive consumers of legitimately
earned rebates; (2) attempt to depress rebate-redemption rates by imposing onerous rebate
redemption requirements;187 (3) use rebates to engage in price discrimination; and (4) benefit
from behavioral tendencies that lead to sub-optimal rebate redemption rates.
The first task for lawmakers is to determine which of these problems, if any, require
regulatory intervention. Once lawmakers determine which, if any, of the rebate complaints
require regulatory intervention, they must then determine what form of regulation is most suited
to solving the precise problem at issue. Regulatory options range from “hard” or strong forms of
paternalism,188 which limit consumer choice and impose more significant costs on those
consumers who do not need the benefit of government intervention, 189 to softer forms of
paternalism, such as libertarian paternalism190 or asymmetrically paternalistic regulation:

187

Even here, we must acknowledge that it may be difficult to draw the line between a rebate offeror’s intentional
inducement of breakage and a firm’s passive acceptance of the benefits of consumer irrationality. Tat & Schwepker,
supra note __, at 70 (“Manufacturers . . . hope that not all buyers will actually rebate. . . . If the system is made
simple, then manufacturers will have a greater cost for their offers. However, this cost may be outweighed by the
benefits of higher customer satisfaction, which might transfer to higher customer loyalty and access to consumer
information….”). After all, any rebate offering is going to have some paperwork required of redeemers, especially
to minimize rebate fraud. See supra note __ and accompanying text.
188

See Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in Edward N. Zalta, ed.,The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2005),
available online at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paternalism/ (visited May 9, 2006) (“Paternalism is the
interference of a state or an individual with another person, against their will, and justified by a claim that the person
interfered with will be better off or protected from harm.”).

189

See Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards
___ Minn. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming), available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=766824 (noting that under “hard
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A regulation is asymmetrically paternalistic if it creates large benefits for those
who make errors, while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational.
Such regulations are relatively harmless to those who reliably make decisions in
their best interest, while at the same time advantageous to those making
suboptimal choices.191
B. Banning Rebates: The Strongest Form of Paternalism
A complete ban on consumer rebates is the one measure that would address every
category of rebate complaints discussed in this paper.192 It also reflects the strongest or hardest
form of paternalism.193 One who believes that rebate promotion abuse is endemic or that rebates
are inherently unfair or deceptive based upon either the price discriminating effects of rebates194
or the behavioral economics discussed in this paper might see a complete ban on mail-in rebates
as an attractive solution.195 Unfortunately, a ban on rebates would also eliminate the arguably
forms of paternalism . . . government determines what is best for citizens and accordingly restricts the freedom of
citizens to act otherwise).Cass Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 249, 254 (“[S]trong
paternalism forecloses choice, typically on the ground that all or most people will choose unwisely.”).
190

See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1159
(2003).

191

Camerer, et al., supra note __; see also Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U.L.
REV. 1248 n. 10 (2005) (contrasting both forms of regulation); Sunstein, supra note __, at 257 (discussing
similarities and differences between asymmetrical paternalism and libertarian paternalism).
Mandatory disclosure laws, such as the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2005), are classic examples
of asymmetrically paternalistic regulation, because disclosure laws impose little cost on informed consumers, while
providing a great benefit to uninformed consumers. See Camerer, et al., supra note __, at 1232-33; Glaeser, supra
note __, at 133 (“Typical examples of soft or libertarian paternalism include ‘debiasing’ campaigns, default rules,
and other interventions that change beliefs and attitude without impacting formal prices faced by consumers.”). But
see Matthew A. Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of Mandatory Disclosure: Socio-Economics and the
Quest for Truth in Lending, 14 Cornell J. of Law & Public Policy 199, 217 n. 101 (2005) (discussing costs incurred
by those who must provide mandatory disclosures).
192

Rebates are forbidden in rare circumstances. For interesting examples, see Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 244.461
(Michie 2004) (permitting rebates for distilled spirits and wine, while forbidding the same for malt beverages); Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 311.355 (2004) (providing that “[m]anufacturers of intoxicating liquor other than beer or wine shall be
permitted to offer consumer cash rebate coupons”).

193

See supra note __.

194

Given that rebates facilitate price discrimination, one might ask whether consumer rebates are prohibited under
the Robinson-Patman Act, which makes it “unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . to discriminate in
price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality.” 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). Despite this
language, the Robinson Patman Act does not forbid merchants from engaging in differential pricing practices
against end use consumers. See Edwards, supra note __, at __.
195

See Lynch & Zauberman, supra note __, at 76 (“We recommended regulations that require sellers to offer only
rebates that must be redeemed immediately or class-action lawsuits to allow consumers redress if the recommended
49

possible positive benefits of rebates. A ban would prevent firms from using rebates to engage in
potentially welfare-enhancing price discrimination,196 and would prevent firms from collecting
information that facilitates direct marketing efforts that can, in some cases, be mutually
beneficial for firms and consumers.197 Putting these benefits to the side, there is no indication
that consumers or lawmakers desire a radical prophylactic approach such as a complete ban on
rebates.198 Thus, the remainder of this section will focus on more feasible regulatory options.
C. Unfair or Deceptive Trade Practice Actions
1. A Brief Survey of Federal and State UDAP Law
Unfair or deceptive business practices are prohibited under both state and federal law.199
Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides: “Unfair methods of competition
in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are
hereby declared unlawful.”200 The FTC is empowered to enforce Section 5(a)(1)201 via
regulations prove inconsistent with prevailing FTC unfairness doctrine.”); Sovern, supra note __, at 1642 (“Another
way to respond to the rebate problem is to adopt legislation outlawing or regulating rebates. This might force
manufacturers to offer their products at a lower price to all consumers or perhaps to sell at the actual price without
misleading consumers into erroneously thinking they will obtain a rebate.”) (footnote omitted); Sovern, supra note
__, at 1699 (“Assuming that rulemakers wish to regulate rebates, they would most likely choose one of two
approaches: either they would ban rebates altogether, or as a less sweeping first step, rulemakers could regulate
them, by, for example, requiring simplified rebate procedures.”), A requirement that all rebates be paid at the time
of purchase is nearly the same as a ban from the perspective of a seller who is using rebates to engage in price
discrimination.
196

See supra notes __ and accompanying text.

197

An instant rebate, however, could require that the consumer provide identifying information, thus retaining one
benefit of traditional mail-in rebates.
198

Cf. Lynch & Zauberman, supra note __, at 72 (“It is outside the scope of our expertise to judge whether any
remedy is likely to be considered or adopted for promotional incentives (e.g., rebates) that provide an economic
benefit to some consumers but significant costs to others.”).
199

What follows is merely a brief survey of federal and state UDAP law. For comprehensive treatments, see Dee
Pridgen, Consumer Protection and the Law (2003); Jonathan Sheldon & Carolyn L. Carter, Unfair and Deceptive
Acts and Practices (6th ed. 2004).

200

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). In addition, if applicable, sellers must comply with the FTC Mail or Telephone Order
Merchandise Rule, which imposes additional duties upon merchants. See 16 C.F.R. § 435; see also Pridgen, supra
note __ § 9:18, at 597 (“The rule requires mail order merchants to have a reasonable basis to expect they will be
able to ship the merchandise within 30 days or other specified time period, or give the consumer the opportunity to
cancel the sale and obtain a refund.”); Jonathan Sheldon & Carolyn L. Carter, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and
Practices 5.8.1.1, at 483-84 (6th ed. 2004) (discussing FTC Mail and Telephone Order Merchandise Rule).
50

litigation202 and to promulgate “rules which define with specificity acts or practices which are
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”203 In addition to federal law,
every state has its own “UDAP” law that prohibits unfair or deceptive acts and practices.204
These state statutes (sometimes referred to as a “Little FTC Acts”205) are based in varying
degrees on different model laws206 and differ widely in their approaches.207 Some states prohibit

201

See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (“The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons . . . from using
unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.”).
202

See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3) (proceedings before the Commission); 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (temporary restraining orders
and injunctive relief); 15 U.S.C. § 57b (civil actions for violations of rules and cease and desist orders); see also
Pridgen, supra note __ § 12.1, at 973 (“The traditional remedy for unfair or deceptive trade practices has always
been the simple cease and desist order. Through both statutory amendments and common law development, the
Commission’s arsenal has been expanded by many other enforcement measures such as injunctions, civil penalties,
[and] consumer redress….); Peter C. Ward, Federal Trade Commission: Law, Practice and Procedure §§ ___
(surveying FTC enforcement options).

203

See 15 U.S.C. § 57a. The FTC also promulgates “industry guides,” that do not have the force of law.
Industry guides are administrative interpretations of laws administered by the Commission for the
guidance of the public in conducting its affairs in conformity with legal requirements. They
provide the basis for voluntary and simultaneous abandonment of unlawful practices by members
of industry. Failure to comply with the guides may result in corrective action by the commission
under applicable statutory provisions. Guides may relate to a practice common to many industries
or to specific practices of a particular industry.

16 CFR § 1.5; see also Serge Mezhburd, The Unintelligible Standard: Rethinking the Mandate for the FTC from a
Nondelegation Perspective, 57 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 361, 367 (2000) (citing Application of Guides in
Preventing Unlawful Practices, 16 C.F.R. Part 17 (2001); FTC Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 1.5 (2001)).
204

See Sheldon & Carter, supra note __ § 1.1, at 1 (“ All fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam,
and the Virgin Islands have enacted at least one statute with broad applicability to most consumer transactions,
aimed at preventing consumer deception and abuse in the marketplace.”); see also Debra A. Burke, Cruise Lines and
Consumers: Troubled Waters, 37 Am. Bus. L.J. 689, 710-11 (2000) (“All states have enacted some type of unfair or
deceptive trade practices act (DTPA) which generally prohibits deceptive acts and unfair methods of competition in
the conduct of trade or commerce.”); Michael M. Greenfield, Unfairness Under Section 5 of the FTC Act and Its
Impact on State Law, 46 Wayne L. Rev. 1869, 1895-96 (2000); Jeff Sovern, Protecting Privacy With Deceptive
Trade Practices Legislation, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1305, 1349 (2001) (“[E]very state has enacted a "little FTC" act,
prohibiting, in one form or another, deceptive, and sometimes unfair, trade practices.”) [hereinafter Sovern,
Protecting Privacy].

205

See Pridgen, supra note __ § 3:5, at 101; see also Sheldon & Carter, supra note __ § 1.1, at 1 (noting that “this
name is only precise for those statutes that parallel the FTC Act”).
206

See Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, in Council of State Governments, 29 Suggested State
Legislation 141-50 (1970); Revised Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs on Uniform
State Laws, Ann. Conf. 1966; Unif. Consumer Sales Practices Act, 7A U.L.A. 206 (1970) (adopted by Kansas, Ohio
and Utah). Unif. Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 7A U.L.A. 273 (1966)); see also Glenn Kaplan & Chris Barry
Smith, Patching the Holes in the Consumer Product Safety Net: Using State Unfair Practices Laws to Make
Handguns and other Consumer Goods Safer, 17 Yale J. on Reg. 253, 276 (2000) (noting various model laws for
state UDAP statutes); Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of Consumer Protection
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a list of specified practices and then contain a catch-all provision that bars a person from
engaging “in any other conduct which similarly creates likelihood of confusion or of
misunderstanding,”208 while other states mimic the FTC Act209 and contain only a broadly worded
injunction against misleading, deceptive or unfair business or trade practices.210
Regardless of the precise approach taken, state laws are valuable to plaintiffs for several
reasons. First, courts have held that consumers may not bring private actions under the FTC
Act,211 but “nearly all state acts create a private cause of action for aggrieved consumers.”212
Second, state UDAP laws often have more relaxed standards of proof than common law fraud or
breach of contract claims.213 Plaintiffs often need not prove a defendant’s intention to deceive,214
Acts, 54 Kansas L. Rev. 1 (2005) (“Most little-FTC Acts were based on alternative forms suggested by the FTC or
model state legislation developed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Although
these laws take various forms, each broadly prohibits unfair or deceptive acts, as does the FTCA Act.”) (footnotes
omitted).
207

See Michael M. Greenfield, Unfairness Under Section 5 of the FTC Act and Its Impact on State Law, 46 Wayne
L. Rev. 1869, 1895-96 (2000) (summarizing different approaches); Peter S. Menell, Regulating “Spyware”: The
Limitations of State “Laboratories” and the Case for Federal Preemption of State Unfair Competition Laws, 20
Berkeley Tech. L. J. 1363, 1390 (2005) (“The landscape of unfair competition law can best be characterized as
fragmented, uncoordinated, and amorphous.”); Sovern, Protecting Privacy, supra note __, at 1349. For a statute-bystatute analysis of state UDAP laws, see Sheldon & Carter, supra note __ Appendix A.
208

Sovern, Protecting Privacy, supra note __, at 1349 (citing section 2(12) of the Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act); see also Pridgen, supra note __ § 3:5 (stating that 26 jurisdictions enumerate 13 prohibited practices
and then generally prohibit any other practice that is unfair or deceptive); Unif. Deceptive Trade Practices Act §
2(a)(12), 7A U.L.A. 273 (1966) (catch-all provision prohibiting conduct that creates a likelihood of confusion or of
misunderstanding similar to the specifically prohibited business practices in the Uniform Act).
209

The importance of the FTC Act in the field is profound: several state statutes even direct their state courts to draw
on federal law in determining what conduct is forbidden under the state UDAP statute. Greenfield, supra note __, at
1898 (“Of the twenty-six states that borrow the language of the federal statute, twenty of them explicitly piggyback
on the federal applications of the federal law. These statutes direct the state courts to pay attention to interpretations
that the Commission and the federal courts have given section 5(a).”) (footnotes omitted).

210

See Burke, supra note __, at 710-11; Sovern, Protecting Privacy, supra note __, at 1349.

211

See Pridgen, supra note __ § 12:41, at 921 (“The FTC does not explicitly provide for a private right of action for
consumers and the overwhelming majority of judicial opinion has rejected claims that the Act implies such a
right.”); Sovern, Protecting Privacy, supra note __, at 1321 n. 63 (collecting cases rejecting private right of action
under FTC Act).
212

Burke, supra note __, at 710-11; Pridgen, supra note __ § 3:5, at 10; Jeff Sovern Private Actions Under The
Deceptive Trade Practices Acts: Reconsidering The FTC Act As Rule Model 52 Ohio St. L.J. 437, 448 (1991)
[hereinafter Sovern, Rule Model]. Iowa is an exception. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note __, at 16.
213

See Burke, supra note __, at 710-11 (“observing that “[v]iolations of these state laws are typically easier to
establish than common law fraud or misrepresentation”).
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and many traditional defenses to a common law breach of contract are not available to
defendants sued under UDAP statutes.215 Third, some states permit recovery of attorneys’ fees,
as well as statutory,216 multiple217 and punitive218 damages in UDAP actions.
2. UDAP Claims as Rebate Regulation
Given the broad, flexible language found in Section 5 of the FTC Act and many state
UDAP statutes, unfair or deceptive trade practice claims by regulators and consumers directly
against rebate offerors are one possible form of rebate regulation.219 The FTC has already
experimented with this approach, bringing enforcement actions under Section 5 of the FTC Act220
against companies who were remiss in processing their rebates.221 The first such case was
commenced in 2002, when the FTC filed a complaint against Philips Electronics North America
214

Sovern, Rule Model, supra note __, at 450.

215

Id. at 451-52.

216

See Sheldon & Carter, supra note __ § 8.4.2.1, at 623 (“About half the states authorize private litigants who have
proven a UDAP violation to obtain minimum damage awards ranging from $25 to $5000, even if actual damages
have not been proven.”).

217

See Sheldon & Carter, supra note __ § 8.4.2.1, at 623 (“About half of all UDAP statutes authorize treble or other
multiple damage awards.”); see also Burke, supra note __, at 710-11; Pridgen, supra note __ § 3:5, at 101 (“While
the characterization ‘Little FTC Act’ has stuck, state legislation of this type is actually broader and has considerably
more bite than its ‘mother statute.’ The state laws generally provide for private enforcement with statutory
minimum or even treble damages…”). Other states even allow for punitive damages in UDAP actions. See Sheldon
& Carter, supra note __ § 8.4.3.1, at 635.
218

See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note __, at 24 (“[A]t least fourteen states permit punitive damages in lawsuits
under CPAs for conduct ranging from recklessness to intentional conduct or ill will or in cases involving flagrant or
repeated violations. In six of these jurisdictions, it appears that punitive damages may be awarded despite the
availability of statutory or treble damages.”) (footnotes omitted).

219

See Sovern, Transaction Costs, supra note __, at 1642 (“One way to address rebates is to see them as a particular
species of fraud and deal with them through existing common law deceit claims and deceptive trade practices
legislation.”).
220

In addition, if applicable, sellers must comply with the FTC Mail or Telephone Order Merchandise Rule, which
imposes additional duties upon merchants. See 16 C.F.R. § 435; see also Pridgen, supra note __ § 9:18, at 597 (“The
rule requires mail order merchants to have a reasonable basis to expect they will be able to ship the merchandise
within 30 days or other specified time period, or give the consumer the opportunity to cancel the sale and obtain a
refund.”); Jonathan Sheldon & Carolyn L. Carter, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices 5.8.1.1, at 483-84 (6th
ed. 2004) (discussing FTC Mail and Telephone Order Merchandise Rule).
221
See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Press Release, Iomega Corporation Agrees to Pay $900,000 Civil Penalty
To Settle FTC Charges It Violated Mail Order Rule, December 9, 1998, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/12/iomega2.htm.
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Corporation,222 after over fifty thousand consumers experienced delays of up to six months in
receiving their rebates in violation of the original terms of the rebate promotion.223 The FTC
alleged that Philips’s unilateral modification of the terms of the rebate offer (which stated that
payment would be made within eight weeks of receipt of valid requests) was unfair.224 The FTC
also settled cases against America Online, Inc.,225 CompuServe Interactive Services, Inc.226 and
the nationwide computer superstore, CompUSA, for delaying rebate payments to consumers.227
Of special interest in the CompUSA case, was that the retailing giant was also held accountable
for delays and non-payment of rebate offers made by a third-party manufacturer, Q.P.S., Inc.,
which eventually filed for bankruptcy.228 This was the first time that the FTC held a retailer
liable for a third-party rebate offer.229 The FTC reasoned that CompUSA bore some
responsibility for QPS’s actions because CompUSA helped to advertise the QPS rebate offers
and it knew that QPS was having difficulties in meeting its rebate obligations.230

222

See Complaint, Philips Electronics North America Corp., File No. 022-3095 (2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/08/philipscmp.pdf.
223

See Federal Trade Commission, Press Release, FTC Settles Charges Against Two Computer Peripherals Sellers
for Failing to Keep Rebate Promises, August 5, 2002, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/08/philipsokie.htm.
The complaints and consent orders for Philips Electronics North America Corp and a second rebate offeror, Tim R.
Wofford, the president and owner of OKie Corporation are available on this page.

224

Id.

225

See Federal Trade Commission, Press Release, AOL and CompuServe Settle FTC Charges of Unfair Practices,
September 23, 2003, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/09/aol.htm. For copies of the complaint and the
consent orders, see http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0023000.htm.

226

Id.

227

See Federal Trade Commission, Press Release, The Rebate Debate: Why Were They Late? FTC Settles Charges
Against CompUSA, March 11, 2005, corrected March 17, 2005, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/03/compusa.htm [hereinafter CompUSA Press Release]; see also 13501 Federal
Register, Vol. 70, No. 53, Monday, March 21, 2005, Notices (notice of proposed consent agreement); Block, supra
note __, at B3 (discussing FTC settlement with CompUSA).
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See CompUSA Press Release, supra note ___.
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Id.
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Id.
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State attorneys general have experimented with applying state UDAP statutes to rebate
offerings. For example, New York has a broadly worded statute that outlaws “deceptive acts or
practices” in business.231 In a case brought jointly with the FTC,232 the New York Attorney
General applied this statute, along with FTC Act § 5, to UrbanQ, a rebate offeror that had failed
to pay rebates to deserving consumers in a timely manner.233 The Ohio Attorney General brought
an enforcement action against the national office supply superstore, OfficeMax, under Ohio’s
Consumer Sales Practices Act,234 for failing to pay promised rebate, delays in paying rebates, and
for not having rain-checks available when advertised goods were out of stock.235 Finally, private
plaintiffs have also availed them selves of state UDAP laws. A Michigan court held that
plaintiffs stated a valid claim where the defendant allegedly failed to clearly and conspicuously
disclose that rebate promotion had ended.236 The court stated that such a claim could violate the
Michigan’s Consumer Protection Act,237 a statute based upon the Uniform Deceptive Trade

231

GBL § 349(a) (“Deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the
furnishing of any service in this state are hereby declared unlawful.”).

232

See FTC v. UrbanQ, Stipulated Final Order for Permanent Injunction, CV 03-3147, July 7, 2003., available
online at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/internet/litigation/urbanq_final_order.pdf.

233

See Press Release, New York State Attorney General, Online Retailer Must Pay Overdue Rebates To Consumers,
Hundreds of Complaints Filed in New York Against UrbanQ, June 26 2003, available online at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/jun/jun26a_03.html. This case was brought jointly with the FTC. See FTC
v. UrbanQ, Stipulated Final Order for Permanent Injunction, CV 03-3147, July 7, 2003, available online at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/internet/litigation/urbanq_final_order.pdf.
234

See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1345.02(A) (West 2005) (“No supplier shall commit an unfair or deceptive act or
practice in connection with a consumer transaction. Such an unfair or deceptive act or practice by a supplier violates
this section whether it occurs before, during, or after the transaction.”); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1345.02(B)(1)
(West 2005) (deceptive for seller to represent that “the subject of a consumer transaction has sponsorship, approval,
performance characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits that it does not have”).
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The complaint can be found online http://www.ag.state.oh.us/press_releases/attachments/050114_officemax.pdf.
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Munem v. Best Buy Co., No. 224366 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002), appeal denied, 655 N.W.2d 554 (Mich. 2002).

237

See Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.903 (1)(i) (2005).
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Practices Act,238 which prohibits sellers from “[m]aking false or misleading statements of fact
concerning the reasons for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions.”239
3. Disadvantages of UDAP Claims
a) Procedural Limitations on UDAP Claims
Despite the potential reach of UDAP statutes, there are barriers to using federal and state
UDAP litigation as a method of consumer protection. First, as noted above, courts have held that
consumers may not bring private actions under the FTC Act,240 which means that consumers
must rely on state UDAP provisions. Second, some disputes related to rebates might be
governed by mandatory arbitration clauses, removing these cases from the courts altogether.241
Third, and perhaps most important, as with all consumer disputes, the costs of bringing such
actions may dissuade possible plaintiffs from seeking to enforce their rights in court, especially
since recovery in rebate cases is likely to be modest.242 Class actions would be one possible
solution to this problem,243 but there are barriers to this approach.244 Several states explicitly
See Unif. Deceptive Trade Practices Act U.L.A. § (2)(a)(11), 7A 273, ___ (1966) (“A person engages in a
deceptive trade practice when, in the course of his business, vocation, or occupation, he . . . makes false or
misleading statements of fact concerning the reasons for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions.”); see also
Unif. Consumer Sales Practices Act § 3(b)(8), 7A U.L.A. 206 (1970) (deceptive for seller to indicate “that a specific
price advantage exists, if it does not”).

238
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Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.903 (1)(i) (2005).

240
See Pridgen, supra note __ § 12:41, at 921 (“The FTC does not explicitly provide for a private right of action for
consumers and the overwhelming majority of judicial opinion has rejected claims that the Act implies such a
right.”); Sovern, Rule Model, supra note __, at 1321 & n. 63 (“[O]nly the FTC itself can enforce the FTC Act.”) (
(collecting cases rejecting private right of action under FTC Act).
241

See, e.g., Falbe v. Dell Inc., 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 239 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (granting defendant Dell’s
motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration of rebate claim).
242

See Jeff Sovern, The Jewel of Their Souls: Preventing Identity Theft Through Loss Allocation Rules, 64 U. Pitt.
L. Rev. 343, 383-84 (2003) (“The transaction cost problem is especially troublesome in consumer litigation because
the stakes tend to be small in such cases, relative to the cost of litigation. Few consumers will spend more to assert
their rights than those rights are worth.”); Jeff Sovern, Toward a Theory of Warranties in Sales of New Homes:
Housing the Implied Warranty Advocates, Law and Economics Mavens, and Consumer Psychologists Under One
Roof, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 13, 85 (1993) (discussing impediments to consumer litigation).
243

See Greenfield, supra note __, at 1889 (“The obvious solution to the infeasibility of a private action to capture the
losses inflicted by an allegedly unfair act is litigation by means of class action, in which numerous small claims are
joined together to take advantage of the efficiency of a single action”).
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prohibit UDAP class actions,245 while other states’ UDAP statutes have been interpreted by
courts to reach this result.246 Even in states where UDAP class actions are permitted, class
certification may raise certain challenges in rebate cases.247 These problems can be seen in Stone
v. CompuServe Interactive Services, Inc.,248 where the court upheld the trial court’s denial of
class action certification in a consumer rebate case in part because common issues of fact did not
predominate among class members.249 The Court of Appeals quoted the trial court as follows:
“Each rebate applicant's history is unique and CompuServe's liability for ‘late,’ ‘untimely’ or
‘unreasonable’ performance simply cannot be adjudicated by looking to the class as a whole.”250
b) Substantive Barriers to UDAP Claims: The Limits of “Unfairness” and
Deception
In addition to the procedural barriers discussed above, rebate claims based on behavioral
economics face substantive hurdles under state and federal UDAP law. The language found in
the FTC Act is, by design, broad enough to capture a wide array of ever-evolving unfair business
practices.251 The House Report from the 1914 version of the Act makes the point well:
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See id.
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See Sheldon & Carter, supra note __ § 8.5.2 (citing Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, Montana and South Carolina
code provisions).
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See Sheldon & Carter, supra note __ § 8.5.2 (citing cases).

247

See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note __, at 17 (“[T]he vast differences in the application of state laws makes it
particularly inappropriate for courts to certify multi-state class actions alleging CPA claims or to apply the CPA of
one state to conduct that occurred in another state”).
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Stone v. CompuServe Interactive Services, Inc., 804 So.2d 383, 388-89 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001).
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Id.

250

Id. at 388. But see Amalfitano v. Sprint Corp., No. 36673/99, Slip Op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (certifying class of
consumers who purchased a certain model telephone at Radio Shack element and “who applied for a rebate which
was rejected on the basis that the model did not qualify for the rebate offer”); but see Schwartz & Silverman, supra
note __, at 33-34 (“[T]he relaxation of the need to show proof of actual, reasonable reliance and damages has made
it easier to bring class action lawsuits.”).
251
See Glenn Kaplan & Chris Barry Smith, Patching the Holes in the Consumer Product Safety Net: Using State
Unfair Practices Laws to Make Handguns and other Consumer Goods Safer, 17 Yale J. on Reg. 253, 276-79 (2000)
(discussing intentionally broad language found in UDAP statutes).
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It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices. There is
no limit to human inventiveness in this field. Even if all known unfair practices
were specifically defined and prohibited, it would be at once necessary to begin
over again. If Congress were to adopt the method of definition, it would
undertake an endless task.252
Despite this flexibility, there are limits to what conduct might be deemed unfair under
Section 5. Under current federal law, the FTC cannot deem an act or practice unlawful unless:
(1) the act is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers;(2) the injury is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers themselves; and (3) the injury is not outweighed by countervailing
benefits to consumers or to competition.253 This three-part statutory codification and refinement
of the FTC’s Policy on Unfairness,254 reflects the FTC’s position that “the principal focus of . . .
unfairness policy is on the maintenance of consumer choice or consumer sovereignty, an

252

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 19 (1914); see also Senate Report No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess.,
13 (1914); FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972) (citing the House and Senate reports
favorably). Although the quote is still pertinent, note that H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1142 is referring to the original text
of the FTC Act which only covered “unfair methods of competition.” The Act was amended in 1938 by the
Wheeler-Lea Act. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. at 244 (“The amendment added the phrase
‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices’ to the section's original ban on ‘unfair methods of competition’ and thus made
it clear that Congress, through § 5, charged the FTC with protecting consumers as well as competitors.”).
253

The FTC Act now provides:
The Commission shall have no authority … to declare unlawful an act or practice on the grounds
that such act or practice is unfair unless the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial
injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition

15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
254

See Letter from the FTC to Hon. Wendell Ford and Hon. John Danforth, Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, U.S. Senate, Commission Statement of Policy on the Scope of Consumer Unfairness Jurisdiction
(December 17, 1980), reprinted in International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070, 1073 (1984). For an excellent
judicial treatment of the development of the unfairness doctrine, see American Financial Services Association v.
FTC, 767 F.2d 957 (1985). For scholarly treatments, see, e.g., Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair Acts or
Practices" in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 70 Geo. L.J. 225 (1981); Howard Beales III, The
Federal Trade Commission's Use of Unfairness Authority: Its Rise, Fall, and Resurrection, 22 J. Pub. Pol'y &
Marketing 192 (2003); Jean Braucher, Defining Unfairness: Empathy and Economic Analysis at the Federal Trade
Commission, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 349 (1988); Stephen Calkins, FTC Unfairness: An Essay, 46 Wayne L. Rev. 1935
(2000); Ernest Gellhorn, Trading Stamps, S & H, and the FTC's Unfairness Doctrine, 1983 DUKE L.J. 903 (1983);
David A. Rice, Consumer Unfairness at the FTC: Misadventures in Law and Economics, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1 (1983); Roger E. Schechter, The Unfairness of Click-On Software Licenses, 46 Wayne L. Rev. 1735, 1759-66
(2000).
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economic concept that permits specific identification of conduct harmful to that objective.”255
Under this unfairness standard, the FTC has held that systematic breaches of consumer form
contracts are unfair and unlawful,256 so it is no surprise that the FTC has treated the chronic
denial and delay of legitimately earned rebate rewards, in violation of the stated terms of a rebate
offer, as a UDAP.257 Moreover, one could also imagine courts holding that rebates with extreme
redemption requirements, such as those discussed earlier in this paper,258 are unlawful under or
state federal UDAP law.259 Support for this conclusion can be found in the FTC Credit Practices
Rule,260 which prohibits six different creditor remedies261 under a market failure theory,262 as the
D.C. Circuit explained:
As long recognized, however, certain types of seller conduct or market
imperfections may unjustifiably hinder consumers' free market decisions and
prevent the forces of supply and demand from maximizing benefits and
minimizing costs. In such instances of market failure, the Commission may be
required to take corrective action. Such corrective action is taken “not to secondguess the wisdom of particular consumer decisions, but rather to halt some form
255

See International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070/73 (1984).

256

See Sheldon & Carter, supra note __ § 5.2.5.2 (citing Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354 (11th Cir.
1988), cert. denied 484 U.S. 1041 (1989)).
257

See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.

258

See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.

259

State UDAP statutes follow their own analogous (though distinct) approaches to unfairness. Although the
following discussion will track the current FTC approach, it should be noted that most states have not adopted this
definition of unfairness, continuing to rely on an earlier, arguably more liberal, FTC standard. See Sheldon &
Carter, supra note __ § 4.3.3.4 (“[M]ost courts in interpreting state UDAP statutes do not apply this current FTC
unfairness definition. Instead they use the “S&H” standard.”) (referring to FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405
U.S. 233, 244-45 n.5 (1972) (quoting Cigarette Rule, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in
Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, Statement of Basis and Purpose, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (1964)). I do
not mean to gloss over the possible differences between these two standards, but for my purposes, the differences
are unlikely to alter the basic point of this section — that purely behavioral arguments may conflict with how the
concept of unfairness is applied at the state and federal level. See Sheldon & Carter, supra note __ § 4.3.3.6 at 159
(“To some extent, distinctions between the “S&H” standard and the current FTC definition of unfairness may have
little practical effect.”).

260

FTC Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Credit Practices, 16 C.F.R. § 444.

261

For an overview of the Credit Practice Rule, see Sheldon & Carter, supra note __ §§ 5.13, 4.3.4.1. See also
American Financial Services Association v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957 (1985) (upholding FTC’s promulgation of the Credit
Practice Rule).
262

59

See The Statement of Basis and Purpose of the FTC’s Credit Practices Rule, 49 Fed. Reg. 7744 (March 1, 1984).

of seller behavior that unreasonably creates or takes advantage of an obstacle to
the free exercise of consumer decisionmaking.” 263
It is not clear, though, whether regulators or courts would hold that an honestly and
efficiently managed rebate promotion is unlawful based solely upon the behavioral economics
behind breakage or the price discriminating effects of rebates.264 First, this would require a
determination that the injury caused to rebate-dependent redeemers who fail to redeem is not
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves.265 Regulators or courts might be skeptical of
such a claim since many consumers do indeed redeem rebates and avoid the harm being
addressed here.266 In addition, depending on the particular consumer good at issue, consumers
who do not care for rebates can search out retailers or manufacturers who sell their products
without rebates. Second, a finding of unfairness requires that the injury caused by breakage not
be outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.267 A Senate Report
acknowledged the difficulties of this task:
In determining whether a substantial consumer injury is outweighed by the
countervailing benefits of a practice, the Committee does not intend that the FTC
quantify the detrimental and beneficial effects of the practice in every case. In
many instances, such a numerical benefit-cost analysis would be unnecessary; in
263

American Financial Services Ass’n, 767 F.2d at 976 (citing FTC Policy Statement, supra note __, at 37).

264

See Lynch & Zauberman, supra note __, at 71 (“Some people may believe that knowingly offering a rebate that a
substantial percentage of consumers are unlikely to redeem (though they believe otherwise) is an unfair competitive
practice. However, the FTC appears to operate under a definition of unfairness that makes this outcome unlikely.”);
Schechter, supra note __, at 1766 (observing that “[i]n the 15 years since the International Harvester decision, the
F.T.C. has made cautious use of its unfairness authority”).
265

See Jean Braucher, Defining Unfairness: Empathy and Economic Analysis at the Federal Trade Commission, 68
B.U. L. Rev. 349, 417-18 (1988) (“[T]he first question the FTC asks when considering a challenged practice is
whether the practice is ‘not reasonably avoidable.’ This turns out to be primarily a matter of whether there is a
market failure or imperfection that prevents consumers from registering their preferences through market
mechanisms.”) (citing Credit Practices Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose and Regulatory Analysis, 49 Fed. Reg.
7740, 7744, 7745-7748 (1984)).
266

See Lynch & Zauberman, supra note __, at 71-72 (“Consumers who follow the redemption protocol receive the
benefit, and they might point out that those who do not could have easily avoided the financial loss. However, it is
highly predictable that in the aggregate, consumers will have low redemption rates.”) (footnote omitted).

267
See Schechter, supra note __, at 1785-86 (“[T]his prong of unfairness analysis calls for a cost-benefit analysis of
the practice in question, and the Commission will ‘prohibit a practice only where doing so can be shown to result in
a net benefit.’”) (citing Braucher, supra note ___, at 421).
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other cases, it may be impossible. This section would require, however, that the
FTC carefully evaluate the benefits and costs of each exercise of its unfairness
authority, gathering and considering reasonably available evidence.268
In the case of rebates, the harm of breakage (non-redemption by rebate-dependent
consumers)269 would have to be balanced against any positive welfare benefits created by the
price discriminating effects of rebates,270 and other benefits generated by the information
gathering facilitated by rebates. 271 The net economic effect of particular rebate promotions may
be difficult to determine in part because breakage causes harm only to a sub-group of rebate-nonredeemers (rebate dependent purchasers who fail to redeem), and as we have seen, the size of
this subgroup has not yet been established conclusively.272 In any case, a court considering these
costs and benefits could come to the conclusion that the benefits of rebates in a particular market
outweigh the costs to consumers who experience breakage.273
If proceeding under an unfairness theory presents problems, it seems even more unlikely
that honestly administered rebate redemption programs, under which no affirmative
misrepresentations are made to consumers, would be deemed “deceptive” under Section 5 of the
268

S. Rep. No. 103-130, at 13 (1993).

269

Technically, some breakage might be welfare-enhancing. See supra note __.

270

See supra notes __ and accompanying text (discussing price discrimination and rebates); see also Sovern,
Transaction Costs, supra note __, at 1700 (“Many practices that inflate consumer transaction costs have legitimate
justifications. Some may even benefit consumers by reducing business expenses, thus enabling firms to offer their
products at lower prices, at least in competitive markets.”) (footnotes omitted).
271

See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
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See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.

273

Jeff Sovern offers the following sage guidance:
Policymakers should approach the problem of inflated consumer transaction costs, then, by first
asking whether the firm has increased the consumer's transaction costs. If the firm has,
policymakers should next ask whether the practice involves a term that is salient to a significant
number of consumers. If it is not, policymakers should then explore whether the practice runs
afoul of any of the other criteria discussed above: whether the practice affords any significant
benefit other than to increase consumer transaction costs, whether the practice is one that
consumers would agree to in a competitive market, how consumers would behave in a world of
zero transaction costs, and whether the loss to consumers outweighs the benefit to the firm.

Sover, Transaction Costs, supra note __, at 1705.
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FTC Act or analogous state law provisions. According to the FTC Policy Statement on
Deception, “The Commission will find deception if there is a representation, omission or practice
that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer's
detriment.”274 Under this policy, “A misleading omission occurs when qualifying information
necessary to prevent a practice, claim, representation, or reasonable expectation or belief from
being misleading is not disclosed. Not all omissions are deceptive, even if providing the
information would benefit consumers.”275 While one could argue that it is deceptive to offer a
rebate without making redemption effort clear,276 research has failed to reveal any cases where a
failure to inform buyers of their own potential suboptimal behavior has been held to be
deceptive. Whether or not the FTC would endorse such an expansive view of deception is
questionable.
D. Possible Forms of Rebate Legislation and Regulation
Rebates can also be governed through legislation and regulation.277 It is helpful to divide
this into two approaches: (1) regulation aimed at altering the conduct of consumers to reduce
274

FTC Policy Statement on Deception, 103 F.T.C. 174, appended to Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984)
[hereinafter “FTC Policy Statement on Deception”]; id. (“Some cases involve omission of material information, the
disclosure of which is necessary to prevent the claim, practice, or sale from being misleading.”); see also Sheldon &
Carter, supra note __ § 4.2; Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer E-Commerce As An Unfair and
Deceptive Practice, 46 Wayne L. Rev. 180, 1852-54 (2000) (discussing deception based upon non-disclosure).
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See FTC Policy Statement on Deception, supra note ___, at n. 4. But see Sheldon & Carter, supra note __ §
4.2.14.3, at 138 (“The FTC has also proffered a complex analysis, not adopted by any court interpreting the FTC Act
or any court interpreting a state UDAP statute of when a failure to disclose is deceptive.”).

276

See Braucher, supra note __, at 1854-58 (arguing that non-disclosure of various types of contract terms, such as
licenses, mandatory arbitration provisions, and limitations of remedies, is deceptive).
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This Article will not address the comparative advantages or disadvantages of regulating rebates through
adjudication as opposed to rulemaking or legislation. See Kaplan & Smith, supra note __ 302-04 (discussing
advantages of regulation over case by case UDAP litigation); Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, CommonSense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 54 Kansas L. Rev. 1 (2005) (observing that private lawsuits create
“policy in a piecemeal and retroactive manner”) (citing Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 986 (D.C.
Cir. 1973)); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Rulemaking versus Adjudication: A Psychological Perspective, 32 Fla. St. L. Rev.
529 (2005) (discussing strengths and weaknesses of varying regulatory approach from a psychological perspective);
Schechter, supra note __, at 1793-94 (discussing problems with FTC rulemaking); Sovern, supra note __, at 1706
(“[C]ourts tend to be more limited than legislatures and administrative agencies in fashioning remedies. Thus, while
legislatures and administrative agencies occasionally resort to disclosure requirements courts rarely do. Courts
62

their purported irrationality or suboptimal decision-making; and (2) regulation aimed at altering
the conduct of rebate offerors primarily to eliminate the most egregious rebate promotion abuses.
1. Regulating Consumers (By Regulating Rebate Offerors)
In the rebate context, asymmetrically paternalistic regulation could be used to reduce
purported irrationality or suboptimal consumer decision-making.278 If the problem with
consumer decision-making is a lack of relevant information, then mandatory disclosure
provisions can ensure that decision-makers have the information necessary to make better
decisions.279 On the other hand, if decision-makers are subject to cognitive biases, mandatory
disclosure can be used to de-bias decision-makers and thus improve their decision-making.280
A few states already have mandatory rebate price disclosure statutes that embrace this
approach. New York,281 California,282 Connecticut,283 and Oklahoma284 require rebate offerors to

seldom can do more than either permit a term to stand or strike it.”) (footnotes omitted).
It should be noted, however, that the FTC only has legal authority to regulate deceptive and unfair trade practices.
See supra note ___ and accompanying text. Therefore, if rebates are not inherently unfair or deceptive, legislation
would be required to empower the FTC to regulate in this area, though the FTC already arguably has the authority to
regulate rebate promotions with onerous or impossible redemption requirements. See supra notes ___ and
accompanying text. In the alternative, Congress and the states could directly regulate rebates. Regardless of which
approach is superior, it is not clear how rebate offerors would respond to a multiplicity of state approaches.
Governor Schwarzenegger made this point when he vetoed a rebate bill in California. See infra notes __ and
accompanying text
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See supra notes ___ and accompanying text (discussing asymmetrically paternalistic regulation).
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See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. Legal Studies 199, 207 (2006) (“If the
problem of limited consumer understanding . . . merely reflects a law of information, then the traditional corrective
is the straightforward provision of additional information.”).
280

See Gourville & Soman, supra note __, at 8 (“[I]f consumers are indeed anchoring on a successful redemption
and failing adequately to adjust for things that could go wrong, one could attempt to debias the insufficient
adjustment of such consumers.”); Mitchell, supra note __, at 1255 (“[A]sking decisionmakers to imagine ways that a
chosen option might fail or an ignored option might succeed can remove or reduce the effects of several biases
(although asking individuals to generate many alternative futures may actually exacerbate the underlying biases if
individuals have difficulty generating counterfactuals).”) (Lawrence J. Sanna & Norbert Schwarz, Integrating
Temporal Biases: The Interplay of Focal Thoughts and Accessibility Experiences, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 474, 480
(2004); Lawrence J. Sanna et al., When Debiasing Backfires: Accessible Content and Accessibility Experiences in
Debiasing Hindsight, 28 J. EXP’L PSCYHOL.: LEARNING MEMORY & COGNITION 497 (2002)); Sunstein, supra note
__, at 257-58 (discussing de-biasing efforts).
281

See GBL § 350-a(3) (stating that it is “false advertising to display . . . the price of an item after deduction of a
rebate unless the actual selling price is displayed or announced, and clear and conspicuous notice is given in the
advertisement that a mail-in rebate is required to achieve the lower net price.”). New York recently enacted more
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clearly indicate when rebate redemption is required to achieve an advertised price.285 A leading
consumer law treatise explains the basic idea behind these provisions: “Advertising the net price
of a product for which a manufacturer’s rebate is offered has been determined to be inherently
misleading unless the retail advertiser makes the rebate available to reduce the regular price at
the time of purchase.”286 Other states have statutes that forbid287 a seller from representing that
extensive rebate controls. See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
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California Business and Professions Code § 17701.5 (“It is unlawful for any person to advertise a price that
requires the buyer to send in a coupon to the manufacturer for a cash rebate, unless the price actually paid to the
person selling the item is clearly and conspicuously advertised along with the final price with the coupon.”).
283

In Connecticut, the relevant legal provision is a regulation promulgated by the Connecticut Commissioner of
Consumer Protection under authority granted under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”). See
Conn. General Statutes § 42-110b(a) (“No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.”); Conn. General Statutes § 42-110b(c) (“The
commissioner may . . . establish by regulation acts, practices or methods which shall be deemed to be unfair or
deceptive . . . Such regulations shall not be inconsistent with the rules, regulations and decisions of the federal trade
commission and the federal courts in interpreting the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act.”). The
regulation states that it is an unfair or deceptive act or practice to:
Advertise the availability of any type of rebate by displaying the net price of the advertised item in
the advertisement, unless the amount of the rebate is provided to the consumer by the retailer at
the time of purchase of the advertised item. A retailer will not be required to provide the purchaser
of an advertised item with the amount of the rebate if the retailer advertises that a rebate is
available without stating the net price of the item. For the purpose of this subsection, ‘‘net price’’
means the ultimate price paid by a consumer after the consumer redeems the rebate offered for the
advertised item.
Conn. Agencies Regs. § 42-100b-19 (2005). See also Caldor, Inc. v. Heslin, 577 A.2d 1009, 1011 (Conn. 1990)
(discussing Conn. Agencies Regs. § 42-100b-19).
284

Okla. Stat. tit. 78, § 53(a)(12) (2004) (stating that a person engages in a deceptive trade practice when “[he]
advertises the price of an item after deduction of a rebate unless the actual selling price is advertised and clear and
conspicuous notice is given in the advertisement that a mail-in rebate is required to achieve the lower net price”).

285

Such laws have been proposed in other states. See Maryland House 852, 421st Session (February 8, 2006) (“A
merchant may not advertise the availability of a rebate for consumer goods by displaying the net price of the
consumer goods in the advertisement, unless the amount of the rebate is provided to the consumer by the merchant
at the time of the purchase of the consumer.”); New Jersey Assembly 1874, 211th Legislature (September 23, 2004).
It shall be an unlawful practice for a retail mercantile establishment to advertise merchandise for
sale indicating the availability of a manufacturer's rebate by displaying the net price of the item of
merchandise, unless the amount of the manufacturer's rebate is provided to the consumer by the
retailer at the time of purchase of the advertised item actual selling price of the merchandise is
disclosed in the same font and size as the net price and a clear and conspicuous notice is provided
in the advertisement that a mail-in rebate is required to achieve the lower net price.
2005 Rhode Island House Bill No. 7573, 2005-2006 Legislative Session, Section 6-13.1-(6)(xx).
286

See Howard J. Alperin & Roland F. Chase, Consumer Law: Sales Practices and Credit Regulation § 76, at 40
(2004 Supp) (citing Caldor, Inc. v. Heslin, 577 A.2d 1009 (Conn. 1990)); Pridgen, supra note __ § 3:20, at 136-37
(reviewing deceptive pricing practices, including rebates); Sheldon & Carter, supra note __ § 4.6.3.2, at 180.
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the consumer will receive a rebate, discount, or other economic benefit, if the earning of the
benefit is contingent on an event to occur subsequent to the consummation of the transaction.288
Like rebate price advertising laws, these warnings aim to make the terms of the rebate offering
salient to consumers, which can reduce errors by consumers in determining whether the seller
truly is meeting the buyer’s reservation price.289
Mandatory disclosure could go even further to improve consumer rebate decision-making
with respect to rebates, as Lynch and Zauberman suggest:
[An] argument could be made that sellers should disclose and make salient the
steps that are required to redeem as well as the success rate (i.e., the frequency of
rebate redemptions). If consumers understand that they are unlikely to redeem a
rebate, they might give the rebate less weight in choosing among competing
products than a somewhat smaller, though immediate, price reduction. Such an
informational remedy might provide incentives to marketers to compete by
offering rebates that were more attractive and easier to redeem.290
287

These statutes are technically disclosure prohibiting rather disclosure mandating, but they are included here since
they regulate the flow of information to the consumer in a potentially asymmetrically paternalistic manner.
288

See Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)(17) (2005); Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.903(1)(w) (2005). Despite the potentially
broad scope of such language, California courts have held that this provision does not outlaw typical mail-in
consumer rebates, even though the benefit (the rebate reward) is contingent on a subsequent event (submission of a
completed request). See Kramer v. Intuit Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Pollard v. Ericsson, Inc.,
22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 496 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (cell phone rebates that required consumer to enter into wireless service
contracts with a third-party company not unlawful because the condition could be satisfied before or simultaneous to
the purchase and thus was not a “subsequent” condition). When faced with the issue, the California Court of
Appeals simply concluded that there was “no indication that the Legislature intended to outlaw rebates that are
neither deceptive nor misleading.” Kramer v. Intuit Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412, 416 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
The Uniform Commercial Sales Practices Act, also states that it is a deceptive act for a supplier to indicate:
that the consumer will receive a rebate, discount, or other benefit as an inducement for entering
into a consumer transaction in return for giving the supplier the names of prospective consumers
or otherwise helping the supplier to enter into other consumer transactions, if receipt of the benefit
is contingent on an event occurring after the consumer enters into the transaction.
Unif. Consumer Sales Practices Act § 3(b)(11), 7A U.L.A. 206, 2__ (1970); see also Ind. Code Ann. § 24-5-0.5-3
(Michie 2004) (language similar to UCSPA § 3(b)(11)); Md. Code Ann., Commercial Law § 13-304 (2004) (same);
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-242.1 (b) (same).
289

For other legal treatments of deceptive pricing practices, see Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, 16 C.F.R. Pt. 233
(2005); 16 C.F.R. § 233.1 (former price comparisons); 16 C.F.R. § 233.2 (retail price and comparable value
comparisons); 16 C.F.R. § 233.3 (manufacturers suggested retail/list prices); 16 C.F.R. § 233.4 (bargain offers based
upon purchase of other merchandise); 16 C.F.R. § 233.5 (miscellaneous price comparisons).
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Lynch & Zauberman, supra note __, at 71 (citations omitted). Lynch and Zauberman may overstate the
precedent for such provision, when they note:
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Building upon this idea, one could imagine a mandatory rebate disclosure statute akin to the
warning label on cigarettes:291
To obtain the advertised price, you must submit a rebate form by mail along with
an original receipt and the UPC code from the box by [DATE]. Psychological
and economic research suggests that many consumers will not redeem their
rebates despite an original intention to redeem. Consumers thus should take this
into consideration when considering the purchase price of this product. 292
Another version follows:
To obtain the advertised price, you must submit a rebate form by mail along with
an original receipt and the UPC code from the box by [DATE]. Consumers
therefore should consider whether they are likely to redeem this rebate when
considering the purchase price of this product.
There are a few possible problems with mandatory warnings such as these. First,
informational remedies may be suitable for correcting informational problems, but they may not
be sufficient to address suboptimal decision-making due to pervasive cognitive short-comings:293

A parallel might be drawn between consumers’ misunderstanding of the likelihood that they will
enjoy the proffered benefit of a rebate-reduced price and the likelihood that they will benefit from
a weight-loss supplement. Consider an advertisement that trumpets ‘‘Lose 5 pounds in 10 days,’’
with ad copy about how easy it is to lose weight by taking the product three times a day,
accompanied by before-and-after pictures. If the product works, but only in conjunction with a
rigorous diet and exercise program, the advertisement might be deceptive if it does not make
sufficiently salient the additional conditions that make even motivated consumers unlikely to lose
the promised weight. The FTC has also advocated disclosures of success rates.
Id. But the source to which they cite bears the following disclaimer: “This is the Presiding Panel's report of the
conference proceedings. The views expressed herein by individual government participants do not necessarily
reflect the views of their respective government agencies.” Report of the Presiding Panel, Commercial Weight Loss
Products and Programs —What Consumers Stand To Gain and Lose, A Public Conference on the Information
Consumers Need to Evaluate Weight Loss Products and Programs, October 16-17, 1997, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/03/weightlo.rpt.htm#B.%20Weight%20Loss%20Products%20a. But the point still has
merit.
291

See Xavier Gabaix & David I and Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information
Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Quarterly Journal of Economics 505, 530 (2006) (“[R]egulators could
simply warn consumers to pay attention to shrouded costs. For example, required ‘warning labels’ could be placed
prominently on marketing materials, much like cigarette warning labels.”).

292

See Lynch & Zauberman, supra note __, at 71 (noting that an argument “could be made that sellers should
disclose and make salient the steps that are required to redeem as well as the success rate (i.e., the frequency of
rebate redemptions)”).

293

Jeffrey Rachlinski notes:
If a lack of information is the chief cause of erroneous choice, then the least costly cure is ensuring
more informed decisions. If, however, the problem is that individuals make bad choices even
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Public policy favors less restrictive informational remedies if rebates are judged
deceptive or unfair. However, we are not sanguine that these kinds of standard
informational remedies would produce dramatic effects on consumers’
susceptibility to rebates or alter their probability of redemption. People fail to
redeem rebates because of fundamental and predictable principles of human
motivation and cognition. . . . People systematically underestimate the burden of
time costs to be borne in the future and fail to learn from personally relevant baserate information that they later regret committing to time-consuming activities in
the future.294
Second, not only might behavioral warnings be ineffective, but they might actually distort
the market.295 Decision-makers may be unable to disregard information that is irrelevant to their
decision-making,296 so we run the risk that warnings will turn off those consumers who benefit
from rebates, creating a situation where the cure is worse than the disease.297 As an end result,
both intended redeemers and intended non-redeemers might overweigh the possibility of rebate
redemption failure or larger numbers of rebate-independent purchasers might redeem, thus

when they have good information, then information disclosures and warnings are useless. In fact,
they might even be counterproductive if they inspire overconfidence.
Rachlinski, supra note __, at 1177 (footnotes omitted); see also Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429, 483-84 (2002) (arguing that the form of
presentation of contract terms may not affect cognitive factors).
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Lynch & Zauberman, supra note __, at 72; Sunstein, supra note __, at 260 (“There are, however, serious
problems with informational approaches. Most fundamentally, they do not adequately come to terms with bounded
rationality.”)
295

In a discussion of disclosures to reduce excessive borrowing and use of credit, Ronald Mann explains:
[T]he parallel to smoking campaigns illustrates how difficult such a campaign would be. It has
taken decades of concerted effort at all levels of the government to bring the growth of smoking
among young people to something of a standstill--this for a product without redeeming social
value, plainly addictive and associated with the most catastrophic health consequences. Consumer
expenditure and credit, on the other hand, are more ambiguous in their effects on our economy: we
can hardly expect the government to urge consumers not to spend

Mann, supra note __, at 921.
296

See Katherine J. Strandburg, Privacy, Rationality and Temptation: A Theory of Willpower Norms, 57 Rutgers L.
Rev. 1235, 1273 (2005).

297

Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. Legal Studies 199, 225 (2006) (“It is easy to
imagine situations in which bounded rationality presents a modest problem, so that any cure is worse than the
disease.”). Scholars have also noted that regulators themselves are subject to cognitive biases and other pressures.
See Glaeser, supra note ___; Sunstein, supra note __, at 255.
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weakening the price discriminating effects of rebates. 298 (Of course, one who objects to rebates
precisely because of their price discriminating effects would be pleased if disclosure had such
broad effects.)
Finally, as a practical matter, one might wonder whether mandatory rebate warnings
would survive criticisms that they are a form of nanny-state intervention.299 For example, Lynch
and Zauberman call for two different disclosures: the rebate submission requirements and
success rates.300 Mandatory disclosure of the terms of a bargain has a distinguished pedigree in
the law,301 and is hard to find objectionable. But disclosure of psychological evidence
concerning aggregate consumer behavior is not as well-established and whether an approach that
includes warning cognitive biases is politically tenable is unclear. Critics might argue that it is
one thing to warn about the nearly irrefutable, damaging health effects of smoking, but that it is
quite another thing to warn people about their tendency to forget to do things or to procrastinate.
Nevertheless, the fact that behavioral or cognitive warnings of this sort have not yet been tried
does not mean that the concept is without merit. 302

298

Richard Epstein has made the point in the context of regulating credit cards that “by putting government into the
fray, there is always the risk that de-biasing will take the form of rebiasing, by overstating credit card risks to
individuals who would do well to have them.” See Epstein, supra note __, at 131.
299

A well-known Washington Post editorial levied this charge against the FTC when it pushed for a ban on
advertising to children. See Editorial, The F.T.C. As National Nanny, Wash. Post, Mar. 1, 1978, at A22; see also
Calkins, supra note __, at 1954 (“[T]he press and business interests pilloried the agency as the ‘National Nanny’
after it proposed a rule regulating advertising to children; Congress passed legislation cutting back on the FTC's
jurisdiction over a wide swath of the economy and preventing ‘unfairness’-based regulation of commercial
advertising, and the Commission strategically (and hastily) retreated.”) (footnotes omitted).
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Lynch & Zauberman, supra note __, at 71.

301

See, e.g., The Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2005).

302

See Sunstein, supra note __, at 261 (noting that “the argument for de-biasing is far stronger for smoking” than for
over-borrowing, though the same basic principles apply).
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2. Regulating Rebate Offerors
In a letter to the FTC, U.S. Senator Charles Schumer recently proposed a variety of rebate
protections for consumers aimed at rooting out the most egregious rebate promotion practices.303
A few states already have experimented with paternalistic forms of rebate regulation that aim to
by directly imposing standards of conduct on rebate offerors.304 These types of provisions, which
will be discussed below, include: (1) requiring rebate form availability; (2) fixing time periods
for consumer rebate redemption;305 (3) fixing time periods for payment of rebate rewards; and (4)
liberalizing rebate submission requirements.306
a) Rebate Form Availability
Maine requires stores to ensure that sufficient rebate forms are available for consumers
and to remove outdated forms from view.307 In a similar vein, New York recently passed a rebate

303

Under Senator Schumer’s proposal: (1) companies must provide consumers at least 30 days to redeem their
rebates and must fulfill the terms of the rebate within the same amount of time required of consumers but it should
not exceed 60 days; (2) companies must take steps to send the rebate check in a manner which identifies the piece of
mail as the expected rebate check; (3) companies must accept copies of receipts, not just originals; (4) companies
cannot require consumers to write identifying information on the rebate form unless the receipt does not identify the
purchased product; (5) Companies offering rebates may not require information that is not necessary to process the
rebate, including information other than name, address and phone number; (6) companies must provide telephone
numbers or contact information for rebate inquiries so consumers are able check on the status of their rebates. See
Press Release, Schumer Warns: Post Holiday Rebate Scams Are Fool’s Gold – Stores Hire Rebate Companies
Whose Job It Is to Make Sure You Don’t Get Your Money Back, January 2, 2006, available at
http://schumer.senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/press_releases/2006/PR01.Rebate.010205.pf.html
[hereinafter Schumer Rebate Proposal].
304

Several of the major proposals are summarized on a chart that is an appendix to this paper. See Appendix B.

305

This alternative can be seen as a de-biasing approach.

306

See Sovern, supra note __, at 1699 (noting that “[a]ssuming that rulemakers wish to regulate rebates . . .
rulemakers could regulate them, by, for example, requiring simplified rebate procedures”).
307

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1232 (2004):
Any person . . .which causes to be advertised by means of a newspaper advertisement, circular,
television or radio announcement, in-store promotion or otherwise, the availability of a
manufacturer's rebate form shall have available to the consumer at the time of advertising and
promotion and make available to the purchaser at the time of sale the appropriate manufacturer's
rebate form. This form, or a notice as to its location, shall be located with the merchandise to
which it pertains. Forms which have expired shall be removed from consumer availability in a
timely fashion.

See also Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1231 (2004) (defining manufacturer rebate); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §
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law,308 that requires rebate offerors to provide the rebate redemption form “directly with the
product, or at the same location and at the same time that the consumer purchases the product or
at the time a contractual agreement for service is signed by the consumer.”309 Similar proposals
have been made in other states.310
Mandatory rebate form availability provisions could be viewed as either a method for
correcting the problem of difficult to satisfy rebate redemption requirements (what is more
difficult than a rebate promotion without a form to submit?)311 or as an indirect form of debiasing regulation. A consumer who sees that rebate is being offered but that forms are not
currently available may take the rebate into account in the purchase decision because he is
unduly optimistic or confident about the likelihood that he will follow up to obtain the form from
the rebate offeror at a later date and eventually redeem the rebate. One could logically assume
that the absence of available rebate form creates another step in the rebate redemption process
and another opportunity for procrastination and prospective memory failure. Therefore, form
availability provisions are also geared towards minimizing sub-optimal behavior.
b) Mandatory Rebate Redemption Terms
Regulators interested in a harder form of paternalism could seek to impose mandatory
rebate redemption terms including fixed periods for rebate redemption and for payment of rebate

1233 (2004) (setting forth statutory damages for violations of § 1232).
308

See the research note, supra note __ for a discussion of this Article’s citation of this statute.

309

NY GBL § 391-p(2)(a). Violations can give rise to statutory damages. See NY GBL § 391-p (5) (statutory
damages of $100 to $1000 per violation). The New York statute provides a reasonable alternative, allowing
statutory compliance through the rebate offeror’s provision of sufficient forms, based upon reasonably anticipated
sales, to the retailer or some means of creating a rebate form prior to or at the time of the sale. See NY GBL § 391-p
(2)(b)(1)-(2). The statute also has a special provision for internet and telephone sales. See NY GBL § 391-p (2)(c).
310

See 2005 Massachusetts House 3670, 184th General Court (December 13, 2004) (“Every rebate, however
advertised, offered or communicated to the public, shall be provided to a purchaser of the particular good or article,
at the time of purchase by the retailer.”); Texas H. 3421, 79th Legislature (March 11, 2005), § 21.023.
311

70

See supra Part __.

rewards.312 Legislators in California, New York and Texas have experimented with this
approach, with mixed success. In 2004, the consumer advocacy group, Consumers Union,
supported a bill introduced by California State Senator Liz Figueroa,313 which (like the Schumer
Proposal314) would have required that companies provide consumers at least 30 days to redeem
their rebates.315 Senate Bill 1154 was vetoed by Governor Schwarzenegger. An effort to set
rebate terms met with more success in New York, where a recently enacted statute requires
rebate offerors to give consumers at least 14 days to redeem their rebates.316 In addition, the
statute mandates payment of the rebate (mailing of the check or transmission of payment) within
60 days after receiving a valid rebate request.317 Violations of this law can result in statutory
damages of $100 to $1000 per violation.318 At present, New York appears to be the only state
law to fix rebate redemption and reward payment terms; no analogous law exists at the federal
level.319
312

See Lynch & Zauberman, supra note __, at 72.

313

Senator Figueroa has introduced another rebate bill. See California S. 1737 (February 24, 2006). It has not
passed the California legislature as of this writing.

314

See supra note __.

315

Governor Schwarzenegger explained his action as follows:
While this bill purports to provide flexible options for compliance for companies offering rebates,
the bill will have the effect of reducing the number of rebates offered by manufacturers. This bill
will present unnecessary barriers for companies doing business in multiple states since the rebate
terms for California residents would differ from those in the rest of the country.
Existing contract law and federal and state consumer protection laws make this bill unnecessary
and could cause conflicts for companies that make nationwide rebates offered that would
encourage companies to exclude California from their nationwide consumer rebate offers.

http://www.governor.ca.gov/govsite/pdf/vetoes/SB_1154_veto.pdf.
316

See NY GBL 391-p(3) (“Any . . . entity that offers a consumer rebate shall allow a minimum of fourteen days
from the date the consumer purchases the product, or becomes eligible for the rebate upon satisfying the terms and
conditions of the offer for the submission of a request for redemption by the consumer.”).
317

See NY GBL 391-p(3) (“Upon receipt of a request for redemption meeting the terms and conditions of the rebate
offer, an . . . entity shall mail the rebate check or transmit the rebate funds to the consumer within sixty days.”).
318

See NY GBL § 391-p (5) (statutory damages of $100 to $1000 per violation).

319

U.S. Senator Charles Schumer has proposed such protections. See Schumer Rebate Proposal, supra note __.
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New York’s new timing rules, like the other major rebate proposals (the Schumer Rebate
Proposal, California SB 1154, and Texas HB 511) while well-intentioned, embody some
potentially flawed common sense about rebates. Neither the New York statute nor any or
proposed law, fixes a maximum rebate redemption period. Instead, all of these proposals assume
that the real problem is with rebate offerors who offer short rebate redemption deadlines and that
regulators would not want to interfere with rebate offerors who provide longer deadlines.
Although most consumers might express a preference for long task completion deadlines,320 as
we saw earlier, scholarly work actually supports a different, counterintuitive notion that longer
deadlines may lead to increased breakage and that shorter deadlines might increase rebate
redemption.321 Regulators, therefore, might want to consider mandating shorter redemption
deadlines:
One approach would be to restrict sellers’ ability to offer rebates with a long time
frame, on the grounds that such rebates are inherently deceptive or unfair (as
supported by empirical work and sound psychology). If rebates require fairly
immediate action, people could realistically appraise their likelihood of following
through. Placing a short redemption deadline on consumers is no hardship,
because as we noted previously, people are more rather than less likely to redeem
a rebate with a shorter deadline.322
In the interests of realism, though, it seems highly unlikely that shorter deadlines will
become a reality any time soon. First, consumer rights advocates and sympathetic legislators
probably would object to the idea of shorter, mandatory rebate redemption deadlines, regardless
of what the embryonic social science evidence on this point suggests. Second, shorter deadlines
for rebate redemption could present problems for consumers who wish to evaluate a product
fully before deciding whether to keep the product and redeem the rebate or return the product to
320

Bruce Mohl, Obstacle Courses Can Put Rebates Out of Reach, Boston Globe, February 16, 2003 (noting
consumer complaints over short rebate deadlines).
321

See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.

322

Lynch & Zauberman, supra note __, at 72.
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the retailer. A one-week submission deadline might decrease breakage, but it also might make it
difficult to permit consumers who are unsatisfied with their products to return them to sellers.
This problem could be ameliorated if consumers are permitted to submit copies of receipts and
UPC codes with rebate offers. But then rebate offerors would be in a bind because purchasers
could redeem a rebate and then return the product to the store. 323 Third, shorter deadlines might
turn off consumers who would perceive them as detrimental to their interests, which could result
in lower sales and eventually a decrease in rebate usage. (This would not be objectionable to
those who would support a ban on rebates, but those who see rebates as welfare-enhancing might
find this troubling.) A more plausible alternative to short mandatory deadlines would be uniform
rebate deadlines across the board, either via federal law or a uniform state law.324
c) Mandatory Rebate Payment Terms
As discussed earlier, one of the main frustrations that consumers face is what they
perceive as interminable delays in the payment of rebate rewards.325 This problem, faced by
consumers who have redeemed their rebates, has nothing to do with suboptimal consumer
behavior. Some legislative proposals tackle this issue head-on by setting maximum payment
periods from the time that a valid rebate submission is received. California S.B. 1154 and the
Schumer Rebate Proposal require rebate offerors fulfill the terms of the rebate within the same
amount of time required of consumers, with a maximum time period of 60 days.326 New York
now provides for a 60-day maximum payment period, without any reference to the amount of
time required of consumers.327 A vetoed bill in Texas 328would have required rebate offerors that
323

See supra notes __ and accompanying text (discussing rebate fraud and the need for original UPC codes).

324

Cf. Mann, supra note __, at 927-32 (discussing benefits of term standardization for consumer credit contracts).

325

See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.

326

See S.B. 1154.

327

See NY GBL § 391-p.
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offered rebates of $10 or more329 to mail rebate awards to consumers within 30 days of receiving
a valid request330 notify consumers who submitted incomplete rebate requests of any errors or
missing paperwork,331 and allowed them an additional 30 days to resubmit the rebate request
without penalty.332 In contrast to the imposition of deadlines for rebate submission, there is no
downside for consumers to mandating payment periods333 so the only objections would come
from rebate offerors, who might be dismayed to see inconsistent payment rules imposed in
different states or the emergence of unreasonably short payment periods that complicate the
relationship between the rebate offeror and the fulfillment center.334
d) Liberalizing Rebate Redemption Requirements
Legislative proposals have also attempted to liberalize rebate submission requirements.
Several states have focused on the consumers’ need to retain original receipts. California Senate
Bill 1154 would have forbidden companies from requiring original receipts from consumers
unless they provide duplicate originals,335 while a proposed bill in Rhode Island makes a refusal

328

Governor Perry vetoed the bill, claiming that it would result in an unwarranted expansion of expensive class
action lawsuits against rebate offerors with reasonable procedures for paying rebates. See HB 511 Veto
Proclamation, June 17, 2005, available at
http://www.governor.state.tx.us/divisions/press/bills/veto2005_files/hb0511.pdf (“Under the guise of consumer
protection, this bill would vastly expand class action lawsuits without a direct relationship to demonstrable harm.”).
329
See HB 511, § 35.43(a)(2) (limiting the definition of a consumer rebate as “an offer to a consumer of cash, credit,
or credit toward future purchases that is made in connection with a sale of a good or service to the consumer, is in
an amount of $10 or more”).
330

See HB 511, § 35.43(b)(1) (firms must “mail the amount of the rebate to the consumer or electronically pay the
consumer the amount of the rebate within the time period promised in the rebate information provided to the
consumer, or if silent, not later than the 30th day after the date the person receives a properly completed rebate
request”).
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See HB 511, § 35.43(d)-(e)

332

See HB 511, § 35.43(f).

333

Unless the statutorily imposed deadlines are longer that current typical rebate payment periods and the new laws
create a less beneficial payment norm than currently exists.
334

See supra note ___ (sources explaining that fulfillment centers must be paid by the rebate offeror before they pay
consumers).

335

See S.B. 1154. This bill also would have (1) forbidden companies from requiring consumers to write identifying
information on the rebate form unless the receipt does not identify the purchased product; (2) forbidden companies
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to accept photocopy of receipt unlawful.336 A proposed amendment to New York’s rebate law
goes even further and would entitle all consumers to a duplicate rebate receipt at the time of
purchase.337 The New York proposal also makes clear that the same original documentation
cannot be required for multiple items.338 Other proposals attempt to prevent rebate offerors from
requiring unnecessary information from consumers.339 Both the Schumer Rebate Proposal and
California Senate Bill 1154 forbid companies from requiring consumers to provide unnecessary
information to rebate offerors or to write identifying information on the rebate form unless the
receipt does not identify the purchased product. Some proposals address the purported problem
of hard to identify rebate checks.340 The idea is to prevent situations where consumers will
inadvertently dispose of their checks because they think that it is junk mail. Once again, it is
difficult to see such laws facing a huge amount of resistance, with the exception of the problem
of having multiple state standards to satisfy.
E. Market Self-Correction
Even assuming that consumer decision-making is suboptimal, one might question
whether the rebate market can self-correct, thus obviating the need for paternalistic (asymmetric

from requiring information that is not necessary to process the rebate, including information beyond a name, address
and phone number; and, (3) required that companies provide a telephone number (or internet site for online sales) to
consumers for rebate inquiries to check on the status of their rebates. Id.
336

See Rhode Island H. 7573 (February 16, 2006), Section 6-13.1-(6)(xxi).

337

New York Sen. 7577-A, 228th Leg. Sess. (April 25, 2005) (“Any consumer who purchases a product for which a
consumer rebate is offered, is entitled, at the time of purchase, to a duplicate original sales receipt or a duplicate
original sales receipt that only contains the product for which the rebate is offered.”)

338

See New York Sen. 7577-A, 228th Leg. Sess. (April 25, 2005) (“No . . . entity offering a consumer rebate shall
require as a term or condition of the rebate offer, the same original documentation for more than one rebate offered
for the same item.”).
339

See North Dakota Sen. 2231, 59th Legislative Assembly (January 17, 2005) (“A person offering a mail-in rebate
to the purchaser of a product or merchandise may not require the purchaser to provide a street address as a condition
to receive a rebate).
340

See Schumer Rebate Proposal, supra note __; Tugend, supra note ___. New York Sen. 7577-A, 228th Leg. Sess.
(April 25, 2005) (“Any rebate mailed to a consumer . . . shall prominently and in the English language state, on the
rebate, the name of the product purchased for which such rebate has been issued and that this is a rebate.”).
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or otherwise) regulatory intervention. Many retailers realize that rebates — especially
manufacturers’ rebates, which are out of their control — can reflect poorly on the store that
advertises and sells the product, thus leading to consumer dissatisfaction with the retailer.341
Thus, contrary to the relentlessly negative narratives of exploitive rebate programs, there is
emerging anecdotal evidence that some firms are responding on their own to complaints
regarding rebates and that rebate offerors are working to simplify rebate redemptions.342 One
article notes: “Instead of making it as difficult as possible for a consumer to claim a rebate, some
retailers are simplifying the process, figuring fewer hassles along the way will build customer
loyalty and raise sales.”343 For example, major retailers such as Best Buy, Office Max and
Walgreens provide duplicate rebate receipts at check-out.344 Other businesses similarly have

341

See Tamara Chuang, Persistence Can Pay Off In Rebate Wrangle: Consumers Still Have Options When Mailing
a Claim Doesn’t Work, Orange County Register, November 17, 2003; DeGross, supra note __ (‘‘Consumers take up
complaints with the retail stores, which shift blame to the manufacturers, which shift blame to a rebate house, which
often outsources the work.’’); Rae-Dupree & Spring, supra note __ (discussing consumer resentment towards stores
for manufacturer rebate). The blame game goes both way; manufacturers claim that retailers insist that they include
rebates with their products as a prerequisite to being allocated shelf space. See Rae-Dupree & Spring, supra note __;
Tamara Chuang, Consumers Find Rebates Aren’t Always Easy Money, Orange County Register, January 12, 2004,
at C1.
342

Cox, supra note __ (“Companies are working to streamline the process. Some, such as Verizon Wireless and
Circuit City, operate Web sites where customers can track the status of their refunds. Others allow people to sign up
for automatic e-mail updates when their information is received at the processing center and when the check is
mailed.”).
343

Bruce Mohl, Globe Staff, Retailers Simplify The Rebate Process, The Boston Globe, 7 November 2004, at C1;
see also Block, supra note __, at B3 (“Some retailers, aware that many consumers are disgruntled about rebates, are
trying to make the process easier.”).
344

See Sheryl Harris, Avoiding the Pitfalls of Rebates, The Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), December 10, 2003, at
E1 (“At Office Max, you get two receipts for an item eligible for a rebate: one to mail in and another to keep for
your records.”); Mohl, supra note __ (“Best Buy, Circuit City, Office Max and Walgreens made the rebate process
fairly easy, with special rebate receipts and slips.”); Rae-Dupree, supra note __ (“Best Buy, Circuit City, CompUSA,
OfficeMax, Office Depot, and Walgreens don't combine all of their vendors' rebates either, but they do print separate
rebate receipts. Some of them, including Best Buy, also print out claim forms at the register as Costco does, and they
offer toll-free customer-service phone numbers for reporting problems.”); see also Block, supra note __, at B3
(“Warehouse discounter Costco provides customers with rebate-claims forms at the cash register. Customers can
also submit claims through the company’s Internet site.”); Rae-Dupree, supra (crediting Costco as being among the
first retailer to print out a separate rebate receipt and cash-register-generated claim form along with the customer’s
copy of the receipt).
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been working to streamline their rebate processes or to move their rebate programs online.345
Staples, the nationwide office superstore, recently created an online “Easy Rebates” system,
which obviates the need for mailing in rebates.346 Rebates from Rite Aid, a drug store chain, can
be requested online without submitting any actual UPC codes or receipts by entering information
found on the original receipt.347 Under this “Single Check Rebate” program, a consumer can
request one check that will cover all of the valid rebates for each monthly.348
The scope of these trends — modernizing and simplifying rebate offerings — relative to
the entire rebate business is not clear. But the retailers involved are major players, which
suggests that even without legislative intervention the rebate marketplace already is responding
to some degree, to the types of consumer complaints discussed in this Article, probably because
they perceive a competitive advantage in offering less onerous rebate programs. A comparison
can be drawn here to the disruption wrought by Netflix upon Blockbuster:
Generally, Blockbuster's profit model in the early years of this decade coupled
low rental fees with high late fees. If consumers underestimated the amount of
late fees or the probability that they would pay them, they would underestimate
the costs of renting from Blockbuster. By designing a product that exploited that
error, Blockbuster increased its short-term profits. Netflix responded with a twopronged approach: a pricing model that does not involve late fees and an
education strategy designed to create an aversion to late fees. It is too soon to tell
345
See Adams, supra note __ (discussing rebate simplification efforts by Best Buy and Circuit City); Mark Jewell,
Some Retailers Offering Online Rebates, Associated Press Newswires, 7 November 2004; Associated Press,
Retailers Are Making Rebates Paperless, St. Petersburg Times, 22 November 2004, at 6D; Retailers Are Making
Rebates Paperless, Associated Press, St. Petersburg Times, November 22, 2004, at 6D (BJ’s Wholesale Club
customers redeeming rebates online increased from 35% to 70% from June 2003).
346

Block, supra note __ (discussing rebate simplification efforts at Staples); Mohl, supra note ___ (discussing
Staples’ efforts to simplify rebates through its “Easy Rebate” system).

347

See https://riteaid.rebateplus.com; see also Dalton, supra note __ (noting that Costco, BJ’s Wholesale Club and
Rite Aid offer online rebates).

348

A personal observation: I joined Rite Aid’s online rebate program, and in months when I have entered receipts
but failed to request a check at the end of the month, Rite Aid still has sent me a check anyway. I hardly want to
imply that Rite-Aid’s actions are representative of a wide range of businesses or their regular business practice, but
much of the evidence of rebate “scams” is anecdotal, so I see little harm in supplementing the record with anecdotal
evidence of my own. Another author complained about the unavailability of rebate forms at CVS, but noted that the
company honored his rebate request even though it was technically late. See Mohl, supra note __.
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whether the Netflix approach will result in a long-term market position for
Netflix, but it did disrupt Blockbuster's profit model.349
The bottom line is that a business that relies on exploiting consumers’ sub-optimal
behavior runs the risk that competitors will exploit consumer dissatisfaction.350 This may explain
why some major retailers, including Wal-Mart, have traditionally avoided rebates,351 and others,
including Best Buy, Gateway and Sprint PCS have floated the idea of doing away with rebates
altogether,352 leading commentators to conclude that rebates in their present form may be phased
out in the next few years.353 The demise of rebates may seem implausible, especially in light of
the evidence of enormous rebate expansion cited earlier in this article.354 But it not so many
years ago that consumers were complaining about trading stamps,355 yet competition and new
marketing methods drove them out of the marketplace.356 Also, the question is not whether
rebates will survive, but rather whether rebates in their current form will survive. It is possible
349

See Ronald J. Mann, “Contracting” For Credit, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 899, 913 (2006).

350

Gabaix & Laibson, supra note ___, at 1 (“When consumers make mistakes, firms will try to exploit those
mistakes. In some markets, competitive pressure may undermine such exploitation. For example, competing firms
could reveal the exploitation and win over customers.”) (footnotes omitted).

351

Chuang, supra note __ (noting that “Kmart, Wal-Mart and Target almost never have rebates”) (citing Roger
Lanctot, Beyen Co’s director of advertising analysis); Burns, supra note __ (“‘We try to avoid rebates and prefer to
offer our customers everyday low prices’ Wal-Mart Spokesman Suzanne Haney said.”).

352

See Cox, supra note __ (Sprint PCS stopped offering mail-in rebates, and now only uses instant rebates; Gateway
refrains from rebates on its own branded merchandise); Millman, supra note __ (noting Gateway’s elimination of
rebates); Ellen Roseman, Mail-In Rebates Less Than They Seem: Stories Abound of AWOL Refunds, Toronto Star,
April 23, 200, D5 (“Best Buy Co., the largest electronics retailer in North America, will bow to customer complaints
and phase out rebates over the next two years.”).

353

See Baker, supra note __. But see Musgrove, supra note __ (“‘It’s hard to see [rebates] going away anytime
soon,’ said Steven Baker, an analyst with research firm NPD group Inc. He said companies find them a pretty useful
way to drive people to specific products.’”); Use Them Or Lose them: Rebates Key to Driving Tech Sales, Business
Wire, December 27, 2004 (“‘Rebates are here to stay," said Stephen Baker, director of industry analysis for The
NPD Group. . . . Properly applied, rebates turn out to be a pretty good deal for all involved - manufacturers, retailers
and consumers.’”).
354

See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.

355

See generally Ernest Gellhorn, Trading Stamps, S & H, and the FTC's Unfairness Doctrine, 1983 Duke L.J. 903
(1983). According to one scholar, in 1958, approximately two-thirds of U.S. families participated in trading stamp
programs. See Steven M. Shugan, Brand Loyalty Programs: Are They Shams?, 24 Marketing Science 185, 186
(2005).
356
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See Shugan, supra note __, at 190-91.

that 20 years from now something called “rebates” will still exist, but that technological changes
in communication and electronic payment systems will transform them into something quite
unlike the traditional mail-in rebate that predominates today.
CONCLUSION
As consumer rebate volume soars and consumer complaints regarding rebates rise,
regulators and legislators will be implored to take some action on the “rebate problem.” As this
Article has show, however, there is not one single problem with rebates, but rather there are
several different categories of complaints, each of which affect different groups of consumers
and raise distinct regulatory issues. Rebate offerors arguably (1) deprive consumers of
legitimately earned rebates; (2) impose onerous rebate redemption requirements; (3) use rebates
to engage in price discrimination; and (4) benefit from behavioral tendencies that lead to suboptimal rebate redemption rates. Before taking any action, therefore, regulators must identify
which of the problems regarding rebates, if any, warrant additional legal intervention and second,
they must be careful to tailor their regulatory responses to the precise rebate problems being
addressed.
A failure of problem identification can lead to inappropriate regulatory prescriptions. For
example, consumers, advocates and scholars have complained that rebate offerors and fulfillment
centers improperly deprive consumers of legitimately earned rebates, delay in paying rebate
rewards and attempt to discourage rebate-redemption by imposing onerous and unnecessary
rebate redemption requirements. UDAP actions under existing law can be a good method of
focusing on such pernicious practices, perhaps with procedural fixes that make it easier for
consumers to bring such actions. On the rulemaking or legislative front, rebate offerors could be
required to:
1. Accept copies of receipts or to provide duplicate rebate receipts;
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2. Ensure that sufficient rebate forms are available;
3. Clearly convey the terms of the rebate promotion prior to purchase;
4. Pay rebate rewards within a specified period of time after receipt of a valid request;
5. Clearly identify the rebate reward check;
6. Provide some method for tracking rebate submissions.
All of these proposals would ameliorate some of the most unpleasant aspects of current
consumer rebate practice that crop up repeatedly in press accounts of the so-called rebate scam.
Beyond overt actions by rebate offerors allegedly geared towards thwarting rebate
redemption, some commentators are troubled by the possibility that rebate non-redemption is due
to market-distorting, irrational or sub-optimal consumer behavior. This deeper more
fundamental behavioral complaint about rebates does not necessarily entail any malfeasance by
rebate offerors — the very existence of a rebate program may be exploitative or unfair from this
perspective. Such problems are more complicated for regulators because legal efforts to reduce
suboptimal behavior can have unpredictable and unwanted consequences. Efforts to de-bias
consumers might eliminate the potentially beneficial welfare effects of differential pricing
schemes. Therefore, regulators who are not bothered by the price discriminating effect of rebates
might be opposed to overbroad de-biasing remedies, just as they would not support a ban on
rebates. Moreover, de-biasing remedies face practical problems. Although shorter deadlines
might be beneficial to consumers because they might reduce procrastination and memory failure,
consumer rights advocates are unlikely to support such provisions. In any case, it is not clear
how much rebate non-redemption is due to intended non-redeemers or rebate-independent
purchasers, as opposed to breakage (non-redemption by rebate-dependent purchasers). More
empirical work needs to be done on this point, but regulators might be hesitant to intervene in the
marketplace if we learn that breakage does not affect a significant number of consumers.
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Finally, without being too overoptimistic, it is reasonable for legislators and regulators to
take note of the extent to which the marketplace has already responded to some consumer
complaints regarding rebates. In recent years, several prominent national retailers have
simplified rebate redemption requirements and introduced on-line rebate redemption programs.
In light of these hopeful trends, regulators and legislators may wish to focus their efforts on the
most egregious rebate promotion practices, while waiting to see how rebate programs continue to
evolve in the years ahead.
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APPENDIX A: THE REBATE PROCESS357
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This chart is based, in part, on Silk, supra note __.

NOT
C O N S ID E R E D
“B R E A K A G E ”

APPENDIX B

SUMMARY OF MAJOR REBATE PROPOSALS
Proposal

Status

Minimum
Time to
Redeem

Maximum Time for
Rebate Payment

Consumer Must
Submit Original
Receipts?

Submission
Requirements

Rebate Offeror
Contact
Information/Status
Tracking
Mandated?

Schumer Proposal

Proposed to FTC.

30 days.

Same time provided
to consumers to
redeem but no more
than 60 days.

No.

Consumers not required to
write identifying
information on the rebate
form unless the receipt
does not identify the
purchased product.

Yes.

Consumers not required to
provide unnecessary
information; name, address
and phone number
permissible.
California S.B. 1154

Vetoed.

30 days.

Same time provided
to consumers to
redeem but no more
than 60 days.

Not unless
duplicate
originals are
provided.

Basically same as Schumer
Proposal.

Yes.

Texas H.B. 511

Vetoed.

None. 30 day
grace period
for resubmitting of
deficient
requests.

Must be paid within
time promised and no
more than 30 days
after receipt of valid
request if no time is
stated.

No provision on
point.

No provision on point.

Consumers must be
notified of incomplete
requests and must be
given a 30-day grace
period to cure.

NY GBL § 391-p

Enacted and
recently amended.

14 days.

60 days.

No.

Consumers not required to
submit the same original
documentation for multiple
rebates on the same item.

No provision on
point.
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